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LEAH R. CHRISTIANI: He Said What?! Group threat and explicit racial rhetoric in American
politics
(Under the direction of Frank R. Baumgartner and Timothy J. Ryan)
In recent years, the United States has witnessed a resurgence in the use of overt references to race and
identity by politicians. This increase is surprising since previous studies in political communication
and racial priming suggest that citizens reject explicit references to race. My dissertation examines
why this change has occurred. I propose and find that when members of a dominant group feel
threatened by a minority group, they are more likely to be receptive to denigrations of that minority
group as their prejudice is activated in order to maintain their group position. Racially, when whites
feel that their group’s status on top of the racial hierarchy is threatened, they are more willing to
tolerate overtly negative denigrations of African Americans and other racial minority groups. I
use survey experiments, observational survey data, and analyses of congressional race television
advertisements to evaluate and support my claims.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
In 2006, George Allen was running for reelection as a Senator of Virginia against Democrat
Jim Webb. Allen was widely considered the front runner and rising star in the Republican Party. He
had previously served as Governor and Congressman for the state, and was even planning a possible
2008 presidential bid (Craig & Shear 2006). His large lead in the polls, however, began to crumble
on August 11, 2006, at a campaign rally in which Allen publicly singled out a Webb campaign
volunteer of Indian descent, calling him “macaca” and welcoming him to America and “the real
world of Virginia” (SurveyUSA 2006, Craig & Shear 2006). He then followed this denigration with
a discussion of the war on terror (Craig & Shear 2006).
While a relatively obscure word, macaca can either refer to a monkey or a town in South Africa,
and is considered a racial slur against African immigrants in some European cultures. Allen’s quote
was broadly publicized as racist. Sidarth, the individual to whom Allen had directed this comment,
said that he was “annoyed” that Allen would use his race for political gain and that he believed,
“[Allen] was doing it because he could, and I was the only person of color there, and it was useful for
him in inciting his audience” (Craig & Shear 2006).
Allen tried to backpedal his comment multiple times, claiming that he did not know what
the word meant, and then later saying it was in reference to Sidarth’s mohawk hairstyle (Craig
& Shear 2006). But, the damage was done. Salon.com named Sidarth as their 2006 Person of
the Year (Scherer 2006) and “macaca” was chosen as the most politically incorrect word of 2006
(Monitor 2006). Allen’s lead in the polls dropped by 16 points, and he eventually lost the election
(SurveyUSA 2006).
Contrast this with any number of overt racial references that Donald Trump made throughout
his candidacy. When Trump first announced his bid for president in 2015, he made a statement
characterizing Mexicans as criminals and rapists. This appeal specifically named and disparaged
a nationality — and the comment was widely criticized as racist in the media (Keneally 2018). In
response to the backlash, Trump clarified what he meant, stating: “Some [Mexicans] are good and
some are rapists and some are killers” (Kopan 2016). While this did not clarify much about the
content of the initial statement, it made one thing very clear: Trump was not going to back down
from these explicitly negative comments directed at racial minorities like Allen did a decade prior.
Indeed, Trump continued with similar negative appeals that denigrated minority groups through-
out his candidacy. He tweeted (and later deleted) false statistics about the percentage of whites
killed by blacks, promoted a “Muslim Ban,” and stated that African American youth “have no spirit”
(Desjardins 2017). In 2006, when Allen used an obscure racial epithet, the backlash was fierce, he
was forced to apologize, and ultimately, he lost his election. Yet in 2016, Trump’s rhetoric routinely
goes beyond obscurity and instead explicitly references race and identity in undeniable ways. Trump
never apologized for the racial appeals he made during his candidacy and despite, or perhaps because
of, this explicitly negative rhetoric, he ultimately won the election.
Trump is not the only politician making these kinds of references — and he is certainly not the
first, even in recent history. In America and across the world, overt, negative references to racial and
identity minorities are increasing (Valentino, Newburg & Neuner 2018). Jair Bolsonaro, the man
elected as President of Brazil in 2018, has said that people in a black settlement in Brazil “...are not
even good for procreation” and referred to black activists as “animals” who should “go back to the
zoo” (Forrest 2018). The leader of Hungary’s conservative party characterized refugees as “Muslim
invaders,” who threaten the “cultural identity” of Hungary (Pearson 2018).
In the U.S., the frequency of overt racial references has been steadily increasing since the election
of the first African American president, Barack Obama (Valentino, Newburg & Neuner 2018). About
a month after Obama took office, the Tea Party movement was launched. In rallies, Tea Party
supporters carried signs that at times contained racial epithets and overtly racist imagery comparing
President Obama to an ape. Protesters in Congress on the day of the vote on the Affordable Care
Act (ACA) yelled racial slurs at African American members of Congress (Valentino, Newburg &
Neuner 2018, CBS 2010). One of those members, John Lewis, commented to the media in the
aftermath, saying “...I’ve faced this before. It reminded me of the 60s. It was a lot of downright hate
and anger...” (CBS 2010). The resurgence in overt, negative racial rhetoric is transforming present
day politics in a way that resembles the America of the 1960s.
Norms that govern how we talk about race seem to be shifting. This resurgence of overt rhetoric
is surprising because extensive research has found that in order to characterize a minority group in a
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negative way, politicians had to be subtle, using coded language or dog whistles (Mendelberg 2001,
Valentino, Hutchings & White 2002, Hutchings & Jardina 2009). For example, using “urban” to
cue blacks, or “illegal immigrants” to cue Latinx. Lee Atwater, a prominent Republican political
strategist and consultant,1 explained this strategy best in a 1981 interview, saying:
“You start out in 1954 by saying, ‘[N-word, N-word, N-word].’ By 1968, you can’t say ‘[N-word]’ –
that hurts you, backfires. So you say stuff like, uh, forced busing, states’ rights, and all that stuff, and
you’re getting so abstract. Now, you’re talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talking
about are totally economic things and a byproduct of them is, blacks get hurt worse than whites. ‘We
want to cut this,’ is much more abstract than even the busing things, uh, and a hell of a lot more
abstract than ‘[N-word, N-word].”2
If the reference to race became too clear, there would be backlash and the public would withdraw
their support of the politician who made the reference (Mendelberg 2001, Valentino, Hutchings &
White 2002, Hutchings & Jardina 2009). This expectation aligns with George Allen’s experience in
2006. His comment was identified as racist and as a result, the public withdrew their support and he
lost the election.
The logic behind the effectiveness of subtle racial appeals goes like this: whites harbor racially
resentful attitudes, but they also are (or know that they should appear to be) committed to a norm
of racial equality. When a politician violates that norm by saying something racially insensitive,
individuals withdraw their support. So, politicians have to talk about race in a way that is deniable:
cuing resentment in the minds of their voters but not going far enough that they cannot back away from
it if need be, allowing voters to appear to uphold the norm of equality (Mendelberg 2001, Valentino,
Hutchings & White 2002, Hutchings & Jardina 2009).
The increasing prevalence of explicit rhetoric, without the same level of corresponding backlash,
puts this logic into question. Consider the case of Donald Trump. As mentioned above, he commonly
makes negative, overt references to racial and ethnic minorities. Given racial priming theory, we
would expect that these references would cause a backlash, as they violate the norm of equality, and
result in whites withdrawing their support for him. Instead, Trump’s supporters characterize his
language simply as his way of “speaking his mind” — which they report liking even more than his
1Atwater managed George H.W. Bush’s successful run for the presidency in 1988 — the election that included
the Willie Horton advertisement. This ad is now infamous as a negative, implicit racial appeal — see
Mendelberg’s (2001) work for extensive coverage.
2Quote captured from a New York Times piece (Herbert 2005).
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policy stances (Pew 2018). Rather than generating a backlash, Trump’s overtly negative rhetoric
wins him supporters. Beyond anecdotes, experimental evidence has also demonstrated that these
explicit appeals do not elicit the same amount of backlash among whites for being racist that they
used to (Valentino, Neuner & Vandenbroek 2018). Something appears to have changed.
This change in the norms governing rhetoric has led to an increase in negative, explicitly
racial (and identity-based, like gendered) language, which is concerning to many people. Not only
can racist language be harmful to members of the groups that it stigmatizes on a discursive level
(Matsuda 1989, Lawrence 1990), racist language can also lead to racist action, like hate crimes
(Edwards & Rushin 2018, Müller & Schwarz 2018), and to negative outcomes in realms like health
and education (Paradies 2006, Marx 2006).
So, what has lead to this change in rhetoric? Why don’t whites reject this language as racist,
like they used to? This breakdown of the traditional logic of the power of implicit appeals and
powerlessness of explicit appeals leads to the question: Why are explicit appeals tolerated sometimes
but elicit backlash other times?
1.1 Racial priming
Implicit and explicit appeals have largely been studied with regard to race and, specifically, anti-
black racism in America, as racial political appeals have long been a feature in American politics.
Explicit racial appeals are those that directly mention race or a particular racial group, while implicit
racial appeals evoke race more subtly. These appeals may be positive (complimentary towards the
group they reference) or negative (derogatory towards the group they reference)(Mendelberg 2001,
Valentino, Hutchings & White 2002, Hutchings & Jardina 2009). Negative explicit appeals are those
that have elicited backlash in the past, and those that I investigate in this manuscript.
The power of implicit appeals, studies in racial priming argue, followed the success of the Civil
Rights Movement. This movement brought about a new norm in American society that necessitated
adherence to the principle of racial equality. As a result, explicitly racial rhetoric was no longer
considered effective as it violated the now dominant “norm of equality” (Mendelberg 2001, Bonilla-
Silva 2009). However, implicit appeals were still able to evoke race (and racial animus) to make it a
salient consideration for candidate and policy evaluations, while simultaneously allowing respondents
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to deny that race is a factor in their decision-making (Valentino 1999, Mendelberg 2001, Valentino,
Hutchings & White 2002, Hurwitz & Peffley 2005, Hutchings & Jardina 2009, Banks & Bell 2013).
The majority of studies on racial priming have found that implicit appeals are more effective
than explicit appeals in eliciting racial considerations for judgments about candidates or policies.
When these appeals become explicit, they lose their effectiveness as individuals abandon support for
the policy or candidate because of its violation of the norm of equality, and shift their policy positions
in a liberal direction (Mendelberg 2001, Valentino, Hutchings & White 2002, Mendelberg 2008,
Hutchings & Jardina 2009, Nteta, Lisi & Tarsi 2016). While there is some evidence that explicit
appeals can be effective at cuing racial considerations as well, under certain conditions or for certain
individuals (Huber & Lapinski 2006, Hutchings, Walton Jr & Benjamin 2010), there are mixed
findings on whether this translates to accepting the explicit appeal: Huber and Lapinski (2006) find
that the explicit appeal is still outwardly rejected while Hutchings, Walton Jr, and Benjamin (2010)
find that explicit appeals can be accepted by a subset of the population (Southern, white, men).3
Most recently, Valentino, Neuner, and Vandenbroek (2018) find that racial attitudes predict policy
attitudes and candidate evaluations — such as the Affordable Care Act (ACA), Barack Obama, and
Sarah Palin — irrespective of whether respondents are exposed to an implicit, explicit, or no racial
appeal. Where it once took a subtle, implicit appeal to activate racial attitudes, now they appear to be
activated by default. It bears emphasis that this pattern of results cannot be ascribed to obliviousness
on the part of the survey respondents. Respondents readily identified racial content in the explicit
but not the implicit condition, indicating that the treatment did work in the intended manner. Racial
content was more obviously communicated in the explicit condition, but it was not rejected as it had
been in the past (Valentino, Neuner & Vandenbroek 2018). Clearly something has changed; whites
are simply not as averse to negative explicit appeals as they used to be.
Valentino, Neuner, and Vandenbroek’s findings are replicated across four separate studies on
several different participant pools, indicating that the results likely represent a pattern rather than an
anomaly. In a similar vein, Banks and Hicks (2018) recently find that exposing the racial content in
an appeal (making the implicit appeal explicit) causes white racial liberals to withdraw their support,
3Note that White (2007) also finds that explicit appeals can be effective among blacks — they can prompt
African Americans to think about their group’s interest and thus be more likely to make decisions based
on racial considerations. But, this is a different process than for that of whites, as it is activating in-group
considerations rather than out-group animus (White 2007).
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but not white racial conservatives. Even after racial content is explicitly identified, supporters remain
(Banks & Hicks 2018).
What has caused this change in the acceptance of negative explicit appeals? While the shift in
whites’ willingness to tolerate overtly negative racial rhetoric is clear, the reason behind this shift has
yet to be understood.
1.2 A role for perceived threat
One potential contributor to the renewed effectiveness of explicit appeals may be the existence
of a perceived threat to the dominant group. When there are perceived challenges to historically
established hierarchies or positionings of groups, prejudice is activated as the dominant group seeks
to retain its status (Blumer 1958, Bobo & Hutchings 1996, Quillian 1995, Huddy, Feldman, Taber &
Lahav 2005). Blumer (1958) first proposed that racial prejudice arose from group position. Shifting
focus from individual, psychological explanations for racial prejudice to a more sociological, group-
based understanding, he argued that racial prejudice was preceded by racial identification and a sense
of the way racial groups should be organized in society. One of the key elements that he identifies as
important in structuring racial prejudice is a sense that a subordinate group threatens the dominant
group’s position (Blumer 1958). Bobo and Hutchings (1996) expand on this, finding that when
individuals feel that their racial group is collectively oppressed, they are more likely to find members
of other racial groups as threats.
There have been challenges to Blumer’s (1958) argument that threat itself plays a role in
generating prejudice, especially from those who believe that racial prejudice arises from pre-adult
socialization instead (Kinder & Sears 1981). The exact genesis of racial prejudice itself is outside
the scope of this manuscript — but nevertheless, an understanding of group position and threat can
provide insight. Apart from whether threat increases or generates prejudice, it may still activate
prejudice. While the level of prejudice that an individual holds is difficult, if not impossible, to
change, the expression of those views is often subject to group norms, which are more likely to be
responsive to a perceived group threat (Paluck & Green 2009, Paluck 2009).
This threat may be legitimate or illegitimate, material or symbolic. While it may be connected
to some kind of real or credible threat (Bobo 1988, Scheve & Slaughter 2001), it is not necessarily
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(Blumer 1958, Quillian 1995). A dominant group may be securely in its status on the top of
the hierarchy but still feel threatened. For example, a “real” threat may be one group losing
out economically to another. A perceived threat may be one group feeling like it is losing out
economically to another, but in reality, maintaining economic dominance. Further, the threat could
be a more amorphous threat to a group’s status, rather than to its concrete economic wellbeing or
cultural practices. It could be, say, a dominant group feeling like they are losing control of their
country, that they need to take it back, without a clear sense of the exact form in which this loss is
occurring.
In this manuscript, I propose that increased perceived threat has an effect on whites’ tolerance for
negative, explicit racial rhetoric. When members of a dominant group feel that their group’s status is
threatened, they may be more likely to approve of political rhetoric that denigrates minorities, as
their prejudice is activated. Today, whites are starting to perceive a greater threat from racial minority
groups (Jardina 2019), perhaps as a result of economic stagnation, demographic shifts (Knowles
& Peng 2005), or Obama’s election (Kaiser, Drury, Spalding, Cheryan & O’Brien 2009, Effron,
Cameron & Monin 2009, Valentino & Brader 2011). Whites are starting to feel as though they are in
danger of losing their position at the top of the racial hierarchy. This perception of threat activates
whites’ prejudice and motivates them to want to retain their position. Activated prejudice and a desire
to maintain dominance act as a cross-pressure against their attempt at adherence to a norm of racial
equality. While they may uphold this norm when they do not feel as though doing so would challenge
their position, such a commitment does not remain when their group’s status may be challenged.
Instead, whites no longer feel the same need to abide by this norm of racial equality. They are
worried about their group, their position, and thus they focus on securing their status. With their
prejudice activated and their attention on maintenance of their dominance, they likely welcome
explicit racial appeals that denigrate out-groups. They feel more comfortable expressing prejudice
against racial minorities than they had when they were not under threat and, as a result, when a
politician makes an explicit appeal, they no longer feel the urge, resulting from social desirability to
uphold the norm of equality, to reject the appeal and shift their positions in a liberal direction. Figure
1.1 depicts this relationship. After a threat is prompted, the individual may become threatened and,
when they do, they are more likely to approve of an explicit racial appeal and the politician who
made it.
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Figure 1.1: Theoretical expectation
Status threat trigger Feel threatened Approve of explicit appeal
The first item in Figure 1.1 is the status threat trigger. This is something that could make whites
feel as though their group’s dominance is tenuous. This could be the election of a non-white president,
their soon to be racial minority status, concerns about economic dominance, or any other cue that
may signal group position insecurity. This prompt does not need to be real or objective. Instead,
a politician could distort facts or rhetorically try to drum up threat, even when whites’ position is
secure in the racial hierarchy.
Once this trigger occurs, the individual must actually become threatened — they must feel
threatened. When they do, their prejudice is activated, their desire to maintain their group position is
heightened, and their adherence to the norm of racial equality recedes. They become more open to
denigrations against racial minorities and consequently approve of negative, explicit racial appeals
and the politician who makes them.
1.3 Conclusion
This manuscript examines the relationship between feeling threatened and accepting explicit racial
appeals in several parts. First, the concept of threat is interrogated in Chapter 2. With survey experi-
ments and analyses of observational survey data, I demonstrate that whites perceive status threats in
different ways. What feels threatening to one person may feel exciting to another. Racial attitudes,
existing feelings toward racial minorities, determine how and when whites become threatened.
In Chapter 3, I investigate what happens when an individual becomes threatened, with survey
experiments and additional observational data. I demonstrate that becoming threatened in response
to a status threat trigger makes whites more willing to accept negative, explicit racial rhetoric and the
politician who makes it.
Chapter 4 documents partisan differences. As whites are now sorted into parties based on their
racial attitudes, perceptions of status threat and approval of racist rhetoric are similarly polarized.
When faced with a status threat trigger, Republicans move toward accepting the explicit appeal while
Democrats move away from the appeal, in a backlash. Clearly, for Democrats, this “status threat
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trigger” cues something different than a threat. In this chapter, evidence from survey experiments is
paired with observational, time series data on whites’ attitudes about their group’s position in society
and their willingness to tolerate racist rhetoric.
Finally, Chapter 5 analyzes the use of racial appeals in the 2016 U.S. House elections, using a
dataset of television advertisements coded for their racial content. Following from the individual-level
analyses in previous chapters that document the importance of perceived threat (which arises from
racial animus) in motivating acceptance of negative racial appeals, I predict that the same link will
be present at the district-level. I find that when a population is particularly hostile toward racial
minorities, negative racial appeals are more prominent in elections.
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CHAPTER 2: WHAT IS “THREAT” AND WHO FEELS THREATENED?
Threat is a broad concept that has been defined and measured in a variety of ways for decades.
Feeling threatened can be even more difficult to understand, it depends on individuals’ reactions to
stimuli. Some people may find a change threatening, while others are not bothered by it at all.
In this chapter, I provide a framework for how I conceive of threat in this manuscript. Then, I
describe the ways that I induce threat through a series of survey experiments. I uncover heterogeneous
treatment effects based, almost entirely, on the respondent’s level of racial resentment. Whites who
are more racially resentful find the status, economic, and cultural threats that I induce with a series
of news articles to be particularly bothersome. Those who are lower in racial resentment, though,
find these articles to be exciting, hopeful, and cause for pride. Feeling threatened is key to coming
to accept rhetoric that denigrates minority groups. The first step in understanding that process is
identifying when respondents actually feel threatened. Finally, I use observational survey data to
illustrate that these experimental findings have external validity.
2.1 Group threat and the activation of prejudice
Theories of group threat start with the observation that social groups occupy historically established
hierarchies or positionings in society. Based on group identities, like race, certain groups dominate,
reaping the most resources and esteem, and others are subordinate. A dominant group enjoys benefits
from its position on top, through beliefs of natural superiority and tangible privileges it is afforded
in society (Blumer 1958, Jardina 2019). In the United States, the racial structure was constructed
in order to justify enslaving Africans — in order to do so, whites were situated at the top of the
hierarchy and blacks at the bottom (Smedley 2007). Going forward, policies like the one drop rule,
which stated that anyone with any amount of black ancestry would be considered black, further
reified the dichotomy between black and white — and laid foundation for the maintenance of such
group positionings (Khanna 2010).
Of course, the racial order of the United States has never been as simple as a dichotomy. Other
groups have always been in the U.S., and their numbers have grown in recent years. These groups,
like Latinx and Asians, occupy space in between (and to the side of) the white and black poles
of the racial hierarchy (Kim 2003). Further, the group position that an individual occupies based
on their race is conditioned by other identities that they may hold, such as their gender and class
(Crenshaw 1989).
When members of a dominant group feel as though their group is losing that dominance, their
prejudice is activated as they seek to retain their status (Blumer 1958, Bobo & Hutchings 1996,
Quillian 1995). This threat operates at the level of group, not individual, perceptions. When someone
perceives a threat to their group, even if it will not likely affect them personally, their prejudice
activates. Feeling that their group is threatened can lead people to express more negative attitudes
towards members of other groups, and express more positive attitudes about members of their own
group (Craig & Richeson 2014a).
In the conception I lay out here, perceived threat activates the expression of prejudice; it does not
increase prejudice. While the level of prejudice is difficult to change, the expression of that prejudice
is often subject to group norms, which are more malleable — and thus, likely more responsive to felt
threat (Paluck & Green 2009, Paluck 2009). Further, the individual’s perception is key. There can be
a distinction between “real” threat and “felt” threat. Of course, these two constructs can sometimes go
hand in hand. Members of a dominant group may feel threatened because there truly is a threat to their
dominance (Bobo 1988). However, is not necessarily the case. Individuals may feel a threat to their
group even when there is no credible challenge to their dominance (Blumer 1958, Quillian 1995).
Emotionally feeling threatened has been found to be more influential on the development of
political attitudes than cognitively perceiving threat (Brader, Valentino & Suhay 2008, Smith &
Mackie 2008). Generally, when people feel anxious, they are more open to new information, which
can result in being open to invalid or false information as well (Marcus, Neuman & MacKuen 2000,
Brader, Valentino & Suhay 2008, Valentino, Hutchings, Banks & Davis 2008). Brader, Valentino,
and Suhay (2008) measure feeling threatened through the presence of negative emotions (anxiety,
anger, and worry), which they collapse into one measure that they identify as “anxiety” and say is a
marker of feeling threatened. They find that the development of these negative emotions after reading
an article about immigration is more predictive of anti-immigration policy attitudes than the cognitive
11
perception of such a threat. When respondents are more anxious about the “threat” that immigration
poses, they are more likely to oppose pro-immigration policies (Brader, Valentino & Suhay 2008).
When members of a dominant group feel that their group’s status is threatened, they may be
more willing to express prejudice against minorities. This connection operates, at least partially,
through the triggering of negative emotions like anxiety, anger, and worry (measures of felt threat).
The importance of this perception, of these emotions, is what makes threat so powerful and important
in politics, as it allows for its manipulation. Elites who can benefit from the activation of white racial
prejudice may try to heighten perceptions of threat intentionally to achieve their goals.
2.1.1 Forms of perceived threat
Perceived threat can take many forms, such as economic, political, cultural, and status threat
(Bobo 1988). A status threat is more amorphous than the others. It is a general threat to a group’s
position — which is likely especially concerning to the dominant group. It is the notion that an
individual’s social group is losing power, influence, or sway in society. These forms of threat can
overlap and inform one another — they are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
As one example of the kind of occurrence that can signal declining influence to a dominant
group, take the election of the United States’ first black President, Barack Obama. For many
whites, this posed a status threat (Jardina 2019). It signaled that their group was losing influence in
society and prompted a reactionary movement among whites premised on taking back the power
and influence they believed they formerly held (Parker & Barreto 2014). The election of Obama
led to whites expressing less support for policies designed to promote racial equality (Valentino &
Brader 2011, Kaiser et al. 2009), more preference for other whites (Effron, Cameron & Monin 2009),
and to an increase in negative, explicit racial rhetoric (Valentino, Newburg & Neuner 2018).
But people can learn that they are losing influence in very different ways, too. Another impending
status threat that whites may feel in the U.S. is population displacement. Soon, whites will be
outnumbered in the U.S. by people of color. To many whites, this feels like a threat to their role
in society. This issue was central to a large, white supremacist rally in Charlottesville, VA in 2017.
Protesters chanted, “You will not replace us,” referencing the belief that the white race is in danger,
as whites will soon be outnumbered by non-whites (ADL 2020).
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These references make their way into elected representatives’ speech as well. Representative
Louie Gohmert (R-TX, since 2005) consistently tweets about the number of refugees and immigrants
who are settling in America. In 2015, he wrote: “Coming soon: More immigrants from Muslim
nations than the population of D.C. — 680,000,” clearly drawing attention not only to an influx in
a non-white population, but referencing a displacement by comparing the size to the population of
D.C. Steve King is another representative (R-IA, since 2003) who frequently makes comments that
evoke threat. One of his tweets reads: “The #Muslim Invasion of Europe: a clear concise description
of transformation of Western European Culture by hijrah.” This language is accompanied by a
picture showing three older white people (two women and one man) opening a present contrasted
with another picture of a large group of smiling, non-white men walking with backpacks. Here, he
is clearly trying to portray both a status and a cultural threat posed to white, European culture by
growing immigration.
Status threat is often measured using population displacement measures (Quillian 1995, Mutz
2018, Jardina 2019). Craig and Richeson (2014a, 2014b) find that perceived status threat fuels
the development and expression of prejudiced attitudes. Even when this threat is presented as
solely posed by one racial minority group, whites develop more negative affect towards multiple
minority groups in response (e.g. against blacks, Latinos, and Asians). Further, whites became more
willing to express greater preference for other whites. They find that perceived status threat outpaces
other potential mediators, like perceived uncertainty, racial identification, system threat, and system
justification in the development of negative affect toward racial minorities (Craig & Richeson 2014a).
In addition to negative affect, perceived status threat also pushed self-identified independents closer
to the Republican Party and led white Americans, regardless of party affiliation, toward a greater
endorsement of conservative policy positions (Craig & Richeson 2014b).
Relatedly, Jardina (2019) finds that while racial identity often does not matter for whites, it does
when they perceive a threat to their group’s dominance. An increase in status threat leads whites to
rely more heavily on their own racial identity in the formation of opinions and explicit identification
as a group member. Indeed, one of the explanations that Valentino, Neuner, and Vandenbroek (2018)
put forth to explain their results (that explicit appeals are no longer rejected) is that an increase
in white identity has led whites to feel like an oppressed minority, which gives them permission
to express out-group hostility, and thus a greater acceptance of negative, explicit appeals. Their
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argument follows Jardina (2019) who argues that this increase in white identity is attributable to
perceived group status threat.
Status threat can overlap, inform, or generate other forms of perceived threat as well. Whites
may be concerned that they are losing their demographic majority because they feel as though it
will lead to fewer economic opportunities, or a loss of a national identity that they may conflate
with a racial identity. They also may fear that their group will lose political influence if they are
outnumbered in a democracy.
Studies of the formation of anti-immigration attitudes often draw a distinction between economic
and cultural threat. By separating these forms of threat, it is possible to evaluate whether anti-
immigration sentiments result primarily from threats to an individual’s job prospects, perceptions
of the nation’s economy, or more amorphous threats to their group’s “way of life.” While many
studies conclude that opposition to immigration is often related to both economic and cultural
concerns, it is the latter that is most predictive of anti-immigrant attitudes (Brader, Valentino &
Suhay 2008, Sniderman, Hagendoorn & Prior 2004). Ethnocentrism is an extremely important
explanatory variable (Kinder & Kam 2010, Kinder 2003), as are concerns about “national identity,”
rather than concerns about economic well-being (Sniderman, Hagendoorn & Prior 2004). When
economics considerations do matter, it is often perceptions about the state of the national economy
rather than personal economic threats that shape anti-immigration attitudes (Citrin, Green, Muste &
Wong 1997).
These findings point to the importance of conceiving of threat at the group level. Prejudice is
activated when individuals feel that their group’s status is being challenged — regardless of whether
they perceive a personal, individual-level threat. Further, the fact that perceptions of cultural threat
tend to be more deterministic of anti-immigration attitudes than perceptions of economic threat
demonstrates that measuring these concepts separately may shed light on their specific role in attitude
formation, policy preferences, and a willingness to accept negative, explicit racial rhetoric.
There are different ways that a threat can manifest — an economic threat, status threat, cultural,
political, etc. While these forms of threat can overlap and inform one another, it can still be useful to
understand which forms of threat induce the strongest reactions, and why, to better understand the
way that threat operates in American society.
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2.2 Inducing perceived threat
In a series of surveys, I attempt to induce feelings of threat in participants — as status threat, cultural
threat, and economic threat. Every treatment was presented as a news article that respondents were
asked to read and to give their reactions. Each article was written in a factual, relatively dry manner
so as to merely present the information, rather than lead to any specific emotion. Respondents read
the article, and were left to feel take it however they pleased. After exposure to one of the articles,
they reported how the article made them feel (i.e. anxious, proud, worried, excited, angry, hopeful)
on a five point scale.
The first survey was fielded in the winter 2018-2019 and the second survey was fielded in the
summer of 2019 — by the survey firm Qualtrics, an opt-in panel that recruits participants online.
Both sets of respondents were recruited to match national distributions on gender, age, education,
income, race (though I restrict my analyses to white, non-Latinx respondents). The descriptive
statistics for these variables are presented in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics on demographic and ideological variables
Survey 1 Survey 2
N Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max
Party ID 633 4.30 2.25 1.00 7.00 1222 4.14 2.18 1.00 7.00
Ideology 600 4.30 1.82 1.00 7.00 1121 4.17 1.77 1.00 7.00
Education 648 6.36 1.80 1.00 11.00 1260 6.84 1.80 1.00 11.00
Age 648 52.05 16.08 19.00 88.00 1260 47.62 16.51 19.00 91.00
Income 646 9.67 4.80 1.00 19.00 1199 9.70 4.70 1.00 19.00
Party identification is a 7-point scale ranging from strong Democrat to strong Republican.
Similarly, ideology ranges from very liberal to very conservative on a 7-point scale. Both are
self-reported and the party identification allows for independents, but asks a follow up question to
identify leaners. In both surveys, the mean respondent is Independent (party ID = 4) and moderate or
middle of the road (ideology = 4).
Education corresponds to the highest level of education completed by the respondent. A value
of 1 indicates an education level of 9th grade or less, while a value of 11 is a doctoral degree. In
both surveys, the mean ranges between 6 (some college but no degree) and 7 (two-year/Associate’s
degree), which is comparable to the national average among white Americans (1 year of college).
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The mean age of the respondent is 52 in the survey survey and about 48 in the second, comparable
to the national average for adult whites which is 49. Income is measured on a scale ranging from 1
(less than $5,000) to 19 ($200,000 or more). The mean in both surveys ranges between 9 ($40,000-
$49,999) and 10 ($50,000-$59,999), which is slightly lower than the average for whites (which is
about $65,902).1
In the first survey, the objective was to evaluate the effect that perceptions of status threat had on
acceptance of an explicit racial appeal. I created two treatment conditions: one intended to heighten
perceived status threat and another intended to reduce perceived status threat. The third condition
was a pure control condition, that did not mention anything about demographic change. The control
condition is presented in the Appendix.
The treatment condition designed to heighten perceptions of status threat among white respon-
dents is pictured in Figure 2.1a. The article reports that the U.S. will soon be majority-minority —
even sooner than previously projected. This article was constructed using a real Census article as the
basis (following Craig and Richeson (2014a, 2014b)), but supplemented with additional news articles
that are cited in the Appendix. As such, this article is accurate. Conversely, the treatment intended to
reduce status threat (pictured in 2.1b) is false. It is written in the same way as the first treatment, but
it reports that racial minorities are no longer projected to outpace whites in demographic growth any
time soon.
The second survey tested the potentially different political effects between perceptions of
economic and cultural threat. The prompt for the treatment was the same: respondents were asked
to read a recent news article and let us know how they felt about it. In this case, both of the
treatments were fabricated. The cultural threat treatment condition emphasizes cultural aspects of
changing demographics (i.e. religious and language changes) while the economic threat treatment
condition emphasizes the economic implications (i.e. a smaller share of the workforce for whites).
The treatments are reproduced in Figure 2.2. The control condition was again an article about
the geographic mobility of Americans — akin to the first survey — with no mention of race or
demographics. It is presented in the Appendix.
12018 American Community Survey (ACS) Estimates obtained from Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
(IPUMS) USA, University of Minnesota, www.ipums.org (Ruggles, Flood, Goeken, Grover, Meyer, Pacas &
Sobek 2020).
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Figure 2.1: Treatment conditions for survey one (winter 2018-2019)
(a) Heighten status threat
(b) Reduce status threat
Figure 2.2: Treatment conditions for survey two (summer 2019)
(a) Cultural threat (b) Economic threat
2.2.1 Are these treatments threatening?
After reading the news articles, respondents reported how they felt about what they read. Respondents
indicated the extent to which they felt each emotion (anxious, proud, angry, hopeful, worried, excited).
Response options ranged from 1 to 5 where: 1 = not at all; 2 = slightly; 3 = moderately; 4 = very; 5 =
extremely. Felt threat is operationalized as the triggering of negative emotions: anxiety, anger, and
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worry. This follows Brader, Valentino, and Suhay’s (2008) conception in which they operationalize
threat as anxiety, which they model as a scale that includes anxiety, anger, and worry. In their survey,
as in mine, these negative emotions are highly correlated — likely due to the fact that this is a fairly
basic, self-report measure of emotions (α = 0.89 in survey 1; α = 0.87 in survey 2).
Table 2.2 presents results from six ordinary least squares regressions that predict each emotion,
based on the treatment condition, for the first survey. Because I expected that the heighten status
threat condition would make respondents feel threatened, I expected that they would feel more
anxious, angry, and worried and less proud, hopeful, or excited. Relatedly, I expected that the reduce
status threat condition would make respondents feel secure, and not threatened — thus, make them
feel more proud, hopeful, and excited, while less anxious, angry, or worried.
Table 2.2: Survey 1: Emotional reactions to treatment conditions, compared to control
Anxious Proud Angry Hopeful Worried Excited
(Intercept) 1.77∗∗∗ 1.77∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗∗ 2.01∗∗∗ 1.62∗∗∗ 1.70∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Reduce Status Threat 0.15 0.26∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.05 0.32∗∗ 0.08
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11)
Heighten Status Threat 0.41∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.09 0.57∗∗∗ 0.17
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10)
R2 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00
Adj. R2 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.00 0.03 0.00
Num. obs. 661 659 660 660 662 661
RMSE 1.20 1.17 1.11 1.21 1.20 1.11
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
The results indicate that respondents in the heighten status threat condition, who read about the
US becoming majority-minority sooner than expected, did become more anxious, angry, and worried.
However, they also became more proud. The coefficients on hopeful and excited are also positive,
though insignificant. This is surprising, and unexpected given my hypothesis that the status threat
treatment condition would generate threat — that is, the negative emotions rather than the positive
emotions. It could be that this treatment triggered varying emotions within a single individual, but
as I explore below, it could also be that the people who felt negative emotions are different than
those who felt proud. This may point to the notion that the white respondents did not all receive this
information in a way that made them feel threatened.
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For the reduce status threat condition, participants became more proud, as I expected, but
also more angry and worried. So, when some whites read an article about their likely continued
dominance, they become angry and worried. Again, this is puzzling. It could be that some whites
do not feel good about their own group staying in power; but it could also be that any mention
of demographic change, even if it is said to happen in the far future, can make some whites feel
threatened as it serves as a reminder that this may happen someday.
Results from the second survey indicate that these effects are likely part of a larger pattern,
rather than a function of this particular sample of people (presented in Table 2.3). Respondents in
the economic and cultural threat conditions became more emotional — on all fronts — compared
to those in the control condition. Not only did they become threatened (by expressing anxiety,
anger, and worry), but they also became proud, hopeful, and excited. The coefficients on the
cultural threat condition are larger than those on the economic threat condition, indicating that the
cultural threat generated more emotions — both positive and negative — than the economic threat
condition. However, the differences between the cultural and economic conditions are not statistically
distinguishable from one another.
Table 2.3: Survey 2: Emotional reactions to treatment conditions, compared to control
Anxious Proud Angry Hopeful Worried Excited
(Intercept) 1.92∗∗∗ 1.96∗∗∗ 1.70∗∗∗ 2.14∗∗∗ 1.93∗∗∗ 1.81∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Economic Threat 0.24∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Cultural Threat 0.37∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Adj. R2 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Num. obs. 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260
RMSE 1.31 1.29 1.18 1.30 1.27 1.24
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Based on these reactions, it is clear that there is not a consensus on what white respondents
consider threatening. Some people find reminders about changing demographics to be threatening
(i.e. inducing anger, anxiety, and worry), but others find it positive (i.e. inducing excitement, hope,
and pride). Below, I investigate why some whites would respond positively to the notion that their
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group will not be in the majority. Further, the treatment intended to reduce status threat in the first
survey may not have accomplished that goal. Instead, any mention of changing demographics —
even if respondents were told that this would be in the future, if ever — heightened both positive and
negative emotions. Finally, while cultural threats were slightly more powerful than economic threats
in eliciting emotional reactions, the differences between the two were not statistically significant.
2.2.2 Who gets threatened?
White respondents took these treatments in very different ways — they did not see them as uniformly
threatening, as I had initially predicted. It may be that people simultaneously had positive and
negative reactions to these treatments. But, it could also be that these treatments elicited negative
reactions among some respondents, and positive reactions among others. If the latter is the case,
what drives this difference? Below, I estimate six models predicting each emotional reaction, based
on the treatment condition but also based on a series of demographic and ideological factors, to better
understand the drivers behind becoming threatened by demographic change.
Demographically, I include the respondent’s age (in years), gender (male or female), education
level, and income. Ideologically, I measure party identification, racial attitudes (using the racial
resentment scale), and self-reported ideology. Ideology is self-reported on the traditional 7-point
scale ranging from very liberal to very conservative. Party identification is another self-reported
measure ranging from strong Democrat to strong Republican.
There are many ways to measure an individual’s racial attitudes. One common measure is the
racial resentment scale. This more subtle form of prejudice combines anti-black affect with the notion
that blacks do not live up to traditional American values (Kinder & Sanders 1996, Jardina 2019). As
explanations for racial prejudice grounded in biology declined, more subtle explanations, like that of
racial resentment, grew (Kinder & Sanders 1996). While racial resentment is a common measure
of racial animus today, it still has critics who argue that it conflates ideology with racial attitudes
(Sniderman & Carmines 1997, Sniderman & Piazza 2002). Nevertheless, it is considered a fairly
robust measure of out-group racial animus. The scale combines answers to four questions to generate
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a measure of racial animus, ranging from 0 to 1, where higher values indicate more animosity.2 Note
that the first two items are reverse coded. The questions that compose the scale are:
• The Irish, Italians, Jews and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way
up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
• It is really a matter of not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they could be
just as well off as Whites.
• Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for
Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
• Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
With these measures, I model an individual’s emotional reaction to each treatment condition.
Table 2.4 reports these results for the first survey. Here, the condition intended to reduce status
threat (i.e. reports on stalling demographic change) is called the “Status Allay” condition and the
conditioned designed to heighten status threat (i.e. reports on accelerating demographic change) is
called “Status Threat.”
The interaction terms indicate whether a respondent’s demographic or ideological characteristics
significantly moderates the effect of the treatment, on producing emotional reactions. Note that
all of these variables were measured in the first wave of the survey, while the survey experiment
appeared in the second wave. As such, there is no risk of post-treatment bias (Montgomery, Nyhan &
Torres 2018).
The results demonstrate that the only moderator that consistently interacts with the treatment
condition to produce emotional reactions is racial resentment. This is the case even in this model
that includes many potential moderators like ideology and party identification, that may overlap with
racial resentment in some ways.3 In the heightened status threat condition: as an individual becomes
more racially resentful, they are more likely to become anxious, angry, and worried — and less likely
to become proud (not significant), hopeful, and excited. Put another way: whites who are higher in
racial resentment are more likely to become threatened after reading an article about the accelerating
pace of demographic change in the U.S.
2Supplemental models in the Appendix use racial resentment as a factor variable to identify non-linearities.
They confirm that effects are largely linear.
3The correlation between ideology and racial resentment is 0.53 and the correlation between party identification
and racial resentment is 0.51.
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Table 2.4: Survey 1: Fully specified model predicting emotional reactions
Anxious Proud Angry Hopeful Worried Excited
(Intercept) 3.26∗∗∗ 2.85∗∗∗ 2.19∗∗∗ 2.90∗∗∗ 2.82∗∗∗ 2.70∗∗∗
(0.42) (0.43) (0.39) (0.45) (0.42) (0.41)
Status Allay −0.54 −1.02 0.44 −0.61 0.06 −0.80
(0.61) (0.62) (0.56) (0.65) (0.61) (0.59)
Status Threat −1.06 0.79 −0.52 0.71 −1.20∗ 0.97
(0.60) (0.60) (0.55) (0.64) (0.59) (0.58)
Party identification 0.02 −0.03 0.00 −0.06 0.01 −0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Racial resentment −0.31 0.16 0.42 0.82∗ 0.41 0.46
(0.37) (0.38) (0.34) (0.39) (0.37) (0.36)
Age −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗ −0.01∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Gender 0.37∗ 0.27 0.20 0.23 0.24 0.29
(0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17)
Ideology −0.03 0.03 −0.08 −0.06 −0.11 −0.00
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Education −0.03 −0.01 0.02 −0.03 −0.01 −0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Income −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.00 −0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Status Allay * Party identification 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.09 −0.01 0.01
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Status Threat * Party identification 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.10 0.13
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Status Allay * Racial resentment −0.18 −0.05 −0.92 −0.79 −0.80 −0.37
(0.53) (0.53) (0.48) (0.56) (0.53) (0.51)
Status Threat * Racial resentment 1.99∗∗∗ −0.97 1.32∗∗ −1.72∗∗ 1.42∗∗ −1.53∗∗
(0.52) (0.53) (0.48) (0.55) (0.52) (0.50)
Status Allay * Age 0.00 0.02∗ 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Status Threat * Age 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Status Allay * Gender −0.16 −0.00 −0.09 −0.08 −0.30 0.02
(0.24) (0.25) (0.22) (0.26) (0.24) (0.23)
Status Threat * Gender −0.63∗∗ −0.35 −0.24 −0.21 −0.59∗ −0.35
(0.24) (0.24) (0.22) (0.25) (0.23) (0.23)
Status Allay * Ideology 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.19∗ 0.11
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
Status Threat * Ideology −0.03 −0.19∗ −0.07 −0.05 0.06 −0.15
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
Status Allay * Education 0.05 0.08 −0.04 0.07 0.02 0.10
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Status Threat * Education −0.01 0.02 −0.01 0.03 −0.01 0.06
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Status Allay * Income 0.00 −0.02 −0.02 −0.03 −0.02 −0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Status Threat * Income −0.01 0.02 −0.01 0.01 0.01 −0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
R2 0.17 0.11 0.16 0.08 0.19 0.11
Adj. R2 0.14 0.08 0.13 0.05 0.15 0.08
Num. obs. 606 604 604 605 606 606
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Figure 2.3: Survey 1: Predicted emotional reaction, based on racial resentment level



































































































To visualize this relationship, Figure 2.3 plots the predicted level of each emotion, based
on treatment condition and across racial resentment levels. In the control condition, there is no
relationship between racial resentment and emotional reaction, which makes sense, given the control
article has nothing to do with race. In the status allay condition, in which respondents read an article
about the stagnation of demographic change and likely continued dominance of whites, there is also
not much of a relationship between racial resentment and emotions. This is somewhat surprising —
as it seems like those individuals higher in racial resentment would find this information exciting. A
manipulation check4 demonstrates that whites in this condition did receive the message and believe
that whites would be in the dominant group indefinitely — so it is not simply that this condition was
4Presented and discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3 and the associated Appendix.
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not believable. It may be that because it was not threatening, it simply did not evoke much emotion
at all.
In the status threat condition, there is a significant and substantively meaningful effect on
emotions. Moving from the lowest level of racial resentment to the highest level increased the
expression of negative emotions substantially (by about 2 points on a 5-point scale). Those low in
racial resentment say that the article about the changing demographics of the U.S. did not make
them feel anxious, angry, or worried at all (a predicted value of 1). Instead, these individuals felt
somewhere between “slightly” and “moderately” proud, hopeful, and excited (a value of 2) after
reading this article. Conversely, those with the highest levels of resentment said that they felt
“moderately” anxious, angry, and worried after reading about demographic change (a value of 3).
They reported feeling somewhere between “not at all” or “slightly” proud, hopeful, and excited.
I then estimated analogous models for my second survey, presented in Table 2.5. Note that
the second survey was not split up across two waves, but that all ideological measures used here
as moderators were asked before respondents were exposed to the survey experiment — again
eliminating the possibility of post-treatment bias (Montgomery, Nyhan & Torres 2018).
Here, racial resentment again powerfully determines how white respondents feel about the news
articles they read. As the racial resentment level of the respondent increases, they are more likely
to express negative emotions (i.e. anxiety, anger, worry); that is: become threatened. They are less
likely to express positive emotions. This is true whether the article emphasizes economic or cultural
dimensions of the demographic change.
One difference here is that the interaction between ideology and the cultural threat condition
is significant across five of the six models. The coefficient is always negative. This means that as
the respondent becomes more conservative, they are less likely to express any of these emotions
(positive or negative). This may relate to some underlying personality difference among liberals and
conservatives, like a willingness to express or report emotion. Because the effect is consistent in
direction across the models, it is difficult to parse any difference between liberals and conservatives
in their reaction to the treatment.
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Table 2.5: Survey 2: Fully specified model predicting emotional reactions
Anxious Proud Angry Hopeful Worried Excited
(Intercept) 4.51∗∗∗ 3.16∗∗∗ 2.85∗∗∗ 3.47∗∗∗ 3.51∗∗∗ 2.80∗∗∗
(0.54) (0.54) (0.49) (0.54) (0.53) (0.52)
Cultural Threat −1.91∗ 1.45 −0.29 0.60 −1.41 1.12
(0.78) (0.77) (0.70) (0.77) (0.75) (0.74)
Economic Threat −1.68∗ 0.11 −0.09 0.47 −0.61 0.48
(0.77) (0.76) (0.69) (0.76) (0.74) (0.73)
Party identification −0.00 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Racial resentment 0.05 0.57∗ 0.27 −0.03 −0.09 0.08
(0.27) (0.27) (0.24) (0.27) (0.26) (0.26)
Age −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.00 −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gender −0.25 −0.25 −0.18 −0.24 −0.13 −0.08
(0.17) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Ideology −0.01 −0.06 −0.03 −0.05 −0.03 −0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Eduction −0.21∗∗∗ −0.10∗ −0.07 −0.14∗∗ −0.10 −0.09
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Income 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Cult. Threat * Party identification 0.12∗ 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.07
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Econ. Threat * Party identification 0.11∗ 0.01 −0.03 −0.00 0.04 0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Cult. Threat * Racial resentment 1.74∗∗∗ −1.43∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ −0.92∗ 2.00∗∗∗ −0.80∗
(0.41) (0.41) (0.37) (0.41) (0.40) (0.39)
Econ. Threat * Racial resentment 0.72 −1.61∗∗∗ 0.82∗ −1.01∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ −0.95∗
(0.39) (0.39) (0.35) (0.39) (0.38) (0.37)
Cultural Threat * Age 0.01∗ 0.00 0.01∗ −0.00 0.02∗∗∗ −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Economic Threat * Age 0.01 0.00 0.01 −0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Cultural Threat * Gender 0.03 −0.19 −0.03 −0.11 −0.01 −0.09
(0.24) (0.23) (0.21) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22)
Economic Threat * Gender 0.09 0.07 −0.04 −0.09 −0.16 −0.12
(0.23) (0.23) (0.21) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22)
Cultural Threat * Ideology −0.15∗ −0.24∗∗ −0.14∗ −0.24∗∗ −0.12 −0.27∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Economic Threat * Ideology −0.10 0.00 −0.02 −0.06 −0.08 −0.11
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Cultural Threat * Education 0.15∗ 0.09 −0.02 0.17∗ 0.05 0.09
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Economic Threat * Education 0.16∗ 0.11 −0.03 0.14 0.02 0.10
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Cultural Threat * Income −0.01 −0.01 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Economic Threat * Income −0.00 0.01 −0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
R2 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.16
Adj. R2 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.15
Num. obs. 1055 1055 1055 1055 1055 1055
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Figure 2.4: Survey 2: Predicted emotional reaction, based on racial resentment level




































































































Figure 2.4 plots the predicted level of each emotion, based on racial resentment level. The slope
of the cultural threat line tends to be steeper than that of the economic threat — at least in the case of
negative emotions. Cultural threats made respondents slightly more anxious, angry, and worried than
economic threats. However, the only time that this difference reaches statistical significance is in the
case of the expression of anxiety.
Respondents who are lower in racial resentment become proud, hopeful, and excited after reading
articles about economic or cultural change — even though these changes do not favor the dominance
of their own racial in-group. It could be that these whites value diversity, but it could also be that
these treatments cue something else for them. Maybe they cue an increasing likelihood of Democratic
political success. Or, perhaps these reminders about diversity strengthen or remind liberal whites
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about the norm of equality, which compels them to express positive emotions about the growing role
that racial minorities will play in society. Either way, it is clear that they do not become threatened,
like those respondents who are higher in racial resentment.
One concern that may come up about the models presented here is that there could be one group
driving these results. For example, it could be that respondents low in racial resentment are the ones
who become less threatened in response to the treatment, while those high in racial resentment are
unmoved. In such a case, no group would have become threatened. Because racial resentment is
specified as a continuous variable in the models presented here, it is unclear whether everyone across
the spectrum is moved or whether it is one group moving and anchoring these results. To test for
that possibility, identical models are estimated with racial resentment specified as a factor for both
surveys (presented in the Appendix). Here, non-linearities in treatment effects can be uncovered.
The effects do appear to be fairly linear. Further, it seems as though the white respondents who are
lower in racial resentment drive the development of positive emotions while the respondents higher
in racial resentment drive the development of negative emotions. This makes sense, and is in line
with the interpretation of the models presented in the body of this manuscript. As a whole, whites’
level of racial resentment determines their reaction to an article about demographic change. It is
those whites who are more resentful that become threatened when thinking about the impending
minority status of their group.
2.3 Supplemental evidence: Two observational surveys
An experiment can help elucidate the causal mechanism behind developing feelings of threat by
isolating the effect of a treatment. However, there are some drawbacks to experiments, as this
internal validity can come at the cost of external validity. An experimental setting may not properly
approximate status threats as they exist in the real world. It can be helpful to investigate whether
findings uncovered in an experimental setting extend to the observational surveys, in which there is
no researcher interference. While it is more difficult to determine causality in observational settings,
they can help determine the breadth of the experimental findings presented.
Many surveys have asked about the growing majority-minority demographics, but often only
report their findings at the aggregate level. In order to test whether individuals’ racial attitudes
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determine their opinion about the changing demographics of the United States, individual level data
is necessary. Two surveys help fill this void. The first is the American Trends Panel run in 2018 by
the Pew Research Center5 and the second is the Democracy Fund’s VOTER Study Group’s 2016
survey, fielded by YouGov.
2.3.1 2018 American Trends Panel
The American Trends Panel, run by the Pew Research Center, fielded by GfK, ran from February 26
through March 11, 2018. This nationally representative sample consisted of 6,251 randomly selected
US adults. In the survey, individuals are asked: “According to the US Census Bureau, in the next 25
to 30 years, African Americans, Latinos, and people of Asian descent will make up a majority of the
population. In general, do you think that is good for the country, bad for the country, or neither good
nor bad for the country?” This is the dependent variable that I seek to explain. I expect that people
who are high in racial resentment are more likely to say that these changes are bad for the country.
The distribution of responses to this question from white respondents is presented in Table 2.6.
Table 2.6: Distribution of attitudes about changing racial demographics, among white respondents
Answer Choice N
1. Good for the country 702
2. Neither good nor bad for the country 3136
3. Bad for the country 911
This question did give the opportunity for respondents to say that it has “neither” a good nor
bad effect. This introduces potential social desirability bias, as some respondents who dislike these
changes may opt for saying that it has no effect rather than admitting to their belief that it would
be bad for the country. These numbers, then, may be underestimates of the true white perspective
on this issue. Nevertheless, even with the question presented as such, more whites said that these
changes would be bad for the country (N = 911) than good for the country (N = 702), though the vast
majority said it would be neither good nor bad (N = 3136).
Even if there was a social desirability effect, it is still possible to predict responses to this question
with individual-level factors. The survey does not include a measure of racial resentment or any
5Retrieved from Roper iPoll.
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traditional measure of racial attitudes. However, it includes a question that taps this general sentiment.
It asks respondents: “How much, if at all, do white people benefit from advantages in society that
black people do not have?” This is similar to the racial resentment scale in that it measures racial
attitudes with a white/black dichotomy and asks about advantages — which racial resentment taps
with questions about “special favors,” societal “conditions” that may lead to disadvantage, and
notions of deservingness. Because it is a single question rather than a battery, though, is it likely less
representative of the breadth of racial attitudes and resentment that whites hold. The distribution of
white responses to this question is presented in Table 2.7.
Table 2.7: Distribution of racial attitudes, among white respondents
Answer Choice N
1. A great deal 1083
2. A fair amount 1375
3. Not too much 1471
4. Not at all 802
Using these measures, I then predict whites’ belief about the changing demographics of the U.S.
with their attitudes about white advantage by specifying an OLS regression, presented in Table 2.8.
Both variables are coded so that higher levels indicate greater resentment (i.e. thinking changing
demographics is bad for the country and thinking that whites do not benefit from advantages that
they have). Both models only include white respondents and are weighted so that they are nationally
representative. When this model is specified as an ordered logistic regression (since the dependent
variable includes three ordered category), results do not change.
As the value for the white advantage variable increases, the corresponding coefficient increases
(and is statistically significant in every case). Whites who believe that they do not hold advantages
over blacks are more likely to believe that the changing demographics are bad for the county by
about half a point higher (on a three point scale). Whites who believe that whites have not too much
of an advantage are also more likely to see demographic change as bad (by about 0.33 points, on
average) and those who think whites have a fair amount of advantage (but still not a great deal of
advantage) are 0.16 points closer to believing that demographic change is bad for the US. All of
these are compared to the baseline, which is that whites have a great deal of advantage in society,
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compared to blacks. When whites believe that they do not have advantages, they are also more likely
to dislike the growing racial diversity of the country.
Table 2.8: Analysis of 2018 Pew data predicting attitudes about changing demographics, white
respondents only
Model 1 Model 2
(Intercept) 1.64∗∗∗ 1.67∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.08)
White advantage = a fair amount (2) 0.36∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03)
White advantage = not too much (3) 0.60∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03)












Religion (as factor) No Yes
Survey weights Yes Yes
R2 0.19 0.32
Adj. R2 0.19 0.32
Num. obs. 4709 3032
RMSE 0.48 0.44
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
2.3.2 Democracy Fund’s VOTER Study Group 2016 Survey
The Democracy Fund’s 2016 Views of the Electorate Research (VOTER) Survey fills in a couple of
gaps from the Pew survey. First, they have a more robust measure of attitudes about the changing
demographics in the U.S. Second, they include the traditional racial resentment four question battery.
This survey was conducted by YouGov from November 29 through December 29, 2016 and in total,
surveyed 8,000 adults.
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The survey asks four different questions to gauge the respondents’ perspective on what the
changing demographics will mean for the U.S. The survey asks respondents: “Now, as you may
know, Census projections show that by 2043, African Americans, Latinos, Asians, and other mixed
racial and ethnic groups will together be a majority of the population. Thinking about the likely
impact of this coming demographic change, how much you agree or disagree with each of these
statements?”
1. Americans will learn more from one another and be enriched by exposure to many different
cultures
2. A bigger, more diverse workforce will lead to more economic growth
3. There will be too many demands on government services
4. There will not be enough jobs for everybody
Individuals gave responses to each item, ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. I
reverse coded the third and fourth item so that higher values indicate less positive outlooks on the
growing diversity of the U.S. The distribution of the this scale is presented in Figure 2.5 alongside
the distribution of the racial resentment scale, which was constructed identically to the scale used in
the survey experiments at the beginning of this chapter.
Figure 2.5: Distribution of independent and dependent variables, white respondents only




































Note: N=6200 for the question about majority-minority and N=6355 for racial resentment — both among
white, non-Latinx respondents. Both variables range 0 to 1. For the majority minority variable, the mean is
0.46 and for racial resentment, it is 0.61. Note that this is slightly higher than the mean racial resentment in
other samples, but it is still quite close (for the 2018 CCES, the mean racial resentment is 0.58). While skewed
towards resentful, it is likely representative of the white population’s views.
31
Using these measures, I predict whites’ attitudes toward their soon-to-be minority status with
their level of racial resentment by estimating an OLS regression. Results are reported in Table 2.9.
Model 1 is the simple bivariate comparison and Model 2 includes the typical battery of control
variables, to attempt to isolate the role that racial resentment plays in determining whites’ attitudes
about a growing minority population. Both models are weighted so as to be nationally representative.
Table 2.9: Analysis of 2016 Democracy Fund data predicting attitudes about changing demographics
with racial resentment, white respondents only
Model 1 Model 2
(Intercept) 0.19∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02)
















Religion (as factor) No Yes
Survey weights Yes Yes
R2 0.25 0.38
Adj. R2 0.25 0.38
Num. obs. 6162 4505
RMSE 0.18 0.15
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
In each case, higher levels of racial resentment are linked to higher animosity toward the growing
diversity of the United States — for whites. An increase from the lowest level of racial resentment to
the highest level leads to a corresponding 0.24 increase in animosity toward majority-minority status
(on a 0-1 scale).
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These findings dovetail with those of the Pew study. Taken together, they lend extend external
validity to those of the survey experiments. Whites who are resentful, or who may not recognize
advantages that they have, are more likely to dislike the changing demographics of the United States.
We observe this in both experimental and observational settings. They are more disapproving of —
and perhaps more likely to become threatened by — these changes.
2.4 Conclusion
Threat can come in many forms — and clearly, it looks different to different people; even when those
people all belong to the same dominant racial group. Across two surveys intended to investigate the
dynamics of status, economic, and cultural threat, and with one observational survey, it is clear that
there is heterogeneity in how whites feel about a potential threat to their group.
In every experiment, white respondents reacted both positively and negatively to the intended
threat. Some whites became excited, hopeful, and proud when they read an article about the changing
racial demographics of the United States, emphasizing that their own racial group will soon be in the
minority. Clearly, this did not represent something particularly threatening to them. Instead, it is
something to be celebrated. This could be for altruistic reasons — but it could also be for strategic
reasons: an article about the changing demographics of the US may cue electoral success to more
racially liberal whites (who are likely Democrats). Or, white liberals may still hold onto the racial
norm of equality (Banks & Hicks 2018) in such a way that a reminder about growing diversity
strengthens adherence to this norm for them.
Racial resentment played an important role in explaining who became threatened. It was not the
only factor that uniquely determined individuals’ reactions to these articles, but it most consistently
predicted respondents’ emotional reactions to the treatment. Racially resentful whites did become
threatened after reading these articles. When they thought about the changing racial demographics of
the United States, they started to feel threatened (as evidenced by the expression of anxiety, anger,
and worry). This news about the impending majority-minority status of the US — which is accurate
— likely made whites feel as though they were losing influence in society.
With observational data, the relationship between racial attitudes and threat seem to gain some
external validity. Whites who are less likely to recognize their group’s advantages are more likely
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to believe that the changing racial demographics of the U.S. are a bad thing. In a second analysis,
white respondents who have higher levels of racial resentment were also more likely to express
animosity toward the changing demographics of the U.S. These observational analyses — while
unable to assess causality like the survey experiments — illustrate that this phenomenon exists in the
real world, outside of the experimental setting.
One takeaway from these analyses is that perceptions of threat are not uniform and objective.
Instead, these stimuli make some people feel threatened, while they make others feel absolutely
nothing (or even, positive). The effects of these treatment depend on whites’ racial attitudes. In
the next chapter, I investigate the effects that feeling threatened can have on the white respondents’
willingness to accept a negative, explicit appeal directed at a racial minority group. As will become
clear, feeling threatened is an important factor driving a willingness to approve of negative and
overtly racial language.
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CHAPTER 3: ACCEPTING EXPLICIT RACIAL APPEALS
At a 2019 rally in North Carolina, Donald Trump defended the second amendment by talking
about violence. He spoke about an unnamed group of people, saying: “They’re really into destroying
our second amendment. Who’ve been violently operating for more than 10 years, we got them all,
we think they are no good. With conducting brutal, medieval style killings, you know what medieval
style is? Okay. Little pieces, little pieces, little pieces, medieval style, including the dismemberment
of their victims, and they enjoyed every minute of it. These are sick people.”
He used this description to precede his defense of recent comments that he made in which he
called members of MS-13 (a largely Central American gang) “animals.” He defended this statement,
saying: “I don’t think they’re human beings. Most of those indicted were in our country illegally,
19 to be exact, 19 of 22... These are savage beasts, these are savage killers, and they should’ve
been brought out a long time ago by the Obama administration. We’re bringing MS-13 out by the
thousands, getting them the hell out of our county.”
Here, Trump first directs the crowd’s attention to violence: drumming up fear, anxiety, and anger,
as he vividly describes murder. Then, he characterizes a group — MS-13, a gang composed mostly
of Latinx members — as less than human. His reference is not explicit — he does not say that Latinx
people are less than human, as a whole, but he cues this racial group with an implicit reference, using
MS-13. He first uses a threat of violence to then make this denigration that follows. The emotions
that he evokes with such a visceral reference to violence tee up the negative racial appeal that follows.
Finally, he follows this with a push for policies that deport people living in America.
Threat and racial appeals are intimately linked. When people in a dominant group feel as though
they could lose something, their prejudice activates, and they become more tolerant of rhetoric that
denigrates minority groups. While Trump’s example is extreme, it illustrates the way that politicians
can use threat to prime peoples’ willingness to denigrate a minority group — and, here, accept a
reference that characterizes a group associated with Latinx people as “animals.”
Chapter 2 demonstrated that people react very differently to threat stimuli. Some whites,
especially whites who are particularly racially resentful, become threatened when they read an article
that reminds them about their impending status as a racial minority group. What effect do these
emotions have on the acceptance of explicit racial appeals?
I expect that when whites become threatened, they will be more willing to accept explicit racial
appeals, as their prejudice is activated and their desire to adhere to a norm of racial equality is
weakened. When threatened, whites want to retain their dominant status in the racial hierarchy and,
as such, are willing to express and approve of prejudice in political rhetoric. Figure 3.1 represents
this process visually.
Figure 3.1: Theoretical expectations
Racial resentment






Whites are first exposed to a status threat trigger — some kind of stimulus, such as a reminder
that their group will soon be in the racial minority. Then, depending on their racial resentment level
(as demonstrated in Chapter 2, and represented by arrows A and B), they may become threatened.
When they do become threatened, they are more willing to approve of negative, explicit racial appeals
(arrow C). There is also some possibility that approval for the flyer will operate outside the realm of
the mediator, which arrow D leaves open.
In this chapter, I test this expectation with two original surveys, and one analysis of 2016 ANES
(American National Election Survey) data. In every case, I find support for the expectation that
whites who are threatened are more willing to approve of negative, explicit racial rhetoric.
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3.1 Survey experiments
In order to test these expectations, I fielded two surveys with the firm Qualtrics — first in the winter
of 2018-20191 and second in the summer of 2019. Both were intended to test when white respondents
were receptive to negative, explicit racial appeals. Respondents were randomly assigned to treatment
conditions intended to heighten their perception of status threat and then asked to rate a negative,
explicit racial appeal. The expectation in both cases was that when individuals develop negative
emotions (i.e. anger, worry, and anxiety) after reading about the impending status threat, they would
be more willing to approve of a fabricated political flyer denigrating African Americans.
3.1.1 Design: First survey (winter 2018-2019)
Untangling the relationship between racial attitudes, threat, and racial appeals can be difficult for
several reasons. First, simply measuring racial attitudes may change how respondents later evaluate
racial appeals. Second, isolating and inducing the feeling of threat can be problematic, as it is tied to
real world events. If threat is already at its peak in the population, for example, then an experimental
treatment intended to heighten it may do nothing — it is already at a ceiling.
In order to test the relationship between felt threat and the acceptance of explicit racial appeals,
I designed an experiment to address both of these limitations. Using a two-wave panel design, I
am able to separate measures of racial attitudes from evaluations of the racial appeal. Then, the
experiment embedded in the second wave is composed of three conditions in order to increase
variation in the level of threat induced. The first treatment heightens threat, the second treatment
reduces threat, and the third condition is a pure control. If threat is at a ceiling, this second treatment
condition may still effectively produce variation in levels of threat by assuaging that threat.
This between-subjects, two-wave panel survey was fielded by the firm Qualtrics on a diverse
national sample in the winter of 2018-2019. In the first wave, I measure racial attitudes using the
1The first wave was fielded from November 27, 2018 to December 20, 2018 and the second wave was fielded
from January 22 to February 7, 2019.
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racial resentment scale.2 Measuring racial attitudes in the first wave ensures that these questions do
not affect and are not affected by the experimental treatment conditions in wave two.
In the second wave of the survey, I attempt to manipulate feelings of status threat with stories of
demographic change. There are two treatment conditions and one control condition. Respondents in
the “status threat” condition read an article titled, “In a Generation, Racial Minorities May be the
U.S. Majority.” This article reported on the accelerating rate at which the nation’s racial minority
population is growing. In the second treatment condition, the “status allay” condition, respondents
read an article titled, “Racial Minorities No Longer Projected to be the U.S. Majority Any Time
Soon.” This article (falsely) reported that the growth rate among white Americans is out-pacing that
of racial minorities, and that projection of an imminent majority-minority demographic change in
the U.S. is unlikely to occur any time soon. Finally, some respondents read a control article about
the growing geographic mobility of people in the US. The full text of the three articles can be found
in the second chapter of this manuscript.3 The article about the growing racial minority population
is intended to heighten feelings of group status threat (to whites) and the article about the halting
growth of the racial minority population is intended to allay such concerns. After reading this article,
the respondents are immediately asked to report their emotional reactions (whether the article made
them feel anxious, proud, angry, hopeful, worried, or excited) on a 5-point scale from “none at all” to
“extremely” (Brader, Valentino & Suhay 2008).
Then, all respondents are exposed to the dependent variable: a negative, explicit racial appeal.
The explicit appeal is a fabricated political flyer for a candidate that supposedly circulated during the
2018 Congressional midterm elections.4 This flyer is depicted in Figure 3.2. In the flyer, there is a
picture of African Americans protesting. The flyer claims that “Welfare and food stamps are already
bleeding taxpayers dry” and, alongside a picture of African Americans protesting, asks, “And now,
2In a pilot survey fielded on a student sample, I include several measures of racial attitudes including Candis
Smith and Chris DeSante’s new FIRE measure (DeSante & Smith 2019). But, for the Qualtrics survey (with
space limitations), I only include racial resentment.
3The status threat article was largely modeled off Craig and Richeson’s (2014a) treatment, though modified
slightly through the use of other news stories (cited in the Appendix). I developed the status allay article to
mirror the status threat article, but with fabricated statistics that conveyed that the minority population growth
is actually slowing. I then used a Census article on geographic mobility for the control article.
4Some of the language used in this flyer was adapted from the language in one of Valentino, Neuner, and
Vandenbroek’s (2018)’s explicit racial appeals. In their work, respondents read a news article about a recent
controversial advertisement. I condense the appeal and make it a flyer — a direct appeal from a politician —
instead.
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they want MORE?” There is a quote that follows from the candidate which reads: “This new tax
bill is just a giveback to African-American voters and groups like ACORN and the NAACP who got
them elected. It’s Big Government forcing us to pay reparations for slavery, and it has got to end.”
The flyer concludes by urging voters to “Stop the Handouts.”
Figure 3.2: Survey 1: Explicit racial appeal
This is an explicit appeal because the quote overtly mentions “African Americans.” As such,
the reference to race by the candidate is undeniable. It is a negative, anti-African American appeal
because it cues negative stereotypes about African Americans. It characterizes African Americans
as welfare dependent and undeserving of the many government handouts that they receive. It
contrasts them with “taxpayers” who are said to be bled dry by this government assistance to African
Americans. Further, it depicts African Americans as intimidating and demanding, depicting them as
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ungrateful for the excess of government assistance that they already receive. These characterizations
evoke longstanding, negative stereotypes about African Americans in the U.S. context: welfare
dependent, undeserving, and entitled (Gilens 2009, Harris-Perry 2011, Dixon 2008, Neubeck &
Cazenave 2002).
After exposure to the appeal, respondents are asked to evaluate the flyer on several dimensions.
The questions were asked in the following order (below) and respondents were not able to go back
and change their answers to any questions. The flyer was pictured above each question. The questions
intentionally move from general to specific — and from no racial content to asking about the racial
content specifically. The questions were presented in this order to measure respondents’ initial
reaction to the flyer as a whole before priming their racial attitudes by asking questions that evoke
race. The expectation is that the respondents who feel threatened will react more positively to the
flyer and the claims that it makes. The questions asked:
1. Do you think the flyer makes a fair point? (5 point scale; not at all fair to very fair)
2. If he was running in your district, how likely is it that you would support this candidate, Jacob
Miller, for office? (6 point scale; extremely unlikely to extremely likely)
3. Are you offended by the claims made in the flyer? (5 point scale; not at all offended to
extremely offended)
4. How racially insensitive is the flyer, in your opinion? (5 point scale; not insensitive at all to
extremely insensitive)
5. Do you agree or disagree with the flyer’s claim that government handouts to African Americans
need to be decreased? (7 point scale; strongly disagree to strongly agree)
Each question measures a different dimension of “acceptability” of the flyer. The first question
measures respondents’ general, broad reactions to the explicit appeal. In a way, asking whether
the flyer makes a “fair point” gets at the normative acceptability of these kinds of claims. Whether
or not you agree with the explicit appeal, the evaluation is on its merit. Is this an okay position
to hold? The second question is more straight forward: it measures willingness to vote for this
candidate. The third question measures backlash against the flyer in order to determine whether
heightened threat results in less backlash against the explicit appeal. The fourth question measures
the extent to which respondents identify hostile racial content in the flyer. Finally, the last question is
a measure of political attitudes. It measures whether white respondents who feel threatened about the
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changing racial demographics of the United States are more likely to agree that government handouts
to African Americans should be reduced.
One question that may arise is why there is no implicit racial appeal in this study, as this differs
from studies of racial priming. This study is not a racial priming analysis. Instead, it evaluates
the antecedents to approval of an explicit appeal, not the effects of the appeal itself. In this study,
the explicit appeal is the dependent variable and a heightened level of threat is the treatment. It
is designed this way in order to evaluate what leads to approving of an explicit appeal; to better
understand the causal mechanism behind approving of an explicit appeal. The set up seeks to explain
why some studies have found that whites reject explicit racial appeals and others (more recently) have
found that whites accept explicit racial appeals. The shift that has occurred is in whites’ willingness
to approve of explicit appeals. If whites are willing to approve of an explicit appeal, they would
certainly approve of an implicit appeal, which is more subtle (and which, historically, has been the
accepted form of a racial appeal). The recent shift that this study seeks to understand is whites’
increased tolerance for explicit racial rhetoric.
Overall, I expect that respondents exposed to the heightened status threat condition to be more
approving of the racist flyer. They will be more likely to say it makes a fair point, that they would
vote for the candidate who put it out, and that they agree with the claims made in the flyer. They
should be less likely to say that the flyer is offensive or insensitive, as I expect that they will have a
greater tolerance for the explicit appeal.
3.1.2 Analyses and results: First survey (winter 2018-2019)
Before getting to the results, power and balance analyses (presented in the Appendix) demonstrate
that the survey is sufficiently powered and that its randomization was successful. A manipulation
check on the treatment is presented in the Appendix and demonstrates that the status threat condition
did heighten perceptions of threat and that the status allay condition reduced such perceptions.
In terms of felt threat, as measured by the development of negative emotions (following Brader,
Valentino, and Suhay (2008)), the status threat treatment condition made respondents significantly
more anxious, angry, and worried than the control condition, but the status allay treatment condition
did not make respondents significantly less anxious, angry, or worried than the control — as laid
out in detail in Chapter 2. In a sense, it seems that the status allay condition, merely by bringing
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up demographic change (even though it reported that it was slowing), cued a small amount of felt
threat (though not in a statistically significant way). Nevertheless, this study theorizes about and
thus, focuses its tests on, the status threat condition. The following analyses focus on comparisons
between the status threat treatment condition and the control condition.5
Respondents read the article about changing demographics (the treatment) and then some of them
become threatened. The expectation for respondents who do become threatened is that they will be
more willing to approve of a negative explicit racial appeal. This sequence characterizes a mediating
relationship. The treatment changes the level of threat that a respondent feels (the mediator), which
in turn affects their evaluation of the explicit appeal (the outcome). I operationalize the mediator, felt
threat, as the production of negative emotions (anxiety, anger, and worry), as the production of these
negative emotions indicates that the respondent is bothered by changing demographics in the U.S.
Take the production of anxiety, for example. Figure 3.3a demonstrates that individuals did
develop more anxiety in the status threat condition, compared to the control. But, within the status
threat condition, Figure 3.3b and 3.3c demonstrate that anxiety was not evenly distributed.
Figure 3.3: Density of self-reported anxiety after reading treatment article by respondents







































People with higher levels of racial resentment and Republicans were more likely to become anxious.
While the status threat treatment condition did evoke more anxiety overall, there were individual-
level characteristics that determined the extent to which individuals developed that anxiety. The
distributions of anger and worry follow a similar pattern to those presented in Figure 3.3. Beyond
party and racial attitudes, there are a variety of demographic and ideological characteristics that may
contribute to the development of negative emotions. In this chapter, isolating that effect of negative
5Descriptive statistics of key variables are reported in the Appendix.
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emotions, of felt threat, is crucial to identifying the causal mechanism that pushes whites to tolerate
a negative, explicit racial appeal.
These distributions (along with the analyses presented in Chapter 2) suggest that there may be
variety of pre-treatment covariates that determine the level of threat that the treatment induces in
the respondent. In order to get at what happens once a respondent becomes threatened, I rely on
a mediation model developed by Imai, Keele, Tingley, and Yamamoto (2011).6 While mediation
has historically been difficult to establish (Bullock, Green & Ha 2010), Imai, Keele, Tingley, and
Yamamoto’s (2011) model allows for the unbiased estimation of causal mediation effects with no
assumptions about the distributional or functional form of the models used. However, it does require
one assumption to be made: the assumption of sequential ignorability (Imai, Keele, Yamamoto
et al. 2010). There are two parts to this assumption. The first is that there is no omitted variable
bias, exogeneity, or other outside confounders to the treatment. This part is fulfilled as the treatment
assignment in my survey experiment is randomized. The second part of the assumption is that there
are no unmeasured components that affect both the mediator and the dependent variables. In order
to account for this, variables that are potential confounders must be included in the models. For
example, racial resentment likely influences the respondent’s level of felt threat and their reaction to
the flyer. To account for this, I include their level of racial resentment (measured in wave one, well
before the experiment) in the mediation model in order to obtain unbiased estimates of the effect of
felt threat. In the models I specify, I also control for gender, party identification, ideology, education,
and income. Of course, there is always the possibility that there are unmeasured confounders that are
not included in my model.7 As such, it is most important to be aware of this part of the assumption
and to perform sensitivity tests for the mediation models estimated (estimated and presented in the
Appendix; results are robust).
6I use a mediation model instead of an instrumental variables model in order to allow for the possibility that
some of the effect of the treatment may move through channels other than the specified emotional reaction.
This potential is born out in some direct and total effects that emerge in the models.
7To borrow Imai, Keele, Tingley, and Yamamoto’s (2011)’s example, it could be that something like fear
disposition affects both the development of anxiety (in my experiment) and the proclivity to favor the negative,
explicit appeal. The authors conclude that, “It is impossible to entirely preclude the possibility that there exist
unobserved variables that confound the relationships even after conditioning on many observed covariates”
(p. 771).
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I specify sets of mediation models for each emotion measured. I expect that anxiety, worry, and
anger (i.e. feeling threatened) will have significant, positive effects on approval of the explicit appeal.
That is, an increase in anxiety, worry, and anger will lead to greater approval of the flyer. I do not
expect that any positive emotions (i.e. pride, hope, or excitement) will mediate this relationship, as
theoretically, feeling threatened should be the mechanism, not feeling good.
In the first mediation model I specify, anxiety is defined as the mediator. The mediation model
itself is specified in three stages. First, the mediator (anxiety) is first regressed onto the treatment.
Then, the dependent variable (one of the evaluations of the racist flyer) is regressed onto the mediator
(anxiety) and the treatment. Finally, the two models are compared and standard errors and confidence
intervals are obtained using bootstrapping (Imai, Keele, Tingley & Yamamoto 2011). The total effect
of the treatment produced by the mediation model can be interpreted as the effect of the treatment,
regardless of the mechanism. The average direct effect is the effect of the treatment that is not due to
its effect on the mediator (the respondent’s level of anxiety).
The average causal mediation effect (ACME) is the effect of the treatment on the dependent
variable, due to its effect on the mediator.8 This statistic can be interpreted even when there is not
a statistically significant total effect (Shrout & Bolger 2002, Hayes 2009, Zhao, Lynch Jr & Chen
2010, Rucker, Preacher, Tormala & Petty 2011, Kenny & Judd 2014, ORourke & MacKinnon 2015),
with attention to sensitivity analyses (Loeys, Moerkerke & Vansteelandt 2015). It is the effect of the
treatment on the dependent variable that is due to its influence on the mediator (Imai et al. 2011).
Here, it is the average effect that the status threat treatment had on evaluations of the racist flyer that
is attributable to its influence on the respondent’s level of anxiety (one measure of their felt threat).
I specify sets of mediation models for each potential emotional reaction to the treatment article:
anxiety, anger, worry, pride, hope, and excitement. I also specify a model for a felt threat scale that
combines anxiety, anger, and worry due to their strong relationships to one another in this sample (α
8In order to obtain this statistic, recall that regression models are first fit for the mediator and for the outcome
variable. Then, based on the regression that predicts the mediator, predictions for the value of the mediator
(level of anxiety) under the treatment and its value under the control are produced. These values correspond
to the predicted level of anxiety that a respondent would experience after reading (1) the article about the
accelerating majority-minority status of the United States and (2) the article about geographic mobility. Then,
two more predictions are made. First, the outcome (evaluation of the racist appeal) is predicted under the
treatment condition using the value of the mediator predicted under the treatment condition. Second, the
outcome is predicted under the treatment condition using the value of the mediator predicted under the control
condition. The average difference between these two values is the average causal mediation effect.
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= 0.89) and following Brader, Valentino, and Suhay’s (2008) operationalization of threat. Separate
mediation models are specified for each measure of the respondent’s evaluation of the racist flyer.
Recall that respondents were asked whether they felt the advertisement made a fair point, the degree
to which they would support the candidate who put out the flyer, whether they were offended by the
flyer, how racially insensitive the flyer was, and their level of agreement with the central claims made
against African Americans in the flyer. I expect that developing negative emotions after reading
the article about demographic change will lead to more agreement that the flyer makes a fair point,
that they would vote for the candidate who put the flyer out, and that they agree with claims made
about African Americans in the flyer — and to less agreement that the flyer is offensive or racially
insensitive. I also expect that positive emotions (pride, hope, and excitement) will have no effect on
evaluations of the flyer. The average causal mediation effects produced from these mediation models
are presented in Table 3.1 and the full mediation models are presented in the Appendix.
Table 3.1: Survey 1: Average causal mediation estimates for each dependent variable (approval of
explicit appeal), with seven different emotional mediators
Fair Point Vote Offend Insensitive Agree
Negative Emotions
Anxiety 0.16∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.06 0.16∗∗
Anger 0.20∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.02 -0.07 0.13∗∗
Worry 0.21∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.06 0.19∗∗∗
Felt Threat Scale 0.24∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.08 0.20∗∗∗
Positive Emotions
Pride 0.06∗ 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01
Hope 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.02
Excitement 0.05∗ 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01
Note: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 for two tailed test. Estimates reported for average causal
mediation effects in the treatment (heightened status threat) condition. For the dependent variables, higher
values mean greater agreement with the characteristic described by that variable (e.g. greater agreement that
the flyer makes a fair point). For the fair point, agreement, and vote variables, higher values mean greater
acceptance of the racist flyer. Dependent variables for fair point, insensitive, and offend range 1-5; for vote,
1-6; and for agreement, 1-7. The treatment is the heightened status threat condition and the control is the
pure control about geographic mobility. Covariates include gender, party identification, ideology, education,
income, age, and racial resentment. Sample sizes are: anxiety (404), anger (402), worry (404), negative scale
(402), pride (402), hope (403), and excitement (403).
First, examine the average causal mediation effects attributable to the production of negative
emotions. When the respondent becomes anxious, angry, or worried, they become more willing to
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agree that the flyer makes a fair point, that they would vote for the candidate who put the flyer out,
and that they agree with claims made about African Americans in the flyer. There are no statistically
significant effects on being offended by the flyer or believing that it is racially insensitive. Threat
seems to motivate individuals to agree with the flyer, but not significantly depressed any backlash to
it. As the development of anxiety, anger, and worry are closely related in this survey (between the
three, α = 0.89), it is impossible to disentangle effects attributable to one specific emotion with this
sample. Nevertheless, there is a clear, statistically significant and substantively meaningful effect on
approving of the explicit appeal when the respondent develops negative emotions after reading an
article about demographic change.
While individual effects of specific negative emotions cannot be untangled here, the difference
that results from the development of negative or positive emotions is stark. Models that specify
positive emotions as the mediators make it clear that it is not simply emotional arousal that leads to
agreement with this flyer. The models specified with positive emotions (pride, hope, and excitement)
do not replicate the results produced by the models that measure felt threat (with anxiety, anger,
worry, and the scale). While there are positive and statistically significant effects for saying that
the flyer makes a fair point in the pride and excitement models, the magnitudes of these effects are
close to zero (pride = 0.06 and excitement = 0.05), and are tiny in comparison to the effects observed
for the development of negative emotions (e.g. ranging from 0.16 to 0.24). Further, these effects
only exist for one of the five dependent variables whereas the effects born out of the development of
negative emotions consistently pervade all of the models that measure positive approval of the flyer.
The coefficients on the mediation effects for the models specified with the felt threat scale as
the mediator are plotted in Figure 3.4. These estimates are the differences between the value of the
outcome predicted under the status threat condition using the level of felt threat predicted under this
condition (i.e. higher threat) and the value of the outcome predicted under the status threat condition
using the level of felt threat predicted under the control condition (i.e. lower threat). They are the
effects of heightened felt threat (i.e. more anxiety, anger, and worry) in the treatment condition.
Respondents in the status threat treatment condition who became anxious, angry, and worried are
more likely to say that the flyer made a fair point, that they would vote for the candidate who put out
the racist flyer, and that they agree with the claims made in the flyer about African Americans.
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The average causal mediation effects can be interpreted similarly to OLS coefficients. In the
status threat treatment condition, a one unit increase in felt threat lead to a 0.24 point increase in
agreeing that the flyer made a fair point. The same increase in felt threat also led to a 0.25 increase in
willingness to vote for the candidate who put out the racist flyer and a 0.20 increase in agreement
with the flyer’s claim that African Americans receive too many handouts from the government. This
is all to say: respondents who become anxious, angry, and worried (who feel threatened) after reading
about the growing majority-minority population, are more approving of the explicit, anti-black
appeal.
Note that the effect on whether or not the respondent agrees with the flyer remains even after
respondents were asked whether or not they felt the flyer was racially insensitive or offensive. These
slightly leading questions amount to “calling out” the flyer by identifying its racial content and
making some suggestion that it could be insensitive or offensive. Nevertheless, even after answering
these questions, respondents in the treatment condition who felt threatened were still willing to agree
with the most overtly racial dependent variable: they were willing to endorse the stereotype that
African Americans get too many handouts from the government.
In the heightened status threat condition, respondents who felt threatened were more likely to
approve of the explicit racial appeal and the politician who made it. It should be noted that the status
threat article induced threat by reporting that the minority population was growing and the white
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population was shrinking. The article attributed this phenomenon to many minority groups and did
not at all single out African Americans. If anything, the notion of “majority minority” often sparks
thoughts of the Latinx and growing immigrant populations. Nevertheless, whites who felt threatened
by this story were more likely to approve of a racist flyer specifically directed at African Americans —
a group that is not stereotypically associated with demographic change. This is in line with findings
from Craig and Richeson (2014a) who demonstrate that increased status threat leads to increased
racial animosity against all minority groups, not solely the group who is purportedly posing the
threat.
3.1.3 Design: Second survey (summer 2019)
The second survey was again fielded with Qualtrics in the summer of 2019 on white, adult respon-
dents.9 As a follow up, I wanted to test whether the form of the perceived threat (economic or
cultural) mattered for producing tolerance of negative racial appeals. I expected, following work on
the development of anti-immigration attitudes, especially in the European context, that cultural threats
would evoke more felt threat, and produce greater support for the explicit appeal than economic
threats.
The design of the second survey was largely the same as the first survey. However, one important
shortcoming of the second survey was that it was not a two wave survey. So, respondents answered
questions about their racial attitudes before they were exposed to the survey experiment. This
introduces the possibility that the racial resentment items may have primed respondents to think
about race in a way that could affect the experimental results. There were questions that separated the
racial resentment measures and the experiment, but some of these included items about immigration
and other racialized policy questions. As such, the design of the survey itself is less clean and
straightforward than the first survey.
The experiment in the second survey was meant to test the difference between economic and
cultural threats. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: a cultural threat, an
economic threat, or a control.10 Respondents were asked how they felt about the article they read,
using the same scale that is used in the body of the paper (self-report of emotions on a 5 point scale).
9Descriptive statistics for key variables in the Appendix.
10All conditions pictured in Chapter 2.
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Then, all respondents were asked to evaluate the dependent variable (Figure 3.5). The expectation
was that the cultural threat condition would produce more support for the flyer than the economic
condition.
Figure 3.5: Survey 2: Explicit racial appeal
Respondents indicated their level of agreement with the following questions:
• Fair Point: Do you think the flyer makes a fair point?
• Vote: If he was running in your district, how likely is it that you would support this candidate,
Jacob Miller, for office?
• Agree 1: Do you agree or disagree with the flyer’s claim that African Americans tend to ask
too much of the rest of us?
• Agree 2: Do you agree or disagree with the flyer’s claim that African Americans tend to get
more than they deserve from the government?
• Reparations: As you can see, the flyer says that reparations for slavery should not be paid to
African Americans. How much or how little do you support paying reparations for slavery?
• Agree 3: Do you agree with the flyer’s suggestion that African Americans tend to be freeload-
ers?
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Mirroring the first survey, the first question evaluates the normative acceptability of this explicit
appeal. The second question asks about vote choice, and the next four evaluate level of agreement
with several dimensions of the flyer. The flyer itself was constructed to mirror the first flyer, but overt
references to economics were omitted, due to the treatment focus on economic versus cultural threats.
For examples, instead of saying “stop the handouts,” like the first flyer did, the second flyer says
“stop the takeover.”
3.1.4 Analyses and results: Second survey (summer 2019)
Respondents were randomly assigned to their treatment conditions. However, there was some
imbalance detected between the groups — evidenced by balance checks presented in Table 3.2. The
control condition was slightly more conservative (ideologically) than the cultural threat condition —
and than the economic threat condition, though the difference between the economic and control
conditions did not reach conventional levels of statistical significance.
Table 3.2: Balance checks
PID Ideology RR Education Income Gender Age
(Intercept) 4.21∗∗ 4.34∗∗ 0.57∗∗ 6.89∗∗ 9.69∗∗ 0.52∗∗ 48.52∗∗
(0.11) (0.09) (0.01) (0.09) (0.23) (0.02) (0.80)
Cultural Threat −0.12 −0.28∗ −0.04 −0.03 0.12 −0.00 −0.65
(0.15) (0.13) (0.02) (0.12) (0.33) (0.03) (1.15)
Economic Threat −0.09 −0.21 −0.02 −0.12 −0.06 −0.03 −2.04
(0.15) (0.13) (0.02) (0.12) (0.33) (0.03) (1.13)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adj. R2 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
Num. obs. 1222 1121 1260 1260 1199 1260 1260
RMSE 2.19 1.77 0.27 1.80 4.70 0.50 16.51
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
The direction of this imbalance may partially explain the failed manipulation checks, presented in
Table 3.3. Here, respondents were asked (after they received the treatment and after they responded to
the dependent variables), three questions: (1) How much does the growing racial minority population
help or hurt American’s economy?; (2) How much does the growing racial minority population help
or hurt American’s culture?; and to indicate their agreement with the following statement: (3) Racial
minorities are likely to reduce the influence of White Americans in society very soon. Table 3.3
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reports results from OLS regressions that predict these outcomes using the treatment condition. The
respondents in the control condition were actually more likely to indicate perceived threat when it
came to America’s economy and culture than were those in the treatment conditions. There was no
effect on the likelihood of believing that racial minorities would overtake whites’ influence soon.
This could be attributable to the greater number of conservatives in the control condition.
Table 3.3: Manipulation checks
Overall MC Cultural MC Economic MC
(Intercept) 4.50∗∗∗ 4.04∗∗∗ 4.05∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Cultural Threat Treatment 0.13 −0.27∗ −0.22
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
Economic Threat Treatment 0.04 −0.24∗ −0.29∗
(0.10) (0.12) (0.11)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.01
Adj. R2 -0.00 0.00 0.00
Num. obs. 1260 1260 1260
RMSE 1.53 1.70 1.65
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
The treatment did not affect perceptions of threat as it was expected to, and like it did in the first
survey. However, there was still an effect on felt threat. Recall from analyses in Chapter 2 that racial
attitudes interacted with the treatment conditions to produce felt threat. That is, for respondents
who were exposed to cultural and economic threats, increases in racial resentment led to increases
in felt threat. This is some indication that the treatment was able to elicit felt threat, especially in
respondents with higher levels of racial resentment, even if it did not move perceptions of threat.
Mediation models will allow us to isolate effects for those respondents who did become threat-
ened. Table 3.4 presents average causal mediation effects from models specified for the cultural threat
condition compared to the control. Respondents who became threatened (i.e. developed negative
emotions) after reading the cultural threat article were more likely to approve of and agree with the
flyer. However, the effects remained in part when respondents developed positive emotions — though
there is a difference in magnitude. The negative emotions had much stronger effects on producing
approval of the flyer (ranging from 0.05 to 0.18) than the positive emotions (typically fairly close to
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zero, ranging from 0.04 to 0.09). So, there is some hint that negative emotions drove support for the
explicit racial appeal.
Table 3.4: Average causal mediation estimates for each dependent variable (approval of explicit
appeal), with seven different emotional mediators; cultural threat condition compared to control
Fair Point Vote Agree 1 Agree 2 Agree 3 Reparations
Negative Emotions
Anxiety 0.10*** 0.15*** 0.10 *** 0.12 *** 0.17*** -0.08***
Anger 0.06* 0.08** 0.05 * 0.06* 0.11* -0.07*
Worry 0.11*** 0.14*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.15*** -0.06*
Felt Threat Scale 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.09*** 0.12*** 0.18*** -0.09***
Positive Emotions
Pride 0.04* 0.04** 0.04* 0.03* 0.09** -0.11**
Hope 0.04* 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.05* -0.07**
Excitement 0.04** 0.04** 0.03 0.03* 0.06* -0.08**
Note: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 for two tailed test. Estimates reported for average causal
mediation effects in the treatment (cultural threat treatment) condition. For the dependent variables, higher
values mean greater agreement with the characteristic described by that variable (e.g. greater agreement that
the flyer makes a fair point). For the fair point, agreement, and vote variables, higher values mean greater
acceptance of the racist flyer. Dependent variables for fair point range 1-5; for vote, 1-6; and for agreement,
1-7. The treatment is the cultural threat condition and the control is the pure control about geographic mobility.
Covariates include gender, party identification, ideology, education, income, age, and racial resentment.
Sample size is N = 693.
These effects are somewhat similar to those observed when the models are specified to compare
the economic threat condition to the control condition (Table 3.5), but the differences are not as
stark, lending some evidence to the expectation that cultural threats are more deterministic of support
for explicit appeals than economic ones. Note that in the full models, the ACME in the treatment
condition is always higher than the ACME in the control condition when the mediator is a negative
emotion — and the opposite is true when the mediator is a positive emotion. Again, this corroborates
the notion that some amount of emotional arousal drove support for the flyer in all conditions, but
that it was negative emotions specifically that were most deterministic of generating approval in the
treatment condition.
This second survey had more limitations than the first (i.e. not a two wave survey; failed one
manipulation and balance check), which likely contributed to the milder results. Nevertheless, it
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did provide supplemental evidence indicating that feeling threatened leads whites to accept negative
explicit racial appeals.
Table 3.5: Average causal mediation estimates for each dependent variable (approval of explicit
appeal), with seven different emotional mediators; economic threat condition compared to control
Fair Point Vote Agree 1 Agree 2 Agree 3 Reparations
Negative Emotions
Anxiety 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.10 -0.04
Anger 0.05* 0.06* 0.01 0.10* 0.12* -0.04*
Worry 0.05* 0.07* 0.01* 0.10* 0.13* -0.01
Felt Threat Scale 0.06* 0.08* 0.14* 0.12* 0.15* -0.04*
Positive Emotions
Pride 0.04* 0.06** 0.03 0.02 0.05** -0.09**
Hope 0.05** 0.06** 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.13***
Excitement 0.05** 0.07** 0.05** 0.05** 0.07** -0.11**
Note: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 for two tailed test. Estimates reported for average causal
mediation effects in the treatment (economi threat treatment) condition. For the dependent variables, higher
values mean greater agreement with the characteristic described by that variable (e.g. greater agreement
that the flyer makes a fair point). For the fair point, agreement, and vote variables, higher values mean
greater acceptance of the racist flyer. Dependent variables for fair point range 1-5; for vote, 1-6; and for
agreement, 1-7. The treatment is the economic threat condition and the control is the pure control about
geographic mobility. Covariates include gender, party identification, ideology, education, income, age, and
racial resentment. Sample sizes is N = 713.
3.2 Supplemental evidence: 2016 ANES data
So far, experimental evidence presented in this chapter has pointed to whites’ willingness to accept
negative, explicit racial appeals — when they feel threatened. How does this comport with real
attitudes that whites hold and report?
To better understand the develop of individuals’ attitudes outside of the experimental context, I
scoured observational datasets for feasible measures of the concepts of felt threat and acceptance
of explicit appeals. Both concepts are somewhat captured in the 2016 American National Election
Study (ANES) survey, a nationally representative sample of American adults. The first wave of this
survey fielded between September 7 and November 7, 2016 and the second wave fielded between
November 9 and January 8, 2017.11 The survey was conducted both in person (N = 1,180) and on
the Internet (N = 3,090), for a total sample size of 4,270.
11The key independent and dependent variables in this analysis come from the second wave.
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The independent variable is a measure of felt threat. The question is: “Would you say that whites
have too much influence in American politics, just about the right amount of influence in American
politics, or too little influence in American politics?” The distribution of white respondents’ results is
presented in Table 3.6. Respondents who said that they felt whites had too little influence, or just the
right amount of influence, feel that their group’s position is more threatened than those who believe
that whites have too much influence. The modal response in this data is that whites have just the
right amount of influence.
The dependent variable is a measure of whites’ willingness to tolerate potentially offensive
language. Of course, this proclivity is not a perfect measure of a willingness to accept explicit rhetoric,
as whites’ willingness to tolerate this rhetoric in the abstract may differ from their willingness to
accept an appeal, which is often highly contextual. Nevertheless, it is the best approximation that
observational data affords. The question reads: “Some people think that the way people talk needs to
change with the times to be more sensitive to people from different backgrounds. Others think that
this has already gone too far and many people are just too easily offended. Which is closer to your
opinion?” The distribution of whites’ responses to this question is in Table 3.7. The modal response
is that people are a little too easily offended, but the sample is fairly evenly distributed across each
category.
Table 3.6: Distribution of felt threat in 2016 ANES data among whites
Answer Choice N
1. Too much influence 1226
2. Just about the right amount of influence 2120
3. Too little influence 216
Table 3.7: Distribution of tolerance of explicit rhetoric in 2016 ANES data among whites
Answer Choice N
1. The way people talk needs to change a lot 801
2. The way people talk needs to change a little 994
3. People are a little too easily offended 1201
4. People are much too easily offended 1186
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Table 3.8 reports results from two OLS regressions that predict the degree to which an individual
thinks that people are too easily offended by language (note that higher values of the dependent
variable indicate greater agreement that people are too easily offended). Model 1 is the bivariate and
Model 2 includes control variables. The models only include white, non-Latinx respondents and use
survey weights that make them nationally representative.
Table 3.8: Models predicting agreement that people are too easily offended
Model 1 Model 2
(Intercept) 2.26∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.15)
White influence: Right amount 0.69∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)


















Religion (as factor) Yes
R2 0.09 0.28
Adj. R2 0.09 0.27
Num. obs. 2557 2110
RMSE 1.00 0.89
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
The baseline category for the independent variable of interest is that whites have too much
influence in politics. Compared to this baseline, respondents who said that whites have the right
amount of influence were more likely to agree that people are too easily offended (β = 0.19).
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Respondents who said that whites had too little influence were also more likely to agree that people
are too easily offended, to an even greater extent (β = 0.42). This makes sense, theoretically: higher
levels of felt threat lead to greater tolerance of potentially offensive language.
Note that separate models have been specified (not shown here) that substitute other measures
of racial animus for the racial resentment measure, including stereotype endorsement and feeling
thermometers. The estimates on the key independent variables do not change in significance or
direction — though they are actually slightly larger in magnitude than those presented here. Similarly,
the results presented here hold when the model is specified as an ordered logistic regression (as the
dependent variable has four ordered categories). The sign and direction of the estimates are the same
— and the magnitude is slightly larger than those presented here. Finally, there are no effects for any
value of the religion factor variable — estimates were just omitted in Table 3.8 to save space.
Figure 3.6 displays the predicted level of the dependent variable for each level of the independent
variable. Whites who believe that their group has too much influence are likely to believe that the
way people talk needs to change a little — but whites who believe that their group has too little
influence are more likely to say that people are a little too easily offended these days.






















The prevalence and effectiveness of explicit racial rhetoric ebbs and flows; appeals seem to be
tolerated at some moments more than others. In this chapter, I test one causal mechanism by which
whites come to tolerate a negative, explicit racial appeal: status threat. When whites feel threatened,
they are more likely to approve of racist language denigrating a minority group.
Whites who were exposed to an article about the impending demographic majority-minority
status of the United States were more likely to approve of a racist political flyer that targeted African
Americans — as demonstrated in the first survey. It bears emphasis that the status threat article
reported accurate statistics and paralleled real news coverage. The experiment is naturalistic in the
sense that white Americans really are being exposed to these messages. The US’s population is
becoming less white, rapidly. The United States is projected to be majority-minority by 2042, just as
the article in the treatment condition reports. To many whites, this fact represents a status threat and
when they are reminded of their impending minority status, they retaliate against racial minorities.
To supplement these findings, the second survey provided some evidence that cultural threats are
more threat-inducing and more likely to lead to an acceptance of negative, explicit racial appeals
than economic threats.
In an analysis of observational survey data, I find that the effect of feeling threatened on whites’
willingness to tolerate offensive language is not confined to experimental settings. Instead, whites
who believe that their group either has the right amount of influence in politics or too little influence
in politics are more tolerant of language that may be offensive.
Chapter 2 demonstrated that whites react differently to the notion that they will soon be in
the minority. Now, Chapter 3 has demonstrated that when whites become threatened about this
possibility, they are more willing to approve of negative, explicit appeals that denigrate African
Americans. This felt threat is not evenly distributed across the population, though, and it is not evenly
distributed between the two political parties. Chapter 4 will investigate the way that partisans react
to these changes, as a sense of status threat appears to have been consolidated into the Republican
party.
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CHAPTER 4: THREAT, DIVERSITY, AND POLARIZATION: PARTISANSHIP AND EX-
PLICIT APPEALS
Race, racial attitudes, and political party are intimately linked in American politics. Whites,
especially since the 1990s, have increasingly polarized in their reported racial attitudes. How does
this affect their perceptions of their own group’s status? Further, does this play a role in determining
their tolerance for overtly negative racial rhetoric?
In this chapter, I investigate the role that party polarization has in shaping whites’ understanding
of their group’s position and their willingness to accept racist rhetoric. I use observational survey
data and survey experiments to demonstrate that concepts like threat and diversity are polarizing
issues, as they are wrapped up in whites’ attitudes about race. Rather than a uniform abandonment
of the racial norm of equality, it appears to be polarized. White Democrats have moved toward
embracing it, along with principles of diversity and inclusion, while white Republicans have pulled
away from it, in a backlash to things like “political correctness” and focused instead on their own
group’s status. A previously dominant norm of equality is now politicized.
4.1 Party, race, and racial attitudes in contemporary politics
Race and racial attitudes have always been central to American politics and American political divides.
They structured the development of the modern party system (Carmines & Stimson 1989, Valentino
& Sears 2005) and continue to shape the political landscape today.
Racial issues were central to party realignment during the Civil Rights era. Beginning in 1963,
the Democratic Party, which used to dominate the South and was founded as a party of white men to
protect their own interests (Black & Black 2009), started to withdraw its commitment to Jim Crow
(Carmines & Stimson 1989, Valentino & Sears 2005) due to mounting pressure by a strong Civil
Rights Movement led by black Americans. White Southerners felt “abandoned” by their party and
sought to take their support elsewhere (Valentino & Sears 2005). Throughout the 1960s, both political
parties started to stake out conflicting positions on racial issues (Layman & Carsey 2002). By 2000,
this transformation appeared to be evident in the presidential contest. Al Gore, the Democratic
nominee, lost every Southern state, including his own. Sears and Valentino (2005) cite this as a clear
indicator that the South’s regional shift toward the Republican Party was complete.
Southern parties decisively split along racial lines first, with almost all white politicians identify-
ing as Republicans and almost all blacks identifying as Democrats (Black 2004, Black & Black 2009).
But, the racial divide was not confined to any particular region. Race and racialized issues continued
to dominate political debate and divide, albeit in a slightly more coded way, through fights about
busing, crime, welfare, and affirmative action (Kinder & Sanders 1996, Mendelberg 2001, Valentino
& Sears 2005). In the 1990s, parties competed over whites with wedge issues — issues that voters
may feel particularly strongly about, like race (Hillygus & Shields 2008). Hillygus and Shields
(2008) found that in 2004, 26% of partisans (non-independents) held issue positions that differed
from those of their party. As such, there was room to court voters using a variety of issues, including
those dealing with race. During this time, negative, implicit racial appeals flourished as both parties
tried to mobilize whites’ racial animus to win over voters (Mendelberg 2001).
Subsequently, partisan sorting and polarization has only intensified and deepened political
divides. Whites’ racial attitudes are not immune to this. Polarization on racial attitudes started
to occur in the early 1990s, but has accelerated greatly since. Between 1986 and 1990, there was
hardly any difference in the mean level of racial resentment held by white Democrats and white
Republicans. It has steadily grown since, and it is currently at its peak: a difference of 0.28 points
(according to 2016 ANES data, on a 0 to 1 scale) (Engelhardt 2020a). Some attribute this change to
cues that they receive from their party (Engelhardt 2019, Engelhardt 2020a), while others see it as
Barack Obama’s presidency motivating people who have less racial animus to become Democrats
and people who have greater racial animus to become Republicans (Tesler 2016). Tesler (2016)
finds that the election of the country’s first black president, Barack Obama, resulted in a spillover of
racialization. That is, even mundane issues previously unconnected to race became racialized, simply
by their association with the first black president. Racial attitudes have started to influence a variety
of political evaluations even more than before, as a result of Obama’s candidacy and administration
(Tesler 2016). Regardless of the exact direction of causality, the move is clear: white Republicans are
becoming reporting higher levels of racially resentment, and white Democrats are reporting lower
levels.
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Racial attitudes are polarizing — which likely has several implications for perceptions of
threat and racial appeals. Recall that the analyses in Chapter 2 demonstrated that racial resentment
determines the extent to which whites feel threatened by a diversifying America. As racial attitudes
polarize, it should follow that whites’ attitudes about their status and whether they face a status threat
are also polarizing. Further, Chapter 3 demonstrated that feeling threatened leads to an increased
willingness to accept negative racial appeals. As such, whites’ willingness to tolerate negative,
explicit racial rhetoric should also be polarizing.
Finally, as issues of status threat and the acceptability of racist rhetoric polarize, they become
part of the political landscape. References to a potential status threat, like an article reminding
whites about demographic displacement, likely cues partisanship for some whites. In the survey
experiments that I have presented in Chapters 2 and 3, the treatment may remind white partisans
about contemporary political debate. If this is the case, their party identification should moderate
their response to the treatment. When they are reminded that the US will soon be majority-minority,
they will think about their party and their party’s stance on white status threat, and subsequently use
those considerations to inform their response.
4.2 Status threat and racist rhetoric over time
We know from previous work that a partisan realignment sorted whites into parties by their racial
attitudes and now, whites are further polarizing based on those attitudes (Engelhardt 2020b, Lublin
2007, Valentino & Sears 2005, Carmines & Stimson 1989). Democratic whites are increasingly
reporting lower levels of racial resentment while Republican whites’ resentment is increasing. Since
racial attitudes lead to feelings of status threat among whites, does this change lead to a divide in
perceptions of status threat as well?
In order to investigate how attitudes about felt status threat are changing, I turn to data from the
American National Election Study. I use the same question presented in Chapter 3 to measure felt
threat: “Would you say that whites have too much influence in American politics, just about the right
amount of influence in American politics, or too little influence in American politics?” The ANES
only asked this question in 1976, 2000, 2012, and 2016.
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The mean answer to this question throughout each year has been about 2: whites have just
about the right amount of influence in American politics.1 However, this mean does not capture the
heterogeneity that has emerged in whites’ views on this issue. Figure 4.1 plots the predicted response
to the white influence question, based on white respondents’ party identification in every year that
the data is available. The correlation between whites’ belief about their group’s influence in society
and their party identification has intensified over the years: in 1976, these concepts did not correlate
(ρ = -0.03). In 2000, a relationship started to emerge (ρ = 0.15) and this relationship doubled by 2012
(ρ = 0.32) and grew in 2016 (ρ = 0.36).






















































































Note: Source is the American National Election Study (ANES). All samples are only white respondents;
survey weights used so nationally representative otherwise; higher values of party identification indicate greater
Republicanism (value of 4 is independent); higher values of white influence mean respondent believes that
whites have too little influence in society (lower values indicate they believe whites have too much influence);
all years data for white influence opinion question comes from post-election survey (party identification
captures pre-election)
1Mean in 1976: 2.08; in 2000: 2.02; in 2012: 2.01; in 2016: 2.03.
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In 1976, this question of white influence did not divide whites: all whites believed that they
had approximately the right amount of influence in society. However, by 2000, something had
shifted and it appeared that this question was starting to correlate with party identification, though
the pattern was not quite clear. By 2012, there is a clear and undeniable relationship between this
belief about a status threat to whites and party identification. Republicans (higher values of party
identification) were more likely to say that whites had the right amount or too little influence in
politics. Democrats, on the other hand, were more likely to lean towards believing that whites have
too much influence. In 2016, the relationship is less linear and more polarized: Republicans (party
ID = 5-7) and Independents (party ID = 4) believe that whites have the right amount of influence in
politics. Democrats (party ID = 1-3) believe that whites have too much influence in politics. This
relationship mirrors the polarization that has emerged in whites’ racial resentment. White Democrats
have become more likely to recognize the outsized influence that their racial group has in politics,
while those whites who feel that their group has the appropriate amount of influence in politics have
been concentrated into the Republican Party.
As racial attitudes and whites’ perceptions of status threat start to polarize, so too should their
tolerance for racist rhetoric. To understand where whites stand on this issue, I turn to the General
Social Survey (GSS), a nationally representative survey fielded by the National Opinion Research
Center (NORC). The GSS asks respondents whether they believe someone who is racist should be
allowed to make a speech. They ask: “Or consider a person who believes that Blacks are genetically
inferior... If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community claiming that Blacks are
inferior, should he be allowed to speak, or not?” Respondents can answer yes (1) or no (0). Figure
4.2 presents the mean answer among white respondents across time.
On the whole, Democrats and Republicans had similar responses to this question until starting
to separate after 2010. In 2010, Democrats and leaners had a mean response of 0.61, Independents
of 0.63, and Republicans and leaners of 0.63. In 2018, the most recent year for which data exists,
the story was different: Independents were the least tolerant of allowing this racist to speak (0.53),
Democrats and leaners were in the middle, but closer to independents (0.58), and Republicans and
leaners were the most tolerant of this rhetoric (0.66). Since 2010, Democrats and Independents have
become less tolerant of public displays of racist rhetoric but Republicans have become more tolerant
of such language.
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Note: Source is the General Social Survey (GSS) 1976-2018
One concern about this measure may be that this question taps more than just the acceptability
of public expressions of biological racism — it also directly taps attitudes about civil liberties. To
address this possibility, I compare respondents’ tolerance for racist speech to their tolerance for
speech from other groups. The GSS asks this same question about people from other groups as well:
an anti-religionist, communist, homosexual, and militarist.2
I can use a comparison between these groups to understand the way that respondents’ views on
allowing a racist to speak differ from their general beliefs about people from other groups’ rights to
express their viewpoints. To do so, I averaged respondents’ tolerance for speech from these other
groups (anti-religionists, communists, homosexuals, and militarists). Then, I subtracted this mean
from their tolerance for the racist speech. This captures the difference between their willingness to
allow racists to speak, compared to their general willingness to allow people from a variety of groups
to speak. Here, a value of 0 means that they rated their tolerance for the racist speech at the same
level as their mean rating for the other groups. A score above 0 means that they are more willing
2I omitted from analysis the question that asks about socialists due to the short time frame that it was asked
(1972-1974). I also omitted the question about a “Muslim clergymen preaching hatred of the US” due to its
racialized nature and to the limited time frame (2008-2018).
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to allow a racist to speak than their average willingness for the other groups, and a score below 0
means that they are less willing to allow a racist to speak than their average for the other groups.
These mean differences are plotted in Figure 4.3 among white respondents only and by their party
identification.
Across time and political parties, all groups had mean scores that were negative, indicating
that they tended to rate their tolerance for racist speech lower than their tolerance for speech from
other groups. Similar to the first plot though, it seems like Republicans and Democrats largely track
until after 2010, when they start to pull apart a bit. In 2010, Democrats scored -0.16, comparable to
Independents (-0.15) and Republicans (-0.14). However, by 2018, things had changed. Democrats
scored -0.25 (i.e. rating their tolerance for racist speech about a quarter of a point lower than their
tolerance for other forms of speech) while Republicans still rated racist speech only about -0.15
points lower than other forms. Independents tracked with Democrats, at about -0.23. Clearly, whites
are starting to polarize on their tolerance for racist speech, just as they have on their racial attitudes
and on their perceptions of status threat.
Figure 4.3: Mean difference between tolerance for racist speech and other forms of speech, among






















Note: Source is the General Social Survey (GSS) 1976-2018
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This manuscript has thus far demonstrated that an increased perception of threat (even when
there is no objective basis) leads to an increase in whites’ willingness to approve of denigrations of
racial minorities. Now, it appears that this increased perception of threat is not distributed evenly
throughout the white population. Instead, as whites have increasingly polarized by racial attitudes,
this perception of threat has been consolidated into the Republican Party. It is now an issue that the
parties can use to distinguish themselves and with which they can mobilize their base. Republicans
can double down on explicit, negative rhetoric to mobilize a base of whites who feel a status threat
and want to maintain their group’s dominance, while Democrats can make explicit, positive appeals
to mobilize their base around rhetoric of diversity and to distinguish their group as an alternative to
the racially resentful Republican Party.
4.3 Partisan response to changing demographics
So, how do partisans react to the reminder about the changing demographics of the U.S., which
is now largely a politicized and polarized issue? Does this reminder affect their approval of an
explicit racial appeal and the politician who made it? In order to answer these questions, I turn to the
two survey experiments fielded by Qualtrics in the winter of 2018-2019 (two-wave survey) and the
summer of 2019.3
If feelings of status threat are as politicized as I outline above, then we would expect that a
reminder about a potential “threat” (the growing diversity of the U.S.) may cue partisanship for some
white respondents. Given such polarization around the issue of a white status threat, this treatment
may make partisanship a more influential factor in their evaluation of the explicit appeal and the
politician who put it out.
The first point to note is that the white respondents’ reported willingness to vote for the politician
tended to align with their party identification. Figure 4.4 demonstrates that as whites’ party identifica-
tion became more and more Republican (i.e. higher values of the party ID variable), they were more
willing to say that they would vote for the candidate. This is an indication that the respondents likely
viewed this politician as a Republican. This is unsurprising, especially given the flyer combines
explicit, anti-black rhetoric with a call for decreasing government aid.
3For descriptive statistics, see Chapter 2. For a detailed description of the survey designs and implementation,
see Chapter 3.
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Now, how did a reminder about a white status threat change their evaluations of this politician
and his flyer? To evaluate this question, I estimate a series of OLS regressions that predict all
dependent variables using the treatment indicator interacted with respondents’ pre-treatment party
identification.
In Survey 1, the dependent variables are: (1) Do you think the flyer makes a fair point? (2) If he
was running in your district, how likely is it that you would support this candidate, Jacob Miller, for
office? (3) Are you offended by the claims made in the flyer? (4) How racially insensitive is the flyer,
in your opinion? (5) Do you agree or disagree with the flyer’s claim that government handouts to
African Americans need to be decreased?
Table 4.1 presents the results when party identification is specified as a continuous variable,
for ease of interpretation. Regressions that specify party identification as a factor variable can be
found in the Appendix. There are no effects of party identification on evaluation of the flyer in the
status allay condition, but there are significant effects in the status threat condition. When whites are
reminded about the growing racial minority population, their party identification positively influences
their willingness to vote for the candidate who put out the flyer and their agreement with the claims
made in the flyer.
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Table 4.1: Partisanship moderates approval of explicit racial appeal, survey 1 (winter 2019)
Fair Point Vote Offend Insensitive Agree
(Intercept) 1.80∗∗∗ 2.05∗∗∗ 3.84∗∗∗ 4.38∗∗∗ 2.96∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.25) (0.21) (0.20) (0.29)
Status Allay 0.09 −0.07 −0.08 −0.28 −0.52
(0.29) (0.34) (0.29) (0.28) (0.40)
Status Threat −0.08 −0.48 0.14 0.18 −1.07∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.34) (0.28) (0.28) (0.39)
Party ID 0.22∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Status Allay * Party ID 0.00 0.04 −0.03 0.01 0.10
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Status Threat * Party ID 0.06 0.12∗ −0.06 −0.05 0.23∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
R2 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.19
Adj. R2 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.19
Num. obs. 636 635 635 633 634
RMSE 1.36 1.61 1.33 1.31 1.87
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Figure 4.5 plots the predicted values for voting for the candidate and agreeing with the claims
made from the models specified with party identification as a factor variable, so that any nonlinearities
can be visualized. When Democrats (especially strong Democrats, party ID = 1) are reminded about
the growing minority population, they are even more likely to not vote for the candidate who put
out the explicit appeal and not agree with the claims made about African Americans. In a sense,
there is somewhat of a Democratic backlash to this flyer, above and beyond their normal level of
disagreement, when they are reminded about the growing diversity of the US. Republicans (party ID
= 5-7), on the other hand, are more likely to vote for the candidate and agree with the claims made
about African Americans when they are exposed to information about changing demographics —
which likely represents a status threat to them.
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The second survey exposed white respondents to one of three conditions: a cultural threat, an
economic threat, or a control. They then evaluated a similar flyer (see Chapter 3 for image) on six
dimensions: (1) Do you think the flyer makes a fair point? (2) If he was running in your district,
how likely is it that you would support this candidate, Jacob Miller, for office? (3) Do you agree or
disagree with the flyer’s claim that African Americans tend to ask too much of the rest of us? (4)
Do you agree or disagree with the flyer’s claim that African Americans tend to get more than they
deserve from the government? (5) Do you agree with the flyer’s suggestion that African Americans
tend to be freeloaders? (6) As you can see, the flyer says that reparations for slavery should not be
paid to African Americans. How much or how little do you support paying reparations for slavery?
Again, a series of OLS regressions are specified, predicting each dependent variable with an
interaction between the treatment condition and partisanship. Results from these models when party
identification is specified as a continuous variable are presented in Table 4.2 — and results from
models in which party identification is specified as a factor variable are presented in the Appendix.
Ideology is included in every model because balance checks revealed that there were statistically
significantly more conservatives in the control condition. Results are largely the same when the
models do not include a control for ideology.
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Table 4.2: Partisanship moderates approval of explicit racial appeal, survey 2 (summer 2019)
Fair Point Vote Agree 1 Agree 2 Agree 3 Rep
(Intercept) 1.91∗∗∗ 2.03∗∗∗ 2.70∗∗∗ 2.51∗∗∗ 2.57∗∗∗ 2.93∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.20) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.21)
Cultural Threat −0.33 −0.45∗ −0.69∗∗ −0.58∗∗ −0.65∗∗ 0.13
(0.23) (0.26) (0.30) (0.29) (0.30) (0.27)
Economic Threat −0.28 −0.26 −0.59∗∗ −0.53∗ −0.48 0.15
(0.22) (0.26) (0.30) (0.29) (0.30) (0.27)
Party ID 0.16∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Ideology 0.09∗∗∗ 0.07∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Cultural Threat * Party ID 0.06 0.10∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.14∗∗ −0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Economic Threat * Party ID 0.03 0.04 0.12∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.13∗∗ −0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
R2 0.13 0.13 0.18 0.19 0.10 0.22
Adj. R2 0.12 0.13 0.18 0.18 0.10 0.22
Num. obs. 1096 1096 1096 1096 1096 1096
RMSE 1.42 1.64 1.87 1.81 1.89 1.73
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
The interaction between the cultural threat treatment condition and party identification is signifi-
cant in evaluations of a willingness to vote for the candidate and in evaluations of agreement with the
flyer. For the economic threat condition, there is a significant interaction in evaluations of agreement
with the flyer. This comports with findings from the first survey, in which party identification shaped
a willingness to vote for the candidate and agree with the explicit flyer in the treatment condition.
Figure 4.6 plots the predicted value of the dependent variable, based on partisanship and
treatment condition, for the cultural threat and control conditions. Aligning with survey 1, these
results demonstrate that when white Democrats (party ID = 1-3) are exposed to a cultural threat, they
are even more likely to disagree with the claims made about African Americans and even less likely
to vote for the candidate who put out the flyer.
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Basically: they double down on their disagreement and disapproval of the explicit appeal. Republi-
cans, on the other hand, are slightly more likely to agree with and be willing to vote for the candidate
when they are exposed to a cultural threat, but only among the strongest Republicans (party ID = 7).
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A reminder about the changing demographics of the US — a potential status threat — further
polarizes white responses to an explicit appeal and the politician who made it. This is especially true
on the questions that evaluate whites’ willingness to vote for the politician (who is perceived as a
Republican) and their agreement with the claims made in the flyer. There are no effects on evaluating
whether or not the flyer made a fair point. This gestures at the differences between these questions.
Vote choice, for example, is much more politicized and partisan than a normative evaluation of the
flyer. Agreeing with the claims made in the flyer is also more political and partisan, as issues of
redistribution, racial policies, and race more broadly have long been a feature of political debate and
of partisan divide. Partisanship has no moderating effect on measures of backlash in the first survey
(i.e. whether the flyer is offensive or racially insensitive) or on agreement with a need for reparations
in the second survey.
This last question: whether or not the respondent agrees with a need for reparations does measure
policy agreement and, as such, would be expected to operate like the other agreement measures in the
second survey. However, there is a huge lack of variability as very few whites agreed with a need for
reparations. Almost all whites, including white Democrats and those who are low in racial resentment,
opposed reparations for slavery. 64% of the sample did not believe that African Americans should
receive reparations, and only 19% believed they should (the rest reported no preference). This may
point to the limit of white Democrats’ willingness to stand by racially progressive policies, regardless
of their partisanship or racial attitudes.
4.4 Conclusion
Diversity, white influence, and potential status threats are all increasingly becoming politicized
and polarized issues. As whites continue to polarize based on their racial attitudes, there are fewer
electoral barriers in place that prohibit Republicans from mobilizing their base with negative, explicit
racial rhetoric. They do not have to worry about alienating conservative Democrats, as this group of
people has started to disappear in such a polarized environment.
Reminding whites that the U.S. will soon be a majority minority country cues partisanship. It
reminds white Democrats that they should be doubling down on a norm of equality and thus, reject
explicit appeals and the politician who made them. Conversely, it reminds white Republicans that
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they are faced with a threat to their status as the racial majority, prompting them to reject a norm of
equality, approve of negative explicit racial rhetoric, and dig their heels for a candidate they perceive
to be one of their own.
Next, Chapter 5 investigates the way that politicians use these negative racial appeals in their
campaign advertising. Moving away from individual-level analyses, it investigates when politicians
turn to racial appeals in congressional elections. This analysis builds on those presented in this
chapter, as it further elucidates the way that racial attitudes and racial appeals are used by elites to
sway voters.
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CHAPTER 5: EXPLICIT APPEALS IN HOUSE ELECTIONS
Wendy Rogers was one candidate in the 2016 race for the Republican nomination for Congress
in Arizona’s first district. She aired a television advertisement in support of her candidacy called,
“World on Fire.” The ad opens with gunshots, sirens, crowds of people, and a couple of white people
who seem injured as they hold each other and flee a chaotic scene. She says: “Just when you think it
can’t get worse, it does. The world is on fire... and it spread to America. We are at war.” Following
this is an image of a man with dark complexion, wearing a tunic (potentially a Muslim thobe),
running and shooting at a police car, which then explodes.
She goes on to say, “open borders and sanctuary cities are killing” and to argue against “coddling
criminals,” as bold text on the screen reads: “AMERICA IS LESS SAFE.” The advertisement
concludes with Wendy, standing next to Donald Trump, assuring her viewers that she will “stand up
for the rule of law” as the “time to protect our country... starts now.”
Wendy did not win in 2016, though she did clinch the nomination in 2018 (losing the general
election, but garnering 46% of the vote). Nevertheless, her advertisement illustrates the way that
politicians can drum up fear and anxiety to mobilize support. The advertisement combines rhetoric
of threat (i.e. America is at war, less safe, and in need of protection) with racial imagery (i.e. dark
man in tunic, white couple fleeing) and racial language (i.e. open borders and sanctuary cities,
themselves anthropomorphized, are doing the killing). These racial references are implicit, as they
do not explicitly identify a racial group, but they get the message across with coded language and
visual cues: black and brown people in this country are threats. Wendy, the white air force colonel,
will help protect you.
As whites are increasingly divided on whether their group faces a threat, what role are politicians
playing? How are they drumming up threat and how are they using it to their electoral advantage?
Chapter 4 demonstrated that there are increasingly partisan differences in the way that whites
understand their position of power in politics. While a norm of racial equality used to dominate, it
now appears to be divided along party lines. On the political left, whites have doubled down on this
norm while on the right, it has been rejected. Barriers to the use of explicit appeals that this norm
may have previously posed have been weakened for the Republican Party. In the example that opened
this chapter: Wendy Rogers is not looking to attract conservative Democrats her advertisement, such
an attempt is futile in such a polarized landscape (and in a primary election). Instead, she is trying to
galvanize a Republican base around issues of status (and physical) threat and racial fear.
This anecdote illustrates the importance of understanding the role that elites play in the way
that status threat can lead to an acceptance of negative racial appeals. Elites using fear and threat
to encourage the mobilization of racism is not a new phenomenon, but instead, closer to a defining
feature of American politics. It is better to think of the recent rise in negative racial appeals as the
return of a political strategy, rather than something new.
Despite the importance of elite strategy, this manuscript has thus far only investigated when
whites, at the individual level, become receptive to explicit racial appeals. Now, it turns to under-
standing when and why these appeals crop up in electoral politics. Keeping with the theory outlined
in this manuscript, I expect that in places where whites feel particularly threatened, politicians will
sense a fertile opportunity for the use of explicit racial appeals. Not only will they likely amplify that
threat themselves, as Wendy Rogers does in her advertisement, but they will use these conditions to
mobilize supporters around racism and resentment.
In this chapter, I evaluate this expectation with an analysis of the 2016 elections for House of
Representatives. I code television advertisements from House elections in the top 210 media markets
for their use of identity-based appeals. Then, I predict the occurrence and number of negative racial
appeals that occur in a district with a measure of district-level racial resentment. While the data
collection is not yet finished, preliminary results indicate a positive and significant relationship
between racial resentment and the use of negative racial appeals in campaign advertisements at the
district level.
5.1 Measuring perceived threat and racial appeals in U.S. congressional districts
In order to evaluate the use of racial appeals in campaign advertising, I turn to two data sources.
First, the Wesleyan Media Project collects television advertisements aired by candidates during
primary and general campaigns. Coding these videos for their use of racial appeals will serve as
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the dependent variable for my analysis: the use of negative racial appeals in campaigns. Then, the
independent variable is the level of status threat that whites feel in a district. For this measure, I
generate district-level estimates of racial resentment using survey data. While racial resentment is
not the same as felt threat, it is a robust predictor, as demonstrated in Chapter 2 of this manuscript.
The sections that follow outline the data collection, variable construction, and descriptive statistics
for these broad concepts.
5.1.1 2016 House advertisements
In order to measure the use of racial appeals by politicians, I turn to a dataset of television ad-
vertisements aired during the 2016 congressional election by candidates running for a seat in the
House of Representatives. This data was obtained by the Wesleyan Media Project, which collects
every advertisement aired for the top 210 media markets in the United States during each election
cycle. While the data have already been coded for features like the issue discussed, the tone of the
advertisement, and where it aired, it does not contain information on whether or not a racial appeal
was made. To gather this data, it was necessary to turn to the original video file, watch it, and code
for whether or not there is a racial or identity-based appeal.
There are 1,994 unique television advertisements for House candidates that aired during the 2016
cycle collected by the Wesleyan Media Project. Undergraduate students were recruited to be part
of the research team. Students were assigned to a set of television advertisements, by name, which
they would watch and then fill out a Qualtrics form to code the advertisement. They were trained
initially, and then part of bimonthly check in meetings during which time we addressed problems or
confusion that may have arisen. Documents outlining the coding process and the code book (with
examples), from which the students worked, are available in the Appendix.
The Qualtrics form that the students filled out asked them questions related to several dimensions
of the advertisement. Students indicated whether there were any (1) verbal or (2) visual references to
a group. Both references distinguished between explicit and implicit references. Explicit references
are direct, overt, and clear verbal references to a group while implicit references do not clearly
mention a group by name. Instead, an implicit reference is a word or phrase that likely cues a
racial (or identity) group, as they are often associated with those groups. For example, “welfare”
makes whites think about blacks, as this policy has been racialized through politician and media
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rhetoric (Gilens 2009). As a group, we regularly discussed these references and, most importantly,
students always recorded the exact words that made them call something an implicit reference. The
instructions that the student coders saw for coding verbal references were:
Were any of the following groups mentioned, verbally, in the ad? Note that this mention can include
either explicit mentions or implicit (coded) mentions.
Explicit mentions are direct references to identity.
For race, words like: whites, Caucasians, blacks, African Americans, Latinos, Hispanics, Mexicans
(include any nationality references like this as Latinos), race, racism, etc.
For gender, words like: women, men, female, sex, sexism, etc.
Implicit mentions are coded language. This should include references to:
For Blacks: welfare, affirmative action, death penalty, etc.
For Latinos: immigration (legal or illegal; documented or undocumented), etc.
For Middle Easterners: terrorism, etc.
For whites: western civilization, etc.
For women: hysterical, irrational, gentle, etc.
Note that these are examples – there are many others that are unlisted.
Include ANY mention, even if the politician himself/herself is not endorsing the mention (i.e. even if
the politician is playing a clip of their opponent mentioning certain groups, implicitly or explicitly).
Students selected all of the following groups that met any of these conditions: Whites / Cau-
casians; Blacks / African Americans; Latinos / Hispanics; Middle Easterners / Muslims; Asians,
Native Hawaiians, or other Pacific Islander; Other racial group (write in); women; men; LGBTQI+
folks; working class whites; working class, all racial groups; rich people / the one percent; broad
reference to race/racism, not specific to a group; broad reference to gender or sexuality, not specific
to a group; reference to another identity group (write in). Note that I follow critical race theorists
by coding for the five most clearly delineated “racial” groups in America: whites, blacks, Latinx,
Asians, and Middle Easterners / Muslims. While some of these groups are better characterized as
ethnicities (e.g. Latinos) or religions (e.g. Muslims), these groups have been racialized in the U.S.
context such that they now effectively comprise racial groups (Omi & Winant 2014).
For each group selected, students would then be asked a series of questions about the verbal
reference. They indicated first whether the reference was explicit or implicit. Then, they wrote the
exact words used to make the reference.1 Note that this gives me the ability to filter what counts
as a reference if needed. Then, they rated the overall tone used to discuss this group (ranging from
extremely positive or complimentary toward the group to extremely negative or derogatory toward
1The Appendix has a running list of the language used to implicitly, negatively reference racial groups.
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the group). Then, they wrote in what was specifically said about the group (again, giving me the
ability to audit if needed).
Next, students indicated who was talking about this identity group in this way (i.e. whether it was
the politician running the ad, the politician’s opponent, or someone else) and whether the politician
who is running the advertisement is endorsing or criticizing this language. Sometimes, politicians
use clips of their opponent saying offensive things in order to galvanize their base in an anti-racist
way. This often happened in the 2016 presidential race between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump.
Many of Clinton’s advertisements juxtaposed clips of Trump’s negative comments about Mexicans,
women, and other groups with her calls for an embrace of diversity. It is important to capture when
an identity-based appeal is made, because it is indicative of the kind of language that politicians were
using in the race at large, even if they do not use it in their own television advertisements. With this
running example, many of Donald Trump’s television advertisements included negative, implicit
references, even though his speeches included negative, explicit references. Coding the references as
they come up in his opponent’s attack ads help to capture the fact that he was using explicit appeals
throughout his campaign. At the same time, it is also important to understand whether the politician
running the advertisement is the one making this appeal. In the case of Clinton and Trump, it was
clear that Trump’s rhetoric for television advertisements was implicit even though his rhetoric for
speeches was explicit. This indicates some level of strategic use of appeals and thus, is a potentially
important facet to capture.
Finally, students were asked to evaluate whether a group-based appeal had occurred — taking the
entire advertisement (both verbal and visual references) into account. They could select: no implicit
or explicit appeal; an implicit, negative appeal; an implicit, positive appeal; an explicit, negative
appeal; or an explicit, positive appeal.
After students completed this coding for all verbal references, they are asked whether any groups
were represented visually in the advertisement. Students saw the prompt:
Were any of the following groups depicted, visually, in the ad?
Include ANY depiction, even if the politician himself/herself is not endorsing the depiction themselves
(i.e. even if the politician is playing a clip of their opponent in which certain racial groups are
depicted).
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This should not include depictions of the politician him/herself or their opponent. If there is just a
general image of a crowd or of a bunch of people at a rally without clearly discernible features, there
is no need to record that.
Students were presented with the same group options as they were for the verbal references, and
they selected all groups that appeared in the advertisement. Then, students indicated the amount to
which a group appeared in the advertisement: only one group member appears; the group appears,
but does not make up the majority; the group is about evenly represented, in comparison to other
groups; the ad is mostly made up of the group; or the ad is entirely made up of the group. They
indicated the tone of the representative (i.e. were they portrayed in a positive or negative light),
and again, as a potential check, they wrote in exactly what the group members were doing in the
advertisement. They noted whether members of the group spoke in the ad, whether the politician
running the ad was endorsing or criticizing this representation, and finally, they again coded for
whether or not there was a identity-based appeal.
To evaluate the extent to which the instructions for coding these advertisements were clear
enough to produce systematic results, I conducted a reliability analysis. 30 advertisements were
drawn at random from the dataset. Then, the undergraduate research assistants (six in total) coded
these advertisements. Three of the coders finished coding all of these advertisements while, at present,
all six coders have coded 12 of the 30 ads.
To calculate the extent to which the coders agree with one another, I calculate Krippendorff’s
alpha. This test can accommodate multiple coders, missing data, and nominal variables, and it is valid
for large or small sample sizes. Further, it evaluates one variable at a time, rather than pooling the
variables, which allows for a more conservative test (Krippendorff 2011). I conducted one test that
included all the coders, and only evaluated observations 1 through 12, since these are the observations
for which they had all finished coding the data. Then, I conducted a second test among the three
coders who had finished coding all of the data. For both, I specified 1,000 simulations. The results
are presented in Table 5.1.
Generally, α ≥ 0.80 is considered a good level of agreement, while α ≥ 0.667 is acceptable
for “tentative” conclusions (Krippendorff 2004).. Among the 6 coders, Krippendorff’s α = 0.86 and
among the 3 coders, α = 0.78. Thus, both measures pass or approximate a good level of agreement,
indicating that the coders are performing within an acceptable range for inference to occur.
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Table 5.1: Krippendorff’s alpha for coding of 2016 television House advertisement data
Alpha
6 coders, 12 advertisements 0.86
(0.83, 0.88)
3 coders, 30 advertisements 0.78
(0.75, 0.81)
Table 5.2 reports the current status of the coding process. The left half of the table reports the
number of unique advertisements that have been coded by the undergraduates, by state. The right half
of the table reports the extent to which these unique advertisements appear in the data. The Wesleyan
Media Project data is organized in such a way that observations capture when an advertisement aired.
So, if the same advertisement aired three times, it would compose three observations in the dataset.
Of the 1,994 unique advertisements, 792 have been coded (about 39.7%). This is similar to the
extent to which the full dataset has been filled with observations, which is about 41.9%. Students
were given assignments by state for ease of organization — so states that occur earlier in the alphabet
are most complete. Some of the states that make up larger portions of the data and that are fairly
complete in the current dataset are California (73.7% complete), Florida (48.4% complete), and
Iowa (46.3% complete). States that make up large amounts of the data that are not yet accounted for
include New York and Texas. There is no immediately obvious way in which this could affect the
preliminary analyses to be presented, but it is important to recognize that the data completed is not at
random, it is by state.
Within the unique advertisements that have been coded (N = 792), there is some variation in the
use of negative racial appeals. Table 5.3 reports the number of unique advertisements that include
negative racial appeals.2 Currently, the highest number of negative racial appeals are made against
Middle Easterners or Muslims.3 Of these negative appeals, about half are implicit (N = 44) and half
are explicit (N = 36). There are many negative, implicit racial appeals against Latinx (N = 51), but
fewer explicit appeals (N = 7). There are also more negative, implicit appeals against Blacks or
African Americans (N = 19) than explicit appeals (N = 3).
2There is a report of positive racial appeal prevalence in the Appendix.
3Recall that I follow critical race theorists in organizing the data by the five main racial groups in the US, as a
result of the racialization of several ethnicities and religions (Omi & Winant 2014).
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Table 5.2: Current coding status for 2016 House advertisements
State Unique Advertisements Total Observations
N Unique N Coded Percent N Total N Coded Percent
AK 12 11 91.7 4665 4657 99.8
AL 22 22 100.0 5050 5047 99.9
AR 5 5 100.0 1311 1308 99.8
AZ 51 50 98.0 20858 19769 94.8
CA 186 137 73.7 77620 57150 73.6
CO 46 46 100.0 17736 17733 100.0
CT 1 1 100.0 602 598 99.3
DE 5 4 80.0 581 549 94.5
FL 215 104 48.4 54782 24189 44.2
GA 8 0 0.0 2584 0 0.0
HI 4 0 0.0 346 0 0.0
IA 95 44 46.3 26156 13141 50.2
ID 3 3 100.0 1183 1182 99.9
IL 53 53 100.0 17622 17612 99.9
IN 61 41 67.2 20466 12240 59.8
KS 51 5 9.8 16361 851 5.2
KY 23 23 100.0 5083 5079 99.9
LA 45 45 100.0 5956 5955 100.0
MD 44 41 93.2 9 0 0.0
ME 50 50 100.0 8948 8436 94.3
MI 52 0 0.0 27023 27023 100.0
MN 73 60 82.2 18435 0 0.0
MO 5 0 0.0 35530 29700 83.6
MS 23 0 0.0 1491 0 0.0
MT 19 0 0.0 3885 0 0.0
NC 37 29 78.4 22816 0 0.0
ND 3 0 0.0 6709 5634 84.0
NE 51 0 0.0 561 0 0.0
NH 16 1 6.3 13572 0 0.0
NJ 29 0 0.0 2887 11 0.4
NM 10 0 0.0 3698 0 0.0
NV 62 1 1.6 2199 0 0.0
NY 166 3 1.8 22563 613 2.7
OH 25 1 4.0 65917 612 0.9
OK 18 1 5.6 3868 416 10.8
OR 4 0 0.0 3031 56 1.8
PA 79 1 1.3 899 0 0.0
RI 2 0 0.0 16282 347 2.1
SC 6 0 0.0 588 0 0.0
SD 1 0 0.0 1141 0 0.0
TN 38 1 2.6 155 0 0.0
TX 88 2 2.3 10727 40 0.4
US 1 0 0.0 20362 193 0.9
UT 37 1 2.7 8017 4 0.0
VA 47 1 2.1 18087 39 0.2
VT 1 0 0.0 62 0 0.0
WA 45 0 0.0 7590 0 0.0
WI 57 1 1.8 13816 266 1.9
WV 15 1 6.7 1737 9 0.5
WY 1 0 0.0 207 0 0.0
Total 1994 792 39.7 621802 260462 41.9
Nevertheless, it is telling that there are 47 occurrences of explicit racial appeals, considering how
direct and undeniable such negative characterizations are.4
4Note that there can be more than one appeal for a group coded (i.e. there can be an implicit and an explicit
appeal) in any given advertisement. The “any appeal” category does not reflect this possibility. As such, the
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The language used for implicit, negative appeals that include a negative, implicit verbal mention
for each of these groups is presented in the Appendix. For blacks, most of these are references to or
characterizations of Barack Obama or references to welfare and food stamps. For Latinx appeals,
most of the references are to immigrants, especially “illegal” immigrants, and to the need for a border
wall. For Middle Easterner or Muslim appeal, most of the references are to terrorism and ISIS. There
are no verbal implicit references to whites (the implicit appeals coded and reported here are visual
references).
In total, 119 of the advertisements coded included at least one negative racial appeal. Some
advertisements contained more than one negative appeal, bringing the overall total number of
negative racial appeals to 159. This means that negative racial appeals occur in about 15% of the
advertisements coded.
Table 5.3: Counts of negative racial appeals in unique advertisements, by racial group
No Negative Any Negative Implicit Explicit
Appeal Appeal Appeals Appeals
Blacks / African Americans 770 22 19 3
Latinx 736 56 51 7
Middle Easterners / Muslims 715 77 44 36
Asians 792 0 0 0
Whites 788 4 3 1
Total: Racial Appeals 673 Unique Ads: 119 117 47
Overall N: 159
To analyze the extent to which racial appeals are used during a campaign, I aggregate the number
and type of racial appeals up to the district level. Currently, there are some advertisements coded
in 96 of the 194 congressional districts for which the Wesleyan Media Project captures data.5 A
little less than half of the districts witness an advertisement with at least one negative racial appeal
(N = 45). The distribution of the number of unique advertisements with a negative racial appeal in
the districts is presented in Figure 5.1a and the distribution of the overall number of negative racial
appeals by district is presented in Figure 5.1b. The mean number of unique advertisements in a
district that include a negative racial appeal is 1.24 (ranging from 0 to 10). The mean number of
sum of implicit and explicit appeals for a group can be larger than the number represented in the “any appeal”
column — which is the case for Latinx and Middle Easterners / Muslims.
5Recall they only collect data for the top 210 media markets.
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negative racial appeals made, irrespective of the advertisement that they are in, is 1.67 (ranging from
0 to 17). As such, there appears to be some variation in the use of negative racial appeals across
congressional districts.
Figure 5.1: Distribution of negative racial appeals at the district level


































Overall, the television advertisements aired during the 2016 House elections appear to include
some variation in the use of racial appeals, the type of racial appeals, and the target of the racial
appeals — at both the individual advertisement level and the aggregated district level. In the
next section, I construct a district-level measure of racial resentment with which I will predict the
prevalence of racial appeals.
5.1.2 District-level racial resentment
To predict the use of racial appeals in elections, I need to operationalize the concept of perceived threat
at the district level. This can be tricky, as the concept itself is relatively broad and amorphous. While
some studies use indicators about demographic change in an area (Hill, Hopkins & Huber 2012), the
analyses presented in Chapter 2 of this manuscript illustrate the shortcomings to such an approach.
An article about the changing demographics of the United States means different things to different
whites, and it does not threaten whites uniformly. Further, Chapter 3 illustrated the importance of this
perception. When whites do not feel threatened, their willingness to accept an explicit racial appeal
is unchanged. It is when whites truly feel threatened that they become receptive to such denigrations.
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As such, it is important that the measure of district-level perceived threat have some connection
to the aggregate beliefs or feelings in the community — in order to operationalize the way that
this threat is rooted in a sense of perception that may or may not be connected to their objective
reality. In order to obtain an aggregated measure of public opinion at the subnational level, Multilevel
Regression and Post-stratification (MRP) has recently become the gold standard for its ability to
generate unbiased estimates of subnational public opinion, even when the sampling from subnational
geographies is not representative (Park, Gelman & Bafumi 2004, Kastellec, Lax & Phillips 2010).
With survey data, MRP generates estimates with two broad steps. First, multilevel regression
models individual survey responses as a function of both individual-level demographic characteristics
and geographic predictors. With this model, it is possible to generate estimates for the dependent
variable based on demographic and geographic predictors. The second step is post-stratification.
Here, the estimates for each demographic-geographic respondent type are weighted (post-stratified)
by the percentages of each demographic type in the geographic unit of interest (for this analyses,
congressional district) (Kastellec, Lax & Phillips 2010, Warshaw & Rodden 2012).
There are several benefits to using MRP as an estimation strategy. MRP outperforms other
methods, like disaggregation, especially with small and medium-sized samples (and it does slightly
better in larger samples) (Lax & Phillips 2009). Part of this improved performance is due to the fact
that post-stratification corrects for clustering issues that can bias estimates. MRP can also be used to
estimate opinion in geographies that are rarely surveyed, like the states of Alaska and Hawaii. Even if
they are not included in national polls, estimates can be computed using MRP as Census information
on the demographic makeup of these states exists. Finally, while it is often used to obtain state-level
estimates, MRP can be used to model public opinion at other subnational levels, like congressional
districts (Kastellec, Lax & Phillips 2010, Warshaw & Rodden 2012).
For the purposes of this analysis, estimates for perceived threat to whites’ group position must
be obtained at the congressional district level and for this, MRP is well equipped. To start, the survey
and survey question/s to be used to generate these estimates must be selected. To generate precise
MRP estimates at the district-level, a fairly large survey sample is required. For this, I turn to the
Cooperative Comparative Election Study (CCES), a large national sample of Americans. The CCES
does not have a question that taps perceived threat exactly, but it does have the racial resentment
battery. While racial resentment is not a measure of perceived threat, Chapter 2 demonstrates that
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racial resentment is a robust predictor of perceived threat. Whites who are high in racial resentment
are the ones who develop feelings of threat when they think about a growing minority population. It
follows that districts which are high in racial resentment are likely the places in which whites can
become threatened, and thus the locations in which politicians would most likely make negative
racial appeals. While racial resentment is not a direct measure of perceived threat, it generates the
same geographic expectations that would arise with a true measure of perceived threat.
While some prior work has used MRP to generate state-level racial resentment estimates (Smith,
Kreitzer & Suo 2019) and other work has generated district-level racial resentment measures using
disaggregation (Garcia & Stout 2019), the use of MRP for congressional district-level racial resent-
ment estimates is new. The CCES fields surveys every year, but the items are not always consistent
when it comes to measures of racial attitudes. In 2016, there are no racial resentment questions on
the CCES but in 2015, there are. There are racial resentment items in the 2014 CCES as well, but in
2014, the U.S. was in the 113th Congress. 2015 and 2016 compose the 114th Congress. Between
the 113th and 114th Congress, there were district changes as a result of redistricting in states like
North Carolina, Texas, and Florida. So in the 2014 data, there could be a mismatch between the
respondent’s identified congressional district and their 2016 congressional district if they lived in
an area that experienced redistricting. As a result, the 2015 CCES (N = 14,250) presents the best
possible data source for district-level racial resentment estimates.
To generate the estimates, I first collected and cleaned the 2015 CCES data and made the racial
resentment scale (range 0 – 1, mean = 0.64) where higher levels indicate greater resentment. I then
collected Census data for congressional districts for the 114th Congress using the Integrated Public
Use Microdata Series’s (IPUMS) National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS).
This provides Census population data at various levels of aggregation, including the congressional
district level. From IPUMS NHGIS, I obtained data on the gender, race, and educational attainment6
makeup of each congressional district. Race is split into the categories: white, black, Latinx, and
6I would ideally extract other predictors as well, but this is the most that the service makes available. It is
necessary to have the joint distribution of all of these items. For example, we must know the number of:
white, males with less than a high school diploma; the number of white males with a high school diploma; etc.
As such, race, gender, and educational attainment are the most specific demographics for which cross-tabs
exist. Nevertheless, Warshaw and Rodden (2012) similarly use only these demographics for their district level
estimates. They argue that the omission of a trait like age likely does not significantly affect the estimates,
especially given prior work which finds that there is little variation among age groups after controlling for
other predictors (Park, Gelman & Bafumi 2004).
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other. Educational attainment is split into: less than high school, high school diploma or equivalent,
some college, and a Bachelor’s degree or higher. I also obtained district-level characteristics like
median income of the district.
With these data, I estimate a model predicting racial resentment with education level, race, gender,
congressional district (by state), and the median income of the district. Then, I generate predictions
for the level of racial resentment, by each demographic type. Finally, I weight these predictions by
the proportion of the population that the demographic type makes up in each congressional district to
generate an overall predicted level of racial resentment for each district.
The resulting estimates for district-level racial resentment range from 0.24 to 0.61, with a mean
of 0.45. Figure 5.2 plots the distribution of district-level racial resentment. The district with the
lowest level of racial resentment is D.C. (RR = 0.24), followed by CA-47 (RR = 0.25), which is a
majority-minority district centered in Long Beach (24% white, 21% Asian, 34% Latinx, and 7%
black). These are followed by MD-7 (RR = 0.27), which is a majority-African American district that
encompasses over half of Baltimore City and was represented by Democrat Elijah Cummings until
his death in October 2019, and MD-5 (RR = 0.30) which is 60% white, 30% black, and 75% urban
(versus rural).
The most racially resentful districts include FL-11 (RR = 0.61) which occupies the Tampa
area. It is 87% white and has been a Republican district since being redistricted by 2013. FL-19
follows (RR = 0.59), which is a district in Southwestern Florida that is 86% white and has also been
Republican since being redistricted in 2013. Then, FL-16 (RR = 0.59), which represents Manatee
and Sarasota County. It is 84% white and has been a Republican district since 2009. Finally, NC-11
(RR = 0.57) is a district in western North Carolina that is 90% white and 53% rural, which was
represented by Republican Mark Meadows, former chair of the House Freedom Caucus, until 2020,
when he become President Trump’s Chief of Staff.
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These examples highlight that the measure is likely capturing the broad racial attitude makeup
of a district. Places with low levels of resentment include majority-minority districts, or very
liberal places like D.C. On the other hand, those districts with the highest levels of resentment are
majority-white and, in some cases, places in Florida and North Carolina that have been redistricted
to become safe districts for Republicans. These give some validity to the measure of district-level
racial resentment. While not a measure of threat in and of itself, it is a robust predictor of whites’
likelihood of feeling that their position in society or politics is threatened (see Chapter 2). As such, it
likely influences the extent to which politicians may choose to use negative racial appeals to garner
support. When they have a sense that their population is highly resentful and thus, easily threatened,
they may drum this up to bolster their use of negative racial appeals.
5.2 Analysis: Resentment and racial appeals
Using the district-level racial resentment and television advertising data, I can investigate a potential
link between the two. Due to the relative scarcity of negative racial appeals and to the fact that
data analysis is only 40% complete, I predict the occurrence of negative racial appeals as a whole,
regardless of target group and type (implicit or explicit). There are three main dependent variables:
(1) the number of unique House advertisements in a congressional district that include at least
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one negative racial appeal, (2) the total number of negative racial appeals made in all advertising
throughout the district, and (3) an indicator for whether or not one negative racial appeal is made in
the district.
All of these dependent variables are predicted with the district’s racial resentment level, ranging
from 0 to 1. The first two sets of models (predicting the number of unique advertisements that
include a negative racial appeal and predicting the number of negative racial appeals) are modeled
with ordinary least squares regressions. The third set of models, predicting whether or not a negative
racial appeal occurs in the district, are modeled with logistic regressions.
For these analyses, there are several important factors that may also influence the prevalence
of negative racial appeals. First, racial appeals may occur more frequently in competitive elections.
To account for this, I include a measure of election competitiveness from Cook’s Political Report.
Cook’s Political Report generates predictions about district competitiveness by comparing how each
district performs at the presidential level (in terms of partisan vote share) to the nation as a whole.
Districts that heavily lean toward one party, compared to the nation as a whole, are deemed safe
districts and are coded as non-competitive. Elections that have the potential to become competitive,
are leaning in one direction, and that are considered toss-ups are coded as competitive. In addition,
I include a couple of district-level demographic characteristics that could influence the prevalence
of negative racial appeals: the rural/urban makeup of the district and the racial makeup (proportion
white) of the district.7 Finally, I include a state-level indicator for whether the district is in a Southern
state.8
Table 5.4 reports results from bivariate and multiple regressions predicting the use of negative
racial appeals with district racial resentment estimates. Across every models, district-level racial
resentment statistically significantly (ranging from p < 0.01 to p < 0.10) predicts the prevalence
of negative racial appeals. Note that this is despite the low sample size and lack of data collection
completion, indicating that there likely is a substantive relationship present.
7District racial makeup obtained from American Community Survey data, from the IPUMS website, for the
114th Congressional districts. The Census only records rural/urban makeup in their decentennial survey,
so estimates are from 2010. This creates a small amount of data loss when it is included, because some
congressional districts changed between 2010 and 2016.
8Southern is defined by the Census as Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia,
West Virginia, Delaware, Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and
Texas.
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Models 1 and 2 predict the number of advertisements in a district that will contain at least one
negative racial appeal. Moving from the lowest level of district racial resentment to the highest results
in seven more advertisements containing negative racial appeals. Considering the mean number of
advertisements in a given district is only eight, this is a substantial increase.
Table 5.4: Predicting negative racial appeals in 2016 House elections with district-level racial
resentment
N Unique Ads N Neg. Appeals Indicator
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
(Intercept) −3.07∗ −3.03∗ −4.85∗ −4.75∗ −5.14∗∗∗ −4.84∗∗
(1.67) (1.69) (2.49) (2.54) (1.98) (2.07)
District racial resentment 9.55∗∗ 7.52∗ 14.43∗∗∗ 11.73∗ 11.09∗∗ 10.98∗∗
(3.68) (4.24) (5.47) (6.35) (4.35) (5.08)
Prop. rural in district 0.63 0.76 2.98∗
(1.26) (1.89) (1.58)
Prop. white in district 0.01 −0.12 −1.87
(1.36) (2.04) (1.60)
Competitive election 1.05∗∗ 1.25∗ 0.68
(0.43) (0.65) (0.51)
Southern state 1.04∗∗ 1.64∗∗ 0.52
(0.44) (0.65) (0.51)
R2 0.07 0.16 0.07 0.16
Adj. R2 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.11
Num. obs. 96 92 96 92 96 92
RMSE 1.90 1.87 2.83 2.80
AIC 129.42 124.83
BIC 134.55 139.97
Log Likelihood -62.71 -56.42
Deviance 125.42 112.83
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
In the first four sets of models, the competitiveness of the election and the geographic location
of the election also matter. Competitive elections see an increase of one advertisement that contains
a negative racial appeal (Model 2, p < 0.05) and an increase in one negative racial appeal overall
(Model 4, p < 0.10). This indicates that politicians may turn to negative racial appeals slightly
more often when they are under electoral pressure. In terms of geography, districts that are within
Southern states saw about one more advertisement that contained a negative racial appeal compared
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to non-Southern states (Model 2, p < 0.05) and about one and a half more negative racial appeals in
general (Model 4, p < 0.05).
Models 5 and 6 predict whether any negative racial appeal will be made during an election.
Recall that this occurs in 45 of the 96 districts. District racial resentment is significantly and positively
related (p < 0.05) to the presence of a negative racial appeal across both models. The only other item
that matters in these models is the rural makeup of the district. Districts with larger rural populations
are more likely to experience an advertisement with a negative racial appeal (p < 0.10).
Figure 5.3 plots the predicted probability of an occurrence of a negative racial appeal in a con-
gressional election, based on district-level racial resentment (using Model 6). When racial resentment
is about 0.30 (on a 0 to 1 scale), there is only about a 12% chance that a congressional television
advertisement will contain a negative racial appeal. However, when district racial resentment is
double that, at about 0.60, the chance that an advertisement will contain a negative racial appeal
shoots up to 75%.
Figure 5.3: Predicted percent chance of a negative racial appeal occurring in a congressional district,


























The extent to which a district is racially resentful, on the whole, at least partially determines
whether politicians will use negative racial appeals in their campaign advertising. The racial attitude
makeup of the district determines both the presence and quantity of negative racial appeals.
5.3 Conclusion
Just as racial attitudes and perceived threat are linked with an acceptance of negative racial appeals
on the individual level, they appear to be linked at the district level as well. More work is needed
to finish coding the advertisements in this dataset to better evaluate this phenomenon; but, these
preliminary results suggest a relationship. When the data collection is complete, there will likely be
more variation in the type and target of the negative racial appeal, making for a deeper and more
comprehensive understanding of racial appeals in campaign advertising.
One important caveat to the analysis presented here is that racial resentment is not perceived
threat. Instead, it is being used here as a proxy since it determines the extent to which whites
develop feelings of threat. In the future, I hope to be able to generate other measures that could
model perceived threat with which I could further explore the connection that appears to exist in this
analysis.
As a whole, preliminary results presented in this chapter suggest that congressional districts
with higher levels of racial resentment experience campaign advertising that has more negative
racial appeals. Taken alongside the individual-level evidence presented throughout this manuscript
that demonstrates the way that perceived threat leads to an acceptance of negative racial appeals, it
suggests a broad pattern, rather than an anomaly.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
The prevalence of overtly racial and racialized language is rising in politics (Valentino, Newburg
& Neuner 2018) and such language is no longer rejected by whites, as it used to be (Valentino, Neuner
& Vandenbroek 2018). This manuscript investigated why we have a seen a shift in the acceptability
of negative, explicit racial appeals among whites. Through a series of experimental and observational
data at both the individual and aggregate level, it has demonstrated that feelings of threat contribute
to whites’ approval of explicit racial rhetoric. When whites feel like they are losing their status on
top of the racial hierarchy, and when that bothers them, their prejudice is activated and they are more
willing to approve of racist rhetoric from politicians.
The norm of equality, the notion that all people are equal regardless of race, used to dominate.
In adhering to this norm, whites would reject language that overtly denigrated racial and ethnic
minorities. They were still willing to accept racist rhetoric, but only when it was implicit, subtle,
and deniable. Now, for some whites, such subtlety is no longer required. Feeling threatened has
partially weakened this norm of equality. Because their prejudice is activated, they ignore this norm
and instead approve of rhetoric that allows them to express their prejudice.
This does appear to be happening somewhat unevenly across the population. Whites are starting
to sharply divide in their reported racial attitudes. Democratic whites are reporting lower levels of
racial resentment than they had in recent years, while Republican whites are reporting higher levels.
The divide is growing. Simultaneously, politicians are seizing this opportunity. Democrats appear
to be doubling down on rhetoric that embraces the norm of equality while Republicans are instead
emphasizing whites’ status threat.
Democratic whites’ recent decline in racial resentment does not necessarily mean that they are
truly letting go of racial animus. For one thing, even though their racial resentment is declining,
the mean level of racial resentment is still about 0.40 on a 0 to 1 scale.1 That means that they are
reporting levels of racial resentment that are slightly below responding “neither agree nor disagree”
1Among white Democrats and leaners, 2016 ANES data.
to statements about whether blacks should not get special favors and whether they need to simply
try harder. While a decline in racial resentment is normatively a good thing, it does not necessarily
mean that white Democrats are outright rejecting racism these days. Further, racial resentment is
only one measure of racial attitudes, and recent work has demonstrated that it may not be the most
robust measure, especially for younger cohorts of Americans (DeSante & Smith 2019).
Nevertheless, a divide in attitudes about their racial group’s position in society exists among
whites, largely along party lines. For Republicans, this polarization has removed barriers to making
explicit, negative racial appeals that used to exist. Now, these appeals can be made to mobilize a base
that is united in their sense that whites have the right amount of influence, or perhaps even too little
influence, in politics today. They do not want to lose their status on top of the racial hierarchy, and
thus are more willing to approve of denigrations of racial minorities.
The effect that this divide has had on the way that Democratic politicians operate is still unclear.
The majority of this manuscript has focused on the presence, use, and effectiveness of negative racial
appeals. However, as whites divide in their perceptions of their group’s status, Democratic politicians
are likely similarly exploiting this divide. Are Democrats making positive, explicit racial appeals? If
so, who are these appeals mobilizing? Do whites respond positively to anti-racist or pro-diversity
appeals? How do black, Latinx, Asian, and other non-white members view these appeals, and does
the race of the politician making the appeal matter? Right now, there are more questions than answers
about how explicit, positive appeals operate in American politics. With the dataset of racial appeals in
congressional advertising presented in this manuscript, I hope to be able to investigate these questions
further.
Further, politicians are not solely making appeals about race. There is a deeper divide. The
election of Donald Trump, despite his misogynistic comments and history of sexual assault, illustrates
that a similar cleavage likely exists around gender and explicit gendered appeals. In the future, I
want to better understand the ways that other identity-based appeals compare to race-based appeals.
While there is likely much they have in common, there is also likely something specific to racial
appeals, as race has so starkly divided America since its inception (Myrdal 1944).
Finally, while this manuscript has demonstrated that feeling threatened is one way that a norm of
equality is weakened, there are likely many other forces that both strengthen and weaken this norm.
Successful social movements, for example, can inculcate social norms. The norm of racial equality,
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as Tali Mendelberg proposes it, arose from the modern Civil Rights Movements’ successes. Thus,
while this manuscript has clarified one force at work, it leaves open an investigation into many more
than could be contributing to the change in acceptance of explicit racial rhetoric.
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APPENDIX A: CHAPTER TWO APPENDIX
A.1 Control article
Figure A.1: Control condition
Citations for the status threat treatment condition
• Beinart, Peter. “There is no immigration crisis.” The Atlantic. 27 June 2018. Link: theat-
lantic.com
• Cohn, D’Vera. “It’s official: Minority babies are the majority among the nation’s infants, but
only just.” Pew Research Center. 23 June 2016. Link: pewresearch.org
• Craig, Maureen A. & Jennifer A. Richeson. 2014b. “On the precipice of majority-minority
America: Perceived status threat from the racial demographic shift affects White Americans’
political ideology.” Psychological Science 25(6) 1189-1197.
• Frey, William H. “The US will become ‘minority white’ in 2045, Census projects. Youthful
minorities are the engine of future growth.” Brookings. 14 March 2018. Link: brookings.edu
• Poston, Dudley Jr. and Rogelio Saenz. “U.S. whites will soon be the minority in number, but
not power.” The Baltimore Sun. 8 August 2017. Link: baltimoresun.com
• Tavernise, Sabrina. “Fewer births than deaths among whites in Majority of U.S. states.” The
New York Times. 20 June 2018. Link: nytimes.com
Citation for the control condition
• Ihrke, David. “United States Mover Rate at a New Record Low.” Census Blogs. 23 January
2017. Link: census.gov
A.2 Models with racial resentment as a factor variable
Models were estimated with racial resentment specified as a factor variable as well. The predicted
level of each emotion is presented in A.2 for Survey 1 and A.3 for Survey 2.
Figure A.2: Survey 1: Predicted emotional reaction, based on racial resentment level, specified as a
factor variable







































































































Figure A.3: Survey 2: Predicted emotional reaction, based on racial resentment level, specified as a
factor variable




























































































APPENDIX B: CHAPTER THREE APPENDIX
B.1 Survey 1 (Winter 2018-2019)
B.1.1 Descriptive statistics
Table B.1 reports the means, standard deviations, minima, and maxima for key variables included
in the analysis. The first five variables are the evaluations of the racist flyer (the negative, explicit
racial appeal). The next seven variables are the emotional reactions to the article (treatment). Figure
B.1 plots the distribution of the racial resentment variable in the dataset. The distribution is nearly
identical for every subset of the dataset as well (i.e. excluding the control condition, excluding the
status threat condition, and excluding the status allay condition) — recall racial resentment was
measured pre-treatment (in wave one).
Table B.1: Descriptive statistics of key variables used in the analysis
N Mean SD Min Max
Flyer: Fair point 650.00 2.84 1.47 1.00 5.00
Flyer: Insensitive 648.00 3.37 1.41 1.00 5.00
Flyer: Agree 649.00 4.09 2.06 1.00 7.00
Flyer: Offend 650.00 2.77 1.45 1.00 5.00
Flyer: Vote 649.00 3.05 1.73 1.00 6.00
Article: Anxiety 661.00 1.97 1.21 1.00 5.00
Article: Pride 659.00 1.94 1.17 1.00 5.00
Article: Anger 660.00 1.70 1.12 1.00 5.00
Article: Hope 660.00 2.06 1.21 1.00 5.00
Article: Worry 662.00 1.93 1.22 1.00 5.00
Article: Excitement 661.00 1.79 1.11 1.00 5.00
Article: Felt Threat Scale 659.00 1.86 1.08 1.00 5.00














Note: mean = 0.58; range = [0,1]; sd = 0.26; N=1,352
B.1.2 Power analysis
In order to ensure that this survey has substantial power to evaluate hypotheses, I perform two power
analyses. First, I perform a Sobel Test for mediation analyses. Then, I calculate power testing
mediation effects in linear regressions based on Vittinghoff, Sen and McCullochs (2009) method.
I use the mediation model that specifies the felt threat scale as the mediator and predicts the fair
point DV. Both tests demonstrate that my model is sufficiently powered to evaluate hypotheses, as
evidenced by power statistics that approach 1 (see Table B.2).
Table B.2: Power tests for mediation model




Below, Table B.3 presents results from a manipulation check. The same question was asked in both
wave one and wave two intended to tap status threat. This question, adapted from Craig and Richeson
(2014a, 2014b), asks respondents to indicate their level of agreement with the statement: “Racial
minorities are likely to reduce the influence of White Americans in society very soon.”1 In wave two,
this question is asked once the experiment, and all relevant dependent variables, have been asked.
Table B.3 demonstrates that respondent’s level of status threat reported in wave two is predicted
by their level of status threat in wave one, along with the treatment condition they were assigned.
The baseline here is the true control condition, to which both treatments are compared. The status
threat treatment significantly raised respondents’ level of perceived threat (0.31) and the status allay
treatment significant depressed it (-0.47).
Table B.3: Manipulation Check
Coefficient Stan. Error
(Intercept) 2.74∗∗ (0.21)
Status Allay (Treatment 2) −0.47∗∗ (0.15)
Status Threat (Treatment 1) 0.31∗ (0.14)
R’s baseline level of status threat (wave one) 0.38∗∗ (0.04)
Adj. R2 0.15
Num. obs. 648
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
B.1.4 Balance check
Table B.4 presents a series of OLS regressions predicting pre-treatment covariates with treatment
condition indicators to ensure that the conditions were balanced on ideological and demographic
covariates. There is one statistically significant effect: education was higher in the heightened status
threat treatment condition than the control (by 0.36 on an 11 point scale). This would influence
1Craig and Richeson’s question actually begins with “If they increase in status,...” and does not include “very
soon” at the end.
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the first analysis (the average treatment effects), which produced null results, but it would have no
influence on the mediation models, as these control for all covariates including education, so its
effect would be isolated and controlled for.
Table B.4: Balance check: predicting covariates with treatment condition indicators
PID Ideology RR Educ Income Gender Age
(Intercept) 4.27∗∗ 4.26∗∗ 0.59∗∗ 6.20∗∗ 9.63∗∗ 0.37∗∗ 51.51∗∗
(0.15) (0.13) (0.02) (0.12) (0.32) (0.03) (1.08)
Status Allay Treatment −0.07 0.01 −0.01 0.12 −0.32 0.03 0.72
(0.22) (0.18) (0.02) (0.17) (0.45) (0.05) (1.52)
Status Threat Treatment 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.36∗ 0.29 0.06 1.27
(0.21) (0.17) (0.02) (0.17) (0.44) (0.05) (1.49)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adj. R2 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Num. obs. 675 640 690 690 688 690 690
RMSE 2.25 1.82 0.26 1.79 4.77 0.49 16.03
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
B.1.5 Sensitivity tests for mediation models
The assumption of sequential ignorability is impossible to directly test — but sensitivity analyses
can determine the range of values over which the substantive results from the mediation analysis
hold. Note that these tests are specifically about the range of values over which the average causal
mediation effect (ACME) of the mediator (here, negative emotions) holds, not the total effect of
the treatment. These sensitivity tests evaluate how bad a violation of the assumption of sequential
ignorability needs to be before a difference in the ACME is produced.
Here, ρ is the sensitivity parameter which describes a range of violations of the assumption of
sequential ignorability. When ρ = 0, the assumption holds and the ACME that is reported in the
body of the paper is produced. The question that these tests help answer is: how large must ρ be
before the mediation effect essentially becomes zero? This can be thought of as a similar issue to
that of omitted variable bias. The researcher may be concerned that there is some omitted variable
that effects both the independent and dependent variables (here, we are concerned that there is some
omitted variable that effects the mediator and the dependent variable). This essentially asks how big
the effect of the omitted variable must be to produce the effects that we observe, assuming that the
true effect of the mediator is zero.
For the following analyses, I examine the sensitivity of the mediation models that use the closest
theoretical measure of threat (the scale of negative emotions) as the mediator. For the average
mediation effect for the treatment group to become zero, ρ must be 0.30 for the “fair point” DV, 0.28
for the “vote” DV, and 0.19 for the “agree” DV (see Table B.5). These numbers do not necessarily
communicate anything on their own, but we could compare them to Imai et al. (2011)’s replication
of the Brader, Valentino, and Suhay (2008) analysis in which the value of ρ for which the ACME
becomes 0 was 0.34 — so my results are fairly comparable and relatively robust. Further, we can
compare them to one another. The dependent variables that measure whether the respondent believes
that the flyer made a fair point or whether the respondent would vote for the politician that put out
the flyer appear to be more robust than the results for the DV about agreeing about the claims made
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about African Americans in the flyer. Figures B.2, B.3, and B.4 plot the average causal mediation
effect across a range of values of ρ. The figures on the left are the values for the control condition
(and thus, not of particular importance on their own) and the figures on the right are the values for
the treatment condition. The control plots do serve to demonstrate that these causal mediation effects
are specific to the treatment condition.
Table B.5: Sensitivity parameters for each model, for ACMEs in the control and treatment groups
Fair Point Vote Agree
Rho at which ACME =0 (Control Group) 0.02 0.14 -0.01
Rho at which ACME = 0 (Treatment Group) 0.30 0.28 0.19
Figure B.2: Sensitivity analyses for the mediation model predicting “fair point” DV














































Figure B.3: Sensitivity analyses for the mediation model predicting “vote” DV















































Figure B.4: Sensitivity analyses for the mediation model predicting “agree” DV














































B.2 Survey 1: Full mediation models
B.2.1 Mediator: Anxiety
Table B.6: Mediation Models: Fair Point DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) 0.07 -0.02 0.19 0.14
ACME (treated) 0.16 *** 0.07 0.27 <2e-16
ADE (control) 0.05 -0.22 0.31 0.73
ADE (treated) 0.14 -0.13 0.40 0.30
Total Effect 0.21 . -0.03 0.46 0.10
Prop. Mediated (control) 0.30 -1.26 2.73 0.22
Prop. Mediated (treated) 0.73 . -3.37 6.38 0.10
ACME (average) 0.12 *** 0.05 0.20 <2e-16
ADE (average) 0.09 -0.16 0.35 0.46
Prop. Mediated (average) 0.52 . -2.40 4.66 0.10
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=404 white respondents
Table B.7: Mediation Models: Vote DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) 0.11 * 0.00 0.23 0.03
ACME (treated) 0.19 *** 0.09 0.31 <2e-16
ADE (control) -0.09 -0.39 0.20 0.56
ADE (treated) -0.01 -0.31 0.28 0.95
Total Effect 0.10 -0.21 0.37 0.51
Prop. Mediated (control) 0.49 -8.06 9.29 0.52
Prop. Mediated (treated) 0.90 -11.76 13.38 0.51
ACME (average) 0.15 *** 0.07 0.25 <2e-16
ADE (average) -0.05 -0.35 0.24 0.74
Prop. Mediated (average) 0.69 -10.34 11.56 0.51
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=404 white respondents
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Table B.8: Mediation Models: Offend DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) 0.10 * 0.01 0.22 0.04
ACME (treated) 0.01 -0.07 0.09 0.82
ADE (control) -0.11 -0.38 0.15 0.42
ADE (treated) -0.20 -0.48 0.08 0.15
Total Effect -0.10 -0.36 0.16 0.44
Prop. Mediated (control) -0.52 -13.03 7.85 0.45
Prop. Mediated (treated) -0.04 -4.56 2.22 0.90
ACME (average) 0.06 . 0.00 0.13 0.08
ADE (average) -0.16 -0.41 0.11 0.23
Prop. Mediated (average) -0.28 -7.56 4.09 0.47
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=404 white respondents
Table B.9: Mediation Models: Insensitive DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) -0.01 -0.10 0.09 0.87
ACME (treated) -0.06 -0.15 0.01 0.12
ADE (control) 0.02 -0.23 0.26 0.89
ADE (treated) -0.03 -0.29 0.22 0.80
Total Effect -0.04 -0.27 0.20 0.73
Prop. Mediated (control) 0.03 -3.72 5.33 0.94
Prop. Mediated (treated) 0.25 -7.36 9.35 0.76
ACME (average) -0.03 -0.10 0.03 0.26
ADE (average) -0.01 -0.25 0.24 0.96
Prop. Mediated (average) 0.14 -4.52 6.59 0.79
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=404 white respondents
Table B.10: Mediation Models: Agree DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) 0.02 -0.10 0.15 0.81
ACME (treated) 0.16 ** 0.05 0.29 0.00
ADE (control) -0.22 -0.57 0.13 0.22
ADE (treated) -0.08 -0.42 0.27 0.65
Total Effect -0.06 -0.40 0.26 0.72
Prop. Mediated (control) -0.01 -3.79 4.25 0.98
Prop. Mediated (treated) -0.60 -13.53 15.56 0.72
ACME (average) 0.09 * 0.01 0.18 0.03
ADE (average) -0.15 -0.49 0.19 0.38
Prop. Mediated (average) -0.30 -8.20 9.14 0.74
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=404 white respondents
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B.2.2 Mediator: Pride
Table B.11: Mediation Models: Fair Point DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) 0.08 ** 0.02 0.18 0.01
ACME (treated) 0.06 * 0.00 0.13 0.03
ADE (control) 0.15 -0.11 0.40 0.25
ADE (treated) 0.12 -0.14 0.37 0.34
Total Effect 0.20 -0.04 0.45 0.10
Prop. Mediated (control) 0.36 -2.14 3.04 0.11
Prop. Mediated (treated) 0.25 -1.17 2.33 0.14
ACME (average) 0.07 *** 0.02 0.14 <2e-16
ADE (average) 0.13 -0.12 0.39 0.28
Prop. Mediated (average) 0.30 -1.86 2.61 0.10
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=402 white respondents
Table B.12: Mediation Models: Vote DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) 0.15 ** 0.05 0.28 0.00
ACME (treated) 0.03 -0.03 0.11 0.36
ADE (control) 0.07 -0.23 0.35 0.61
ADE (treated) -0.05 -0.35 0.22 0.78
Total Effect 0.10 -0.19 0.37 0.50
Prop. Mediated (control) 0.71 -12.73 9.92 0.50
Prop. Mediated (treated) 0.12 -2.15 2.39 0.66
ACME (average) 0.09 ** 0.03 0.18 0.01
ADE (average) 0.01 -0.29 0.27 0.92
Prop. Mediated (average) 0.41 -7.29 6.21 0.50
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=402 white respondents
Table B.13: Mediation Models: Offend DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) 0.00 -0.08 0.08 0.98
ACME (treated) 0.04 -0.02 0.11 0.19
ADE (control) -0.14 -0.40 0.09 0.26
ADE (treated) -0.10 -0.35 0.13 0.42
Total Effect -0.10 -0.34 0.13 0.41
Prop. Mediated (control) -0.01 -2.15 2.19 0.97
Prop. Mediated (treated) -0.19 -4.62 3.05 0.54
ACME (average) 0.02 -0.03 0.07 0.38
ADE (average) -0.12 -0.37 0.10 0.35
Prop. Mediated (average) -0.10 -2.22 1.85 0.67
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=402 white respondents
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Table B.14: Mediation Models: Insensitive DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) -0.02 -0.10 0.04 0.42
ACME (treated) 0.01 -0.05 0.06 0.83
ADE (control) -0.05 -0.30 0.19 0.68
ADE (treated) -0.02 -0.27 0.24 0.88
Total Effect -0.04 -0.29 0.19 0.70
Prop. Mediated (control) 0.07 -3.60 4.14 0.82
Prop. Mediated (treated) -0.01 -2.68 2.18 0.96
ACME (average) -0.01 -0.06 0.03 0.65
ADE (average) -0.04 -0.28 0.21 0.77
Prop. Mediated (average) 0.03 -2.05 2.03 0.88
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=402 white respondents
Table B.15: Mediation Models: Agree DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) 0.06 -0.02 0.17 0.18
ACME (treated) 0.01 -0.06 0.09 0.74
ADE (control) -0.06 -0.41 0.27 0.75
ADE (treated) -0.11 -0.47 0.24 0.56
Total Effect -0.05 -0.38 0.29 0.79
Prop. Mediated (control) -0.13 -6.40 5.02 0.81
Prop. Mediated (treated) -0.02 -2.45 2.80 0.92
ACME (average) 0.04 -0.02 0.11 0.21
ADE (average) -0.08 -0.44 0.26 0.64
Prop. Mediated (average) -0.07 -3.61 4.18 0.82
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=402 white respondents
B.2.3 Mediator: Anger
Table B.16: Mediation Models: Fair Point DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) -0.04 -0.16 0.08 0.53
ACME (treated) 0.20 *** 0.11 0.32 <2e-16
ADE (control) 0.01 -0.27 0.28 0.97
ADE (treated) 0.25 . -0.03 0.53 0.08
Total Effect 0.21 . -0.04 0.47 0.09
Prop. Mediated (control) -0.17 -1.89 1.65 0.57
Prop. Mediated (treated) 0.91 . -3.70 7.79 0.09
ACME (average) 0.08 * 0.01 0.17 0.02
ADE (average) 0.13 -0.14 0.40 0.32
Prop. Mediated (average) 0.37 -1.54 3.83 0.11
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=402 white respondents
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Table B.17: Mediation Models: Vote DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) 0.10 -0.04 0.25 0.18
ACME (treated) 0.17 *** 0.07 0.30 <2e-16
ADE (control) -0.05 -0.37 0.22 0.74
ADE (treated) 0.02 -0.31 0.33 0.94
Total Effect 0.12 -0.17 0.40 0.41
Prop. Mediated (control) 0.46 -5.93 9.27 0.51
Prop. Mediated (treated) 0.82 -8.50 16.47 0.41
ACME (average) 0.14 ** 0.05 0.25 0.01
ADE (average) -0.02 -0.33 0.26 0.90
Prop. Mediated (average) 0.64 -6.57 12.39 0.41
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=402 white respondents
Table B.18: Mediation Models: Offend DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) 0.16 ** 0.04 0.32 0.01
ACME (treated) 0.02 -0.06 0.10 0.66
ADE (control) -0.13 -0.39 0.11 0.33
ADE (treated) -0.28 * -0.55 -0.02 0.04
Total Effect -0.11 -0.36 0.11 0.41
Prop. Mediated (control) -0.84 -10.63 18.73 0.40
Prop. Mediated (treated) -0.07 -2.78 2.92 0.82
ACME (average) 0.09 * 0.01 0.18 0.02
ADE (average) -0.20 . -0.45 0.04 0.10
Prop. Mediated (average) -0.46 -6.19 9.17 0.41
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=402 white respondents
Table B.19: Mediation Models: Insensitive DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) 0.07 -0.04 0.20 0.22
ACME (treated) -0.07 . -0.16 0.00 0.07
ADE (control) 0.02 -0.24 0.28 0.87
ADE (treated) -0.13 -0.39 0.16 0.35
Total Effect -0.05 -0.29 0.17 0.62
Prop. Mediated (control) -0.30 -11.40 7.61 0.70
Prop. Mediated (treated) 0.38 -6.07 8.44 0.63
ACME (average) 0.00 -0.07 0.07 0.99
ADE (average) -0.05 -0.31 0.20 0.65
Prop. Mediated (average) 0.04 -3.73 3.14 0.99
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=402 white respondents
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Table B.20: Mediation Models: Agree DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) 0.04 -0.10 0.21 0.59
ACME (treated) 0.13 ** 0.03 0.26 0.01
ADE (control) -0.18 -0.53 0.16 0.29
ADE (treated) -0.09 -0.46 0.30 0.64
Total Effect -0.04 -0.37 0.29 0.80
Prop. Mediated (control) -0.10 -7.21 6.85 0.88
Prop. Mediated (treated) -0.41 -14.23 13.05 0.80
ACME (average) 0.09 . 0.00 0.20 0.07
ADE (average) -0.13 -0.48 0.21 0.43
Prop. Mediated (average) -0.25 -8.67 6.99 0.81
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=402 white respondents
B.2.4 Mediator: Hopeful
Table B.21: Mediation Models: Fair Point DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) 0.02 -0.01 0.08 0.20
ACME (treated) 0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.29
ADE (control) 0.19 -0.06 0.45 0.13
ADE (treated) 0.19 -0.08 0.43 0.13
Total Effect 0.21 . -0.05 0.46 0.10
Prop. Mediated (control) 0.08 -0.40 0.88 0.28
Prop. Mediated (treated) 0.06 -0.33 0.78 0.37
ACME (average) 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.13
ADE (average) 0.19 -0.07 0.44 0.13
Prop. Mediated (average) 0.07 -0.42 0.70 0.22
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=403 white respondents
Table B.22: Mediation Models: Vote DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) 0.06 -0.01 0.15 0.11
ACME (treated) -0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.70
ADE (control) 0.09 -0.19 0.39 0.54
ADE (treated) 0.03 -0.25 0.34 0.92
Total Effect 0.09 -0.20 0.39 0.58
Prop. Mediated (control) 0.25 -7.53 6.89 0.59
Prop. Mediated (treated) -0.01 -1.61 1.61 0.88
ACME (average) 0.03 -0.01 0.08 0.12
ADE (average) 0.06 -0.22 0.36 0.75
Prop. Mediated (average) 0.12 -2.81 2.93 0.60
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=403 white respondents
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Table B.23: Mediation Models: Offend DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) 0.00 -0.04 0.04 0.98
ACME (treated) 0.04 -0.01 0.11 0.10
ADE (control) -0.14 -0.39 0.12 0.26
ADE (treated) -0.10 -0.34 0.15 0.41
Total Effect -0.10 -0.34 0.15 0.42
Prop. Mediated (control) 0.00 -0.80 1.05 1.00
Prop. Mediated (treated) -0.19 -3.05 3.33 0.48
ACME (average) 0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.15
ADE (average) -0.12 -0.36 0.13 0.33
Prop. Mediated (average) -0.10 -1.41 1.80 0.51
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=403 white respondents
Table B.24: Mediation Models: Insensitive DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) -0.02 -0.06 0.01 0.36
ACME (treated) 0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.28
ADE (control) -0.06 -0.30 0.18 0.63
ADE (treated) -0.03 -0.26 0.21 0.80
Total Effect -0.04 -0.28 0.19 0.71
Prop. Mediated (control) 0.03 -2.95 1.95 0.85
Prop. Mediated (treated) -0.03 -1.65 2.17 0.83
ACME (average) 0.00 -0.02 0.03 1.00
ADE (average) -0.05 -0.28 0.20 0.72
Prop. Mediated (average) 0.00 -0.98 0.95 0.99
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=403 white respondents
Table B.25: Mediation Models: Agree DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) 0.03 -0.01 0.11 0.18
ACME (treated) -0.02 -0.08 0.02 0.41
ADE (control) -0.05 -0.40 0.28 0.77
ADE (treated) -0.10 -0.45 0.25 0.52
Total Effect -0.07 -0.41 0.26 0.67
Prop. Mediated (control) -0.07 -4.99 4.38 0.74
Prop. Mediated (treated) 0.02 -2.01 1.98 0.79
ACME (average) 0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.58
ADE (average) -0.08 -0.43 0.26 0.63
Prop. Mediated (average) -0.02 -1.80 1.68 0.91
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=403 white respondents
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B.2.5 Mediator: Worry
Table B.26: Mediation Models: Fair Point DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) -0.03 -0.15 0.09 0.58
ACME (treated) 0.21 *** 0.11 0.33 <2e-16
ADE (control) -0.01 -0.29 0.26 0.91
ADE (treated) 0.24 -0.04 0.52 0.10
Total Effect 0.20 -0.05 0.46 0.11
Prop. Mediated (control) -0.15 -2.12 1.53 0.62
Prop. Mediated (treated) 0.98 -6.13 8.76 0.11
ACME (average) 0.09 * 0.02 0.18 0.02
ADE (average) 0.11 -0.16 0.38 0.38
Prop. Mediated (average) 0.42 -3.04 3.77 0.13
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=404 white respondents
Table B.27: Mediation Models: Vote DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) 0.08 -0.05 0.22 0.22
ACME (treated) 0.24 *** 0.13 0.38 <2e-16
ADE (control) -0.15 -0.46 0.15 0.34
ADE (treated) 0.01 -0.29 0.32 0.94
Total Effect 0.09 -0.21 0.37 0.53
Prop. Mediated (control) 0.32 -8.16 6.30 0.64
Prop. Mediated (treated) 1.14 -17.63 21.58 0.53
ACME (average) 0.16 *** 0.07 0.27 <2e-16
ADE (average) -0.07 -0.37 0.23 0.67
Prop. Mediated (average) 0.73 -12.85 12.50 0.53
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=404 white respondents
Table B.28: Mediation Models: Offend DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) 0.22 *** 0.10 0.37 <2e-16
ACME (treated) -0.01 -0.10 0.08 0.75
ADE (control) -0.09 -0.38 0.18 0.54
ADE (treated) -0.33 * -0.62 -0.04 0.02
Total Effect -0.10 -0.37 0.15 0.44
Prop. Mediated (control) -1.19 -25.74 19.71 0.44
Prop. Mediated (treated) 0.05 -4.18 3.45 0.87
ACME (average) 0.10 ** 0.03 0.19 0.00
ADE (average) -0.21 -0.48 0.06 0.13
Prop. Mediated (average) -0.57 -11.28 8.65 0.45
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=404 white respondents
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Table B.29: Mediation Models: Insensitive DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) 0.11 * 0.01 0.24 0.04
ACME (treated) -0.06 -0.15 0.03 0.18
ADE (control) 0.01 -0.24 0.25 0.94
ADE (treated) -0.16 -0.43 0.11 0.25
Total Effect -0.05 -0.28 0.18 0.71
Prop. Mediated (control) -0.51 -16.00 15.24 0.71
Prop. Mediated (treated) 0.21 -9.78 10.64 0.78
ACME (average) 0.03 -0.04 0.11 0.44
ADE (average) -0.07 -0.32 0.17 0.55
Prop. Mediated (average) -0.15 -4.36 4.48 0.79
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=404 white respondents
Table B.30: Mediation Models: Agree DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) -0.06 -0.21 0.10 0.44
ACME (treated) 0.19 ** 0.07 0.34 0.00
ADE (control) -0.27 -0.63 0.10 0.17
ADE (treated) -0.01 -0.38 0.36 0.95
Total Effect -0.07 -0.42 0.26 0.68
Prop. Mediated (control) 0.14 -5.71 7.89 0.83
Prop. Mediated (treated) -0.76 -19.57 16.64 0.68
ACME (average) 0.07 -0.03 0.17 0.18
ADE (average) -0.14 -0.48 0.21 0.42
Prop. Mediated (average) -0.31 -5.71 7.24 0.77
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=404 white respondents
B.2.6 Mediator: Excited
Table B.31: Mediation Models: Fair Point DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) 0.03 -0.01 0.10 0.15
ACME (treated) 0.05 * 0.01 0.11 0.02
ADE (control) 0.16 -0.09 0.42 0.20
ADE (treated) 0.17 -0.08 0.43 0.16
Total Effect 0.21 . -0.04 0.47 0.10
Prop. Mediated (control) 0.13 -0.48 1.23 0.23
Prop. Mediated (treated) 0.20 -1.07 1.90 0.12
ACME (average) 0.04 * 0.00 0.09 0.02
ADE (average) 0.17 -0.09 0.42 0.17
Prop. Mediated (average) 0.16 -0.97 1.68 0.12
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=403 white respondents
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Table B.32: Mediation Models: Vote DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) 0.07 * 0.01 0.17 0.03
ACME (treated) 0.02 -0.03 0.08 0.47
ADE (control) 0.07 -0.21 0.37 0.67
ADE (treated) 0.02 -0.27 0.32 0.98
Total Effect 0.09 -0.19 0.39 0.56
Prop. Mediated (control) 0.31 -7.21 8.66 0.57
Prop. Mediated (treated) 0.05 -2.45 2.95 0.76
ACME (average) 0.05 * 0.00 0.11 0.02
ADE (average) 0.04 -0.24 0.34 0.85
Prop. Mediated (average) 0.18 -6.03 5.16 0.57
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=403 white respondents
Table B.33: Mediation Models: Offend DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) 0.00 -0.05 0.05 0.93
ACME (treated) 0.03 -0.01 0.09 0.16
ADE (control) -0.13 -0.37 0.13 0.30
ADE (treated) -0.10 -0.34 0.15 0.43
Total Effect -0.10 -0.35 0.15 0.42
Prop. Mediated (control) 0.00 -1.39 1.64 0.98
Prop. Mediated (treated) -0.11 -1.99 2.76 0.52
ACME (average) 0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.45
ADE (average) -0.12 -0.36 0.14 0.36
Prop. Mediated (average) -0.06 -1.09 1.58 0.70
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=403 white respondents
Table B.34: Mediation Models: Insensitive DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) -0.01 -0.07 0.03 0.51
ACME (treated) 0.00 -0.04 0.04 0.80
ADE (control) -0.04 -0.27 0.20 0.74
ADE (treated) -0.03 -0.26 0.21 0.80
Total Effect -0.05 -0.28 0.20 0.69
Prop. Mediated (control) 0.05 -2.06 4.03 0.83
Prop. Mediated (treated) 0.02 -2.27 1.94 0.91
ACME (average) -0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.55
ADE (average) -0.04 -0.26 0.20 0.78
Prop. Mediated (average) 0.03 -1.56 2.36 0.88
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=403 white respondents
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Table B.35: Mediation Models: Agree DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) 0.03 -0.03 0.11 0.26
ACME (treated) 0.01 -0.04 0.07 0.66
ADE (control) -0.08 -0.42 0.26 0.64
ADE (treated) -0.10 -0.45 0.25 0.53
Total Effect -0.07 -0.41 0.27 0.68
Prop. Mediated (control) -0.06 -4.29 4.40 0.80
Prop. Mediated (treated) -0.02 -2.68 1.85 0.91
ACME (average) 0.02 -0.01 0.08 0.27
ADE (average) -0.09 -0.43 0.24 0.57
Prop. Mediated (average) -0.04 -2.82 2.59 0.81
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=403 white respondents
B.2.7 Mediator: Felt threat scale
Table B.36: Mediation Models: Fair Point DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) 0.01 -0.11 0.14 0.94
ACME (treated) 0.24 *** 0.13 0.36 <2e-16
ADE (control) -0.03 -0.30 0.25 0.82
ADE (treated) 0.20 -0.08 0.49 0.15
Total Effect 0.21 . -0.03 0.47 0.09
Prop. Mediated (control) 0.02 -1.53 2.11 0.94
Prop. Mediated (treated) 1.08 . -4.55 9.39 0.09
ACME (average) 0.12 *** 0.05 0.22 <2e-16
ADE (average) 0.09 -0.18 0.36 0.48
Prop. Mediated (average) 0.55 . -2.25 5.62 0.09
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=402 white respondents
Table B.37: Mediation Models: Vote DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) 0.13 -0.03 0.28 0.12
ACME (treated) 0.25 *** 0.13 0.40 ¡2e-16
ADE (control) -0.13 -0.44 0.15 0.42
ADE (treated) -0.01 -0.34 0.32 0.95
Total Effect 0.12 -0.17 0.39 0.42
Prop. Mediated (control) 0.58 -7.46 7.90 0.48
Prop. Mediated (treated) 1.21 -14.34 19.00 0.42
ACME (average) 0.19 ** 0.09 0.30 0.00
ADE (average) -0.07 -0.38 0.21 0.66
Prop. Mediated (average) 0.90 -10.49 13.81 0.42
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=402 white respondents
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Table B.38: Mediation Models: Offend DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) 0.21 ** 0.08 0.37 0.00
ACME (treated) 0.00 -0.09 0.10 0.89
ADE (control) -0.12 -0.38 0.13 0.38
ADE (treated) -0.32 * -0.60 -0.06 0.02
Total Effect -0.11 -0.36 0.12 0.42
Prop. Mediated (control) -1.11 -12.90 27.07 0.41
Prop. Mediated (treated) -0.02 -2.78 3.24 0.94
ACME (average) 0.11 ** 0.02 0.20 0.01
ADE (average) -0.22 . -0.47 0.02 0.08
Prop. Mediated (average) -0.57 -6.09 13.60 0.41
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=402 white respondents
Table B.39: Mediation Models: Insensitive DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) 0.08 -0.04 0.22 0.20
ACME (treated) -0.08 . -0.19 0.01 0.08
ADE (control) 0.03 -0.23 0.29 0.82
ADE (treated) -0.13 -0.40 0.15 0.33
Total Effect -0.05 -0.30 0.17 0.64
Prop. Mediated (control) -0.33 -11.20 8.63 0.70
Prop. Mediated (treated) 0.42 -7.85 9.34 0.65
ACME (average) 0.00 -0.08 0.08 0.99
ADE (average) -0.05 -0.30 0.20 0.66
Prop. Mediated (average) 0.04 -3.05 3.78 0.97
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=402 white respondents
Table B.40: Mediation Models: Agree DV
Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
ACME (control) -0.01 -0.17 0.16 0.96
ACME (treated) 0.20 *** 0.07 0.35 <2e-16
ADE (control) -0.24 -0.62 0.10 0.18
ADE (treated) -0.04 -0.41 0.35 0.84
Total Effect -0.04 -0.37 0.30 0.80
Prop. Mediated (control) -0.01 -5.87 4.88 0.99
Prop. Mediated (treated) -0.63 -14.88 16.76 0.80
ACME (average) 0.10 . -0.01 0.21 0.07
ADE (average) -0.14 -0.49 0.21 0.41
Prop. Mediated (average) -0.32 -7.66 8.57 0.81
Note: . p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=402 white respondents
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B.3 Survey 2: Descriptive statistics
Table B.41 reports descriptive statistics for key variables in the second survey. The first set pertain
to the dependent variables (evaluations of the flyer, the explicit racial appeal) and the second set
pertain to respondents’ emotional response to the treatment that they read (i.e. control, cultural threat,
economic threat).
Table B.41: Descriptive statistics of key variables in the second survey
N Mean SD Min Max
Dependent Variables
Fair Point 1260.00 2.85 1.51 1.00 5.00
Vote 1260.00 3.07 1.73 1.00 6.00
Agree 1 1260.00 4.22 2.04 1.00 7.00
Agree 2 1260.00 4.06 1.99 1.00 7.00
Agree 3 1260.00 3.53 1.98 1.00 7.00
Reparations 1260.00 5.19 1.93 1.00 7.00
Potential Mediators
Anxiety 1260.00 2.12 1.32 1.00 5.00
Pride 1260.00 2.16 1.30 1.00 5.00
Anger 1260.00 1.83 1.19 1.00 5.00
Hope 1260.00 2.36 1.31 1.00 5.00
Worry 1260.00 2.11 1.28 1.00 5.00
Excitement 1260.00 2.00 1.25 1.00 5.00
Felt Threat Scale 1260.00 2.02 1.13 1.00 5.00
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APPENDIX C: CHAPTER FOUR APPENDIX
C.1 Models with party identification as a factor
Table C.1: Models with party identification as a factor, survey 1
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
(Intercept) 2.15∗∗∗ 2.66∗∗∗ 3.74∗∗∗ 4.06∗∗∗ 3.54∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.27) (0.22) (0.22) (0.31)
Status Allay −0.03 −0.30 −0.22 −0.15 −0.79∗
(0.31) (0.36) (0.30) (0.30) (0.43)
Status Threat −0.15 −0.61∗ 0.10 0.27 −1.28∗∗∗
(0.31) (0.36) (0.30) (0.30) (0.42)
Party ID = 2 −0.09 −0.71 −0.80∗∗ −0.16 −0.28
(0.39) (0.45) (0.38) (0.37) (0.53)
Party ID = 3 −0.02 −0.34 −0.37 0.19 −0.48
(0.41) (0.48) (0.40) (0.39) (0.56)
Party ID = 4 0.78∗∗ 0.39 −0.93∗∗∗ −0.75∗∗ 0.69
(0.31) (0.36) (0.30) (0.30) (0.42)
Party ID = 5 0.85∗ 0.68 −0.91∗∗ −0.56 0.79
(0.45) (0.53) (0.44) (0.44) (0.62)
Party ID = 6 0.55∗ 0.39 −0.89∗∗∗ −0.56∗ 0.56
(0.32) (0.37) (0.31) (0.30) (0.43)
Party ID = 7 1.48∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ −1.72∗∗∗ −1.48∗∗∗ 1.70∗∗∗
(0.31) (0.36) (0.30) (0.30) (0.42)
Status Allay * Party ID = 2 0.61 0.90 0.18 −0.42 1.16
(0.53) (0.62) (0.51) (0.51) (0.72)
Status Threat * Party ID = 2 0.80 1.33∗∗ 0.03 −0.38 1.51∗∗
(0.52) (0.61) (0.50) (0.50) (0.71)
Status Allay * Party ID = 3 0.19 0.42 0.42 0.05 0.72
(0.59) (0.69) (0.57) (0.56) (0.80)
Status Threat * Party ID = 3 0.20 0.18 −0.36 −0.58 0.92
(0.56) (0.66) (0.55) (0.54) (0.77)
Status Allay * Party ID = 4 −0.29 0.06 0.21 0.04 0.63
(0.46) (0.54) (0.45) (0.44) (0.63)
Status Threat * Party ID = 4 −0.03 0.12 −0.02 0.02 0.99
(0.48) (0.56) (0.47) (0.46) (0.65)
Status Allay * Party ID = 5 0.41 0.89 −0.69 −0.12 1.22
(0.63) (0.73) (0.61) (0.60) (0.85)
Status Threat * Party ID = 5 0.20 0.83 −0.38 −0.77 1.83∗∗
(0.59) (0.69) (0.58) (0.57) (0.81)
Status Allay * Party ID = 6 0.21 0.42 −0.04 −0.26 0.60
(0.44) (0.52) (0.43) (0.43) (0.61)
Status Threat * Party ID = 6 0.61 0.91∗ −0.69∗ −0.61 1.86∗∗∗
(0.42) (0.50) (0.41) (0.40) (0.57)
Status Allay * Party ID = 7 0.09 0.41 0.01 0.09 0.97∗
(0.42) (0.49) (0.41) (0.40) (0.57)
Status Threat * Party ID = 7 0.51 1.01∗∗ −0.09 −0.25 1.53∗∗∗
(0.41) (0.48) (0.40) (0.40) (0.56)
R2 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.23
Adj. R2 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.20
Num. obs. 636 635 635 633 634
RMSE 1.35 1.59 1.32 1.30 1.85
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table C.2: Models with party identification as a factor, survey 2
Fair Point Vote Agree 1 Agree 2 Agree 3 Rep
(Intercept) 2.35∗∗∗ 2.56∗∗∗ 2.88∗∗∗ 2.79∗∗∗ 2.97∗∗∗ 2.34∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.23) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.24)
Cultural Threat −0.48∗ −0.41 −0.27 −0.31 −0.34 0.52
(0.24) (0.28) (0.32) (0.31) (0.32) (0.29)
Economic Threat −0.26 −0.11 −0.16 −0.09 −0.20 0.18
(0.25) (0.28) (0.32) (0.31) (0.32) (0.29)
Party ID = 2 0.08 0.28 0.63 0.62 0.17 1.04∗∗
(0.29) (0.33) (0.38) (0.37) (0.38) (0.35)
Party ID = 3 −0.51 −0.58 0.06 −0.23 −0.59 0.86∗
(0.30) (0.34) (0.39) (0.38) (0.40) (0.36)
Party ID = 4 −0.02 −0.15 0.43 0.23 −0.20 1.06∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.30) (0.35) (0.34) (0.35) (0.32)
Party ID = 5 0.68∗ 0.70 0.88∗ 0.77 0.40 1.32∗∗∗
(0.33) (0.37) (0.43) (0.42) (0.43) (0.39)
Party ID = 6 0.40 0.64∗ 1.10∗∗ 1.01∗∗ 0.55 1.12∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.30) (0.35) (0.34) (0.35) (0.32)
Party ID = 7 0.94∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗ 1.20∗∗∗ 0.72∗ 0.20
(0.26) (0.30) (0.34) (0.33) (0.34) (0.31)
Ideology 0.07∗ 0.05 0.18∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.08∗ 0.53∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Cultural Threat * Party ID = 2 0.01 −0.43 −0.69 −0.90 −0.59 −0.95
(0.41) (0.47) (0.55) (0.53) (0.55) (0.49)
Economic Threat * Party ID = 2 −0.02 −0.40 −0.53 −0.79 −0.31 −0.24
(0.39) (0.44) (0.51) (0.49) (0.51) (0.46)
Cultural Threat * Party ID = 3 0.85∗ 0.58 −0.37 0.31 0.08 −0.66
(0.40) (0.46) (0.53) (0.51) (0.53) (0.48)
Economic Threat * Party ID = 3 0.13 −0.14 −0.54 −0.34 0.07 −0.14
(0.43) (0.49) (0.56) (0.54) (0.56) (0.51)
Cultural Threat * Party ID = 4 0.67 0.84∗ 0.46 0.66 0.69 −0.60
(0.37) (0.43) (0.49) (0.47) (0.49) (0.44)
Economic Threat * Party ID = 4 −0.05 0.05 0.14 0.17 0.16 −0.17
(0.37) (0.43) (0.49) (0.47) (0.49) (0.44)
Cultural Threat * Party ID = 5 0.14 0.22 0.34 0.34 −0.20 −1.01
(0.44) (0.51) (0.59) (0.57) (0.59) (0.53)
Economic Threat * Party ID = 5 −0.02 0.16 0.28 0.14 0.20 −0.84
(0.44) (0.50) (0.58) (0.56) (0.58) (0.52)
Cultural Threat * Party ID = 6 0.75∗ 0.39 0.25 0.42 0.34 −0.58
(0.36) (0.42) (0.48) (0.46) (0.48) (0.43)
Economic Threat * Party ID = 6 −0.10 −0.24 −0.17 0.34 0.09 −0.19
(0.36) (0.41) (0.47) (0.46) (0.47) (0.43)
Cultural Threat * Party ID = 7 0.31 0.56 0.64 0.53 0.82 −0.48
(0.33) (0.37) (0.43) (0.41) (0.43) (0.39)
Economic Threat * Party ID = 7 0.28 0.26 0.72 0.50 0.86∗ −0.41
(0.33) (0.38) (0.43) (0.42) (0.43) (0.39)
R2 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.13 0.27
Adj. R2 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.12 0.26
Num. obs. 1096 1096 1096 1096 1096 1096
RMSE 1.41 1.61 1.86 1.80 1.87 1.69
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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APPENDIX D: CHAPTER FIVE APPENDIX
D.1 Descriptives
First, Table D.1 reports the frequency of positive appeals, by racial group.
Next, the words identified as “implicit” references to groups captured in the current dataset are
reported. These are for those groups for whom a “negative verbal, implicit mention” was identified.
Tables D.2 through D.4 report these items for all groups for whom the negative, implicit appeal
came with a verbal mention (rather than a visual depiction), which was the vast majority of negative,
implicit appeals captured.
Table D.1: Counts of positive racial appeals in unique 2016 House advertisements, by racial group
No Positive Any Positive Implicit Explicit
Appeal Appeal Appeals Appeals
Blacks / African Americans 759 33 33 0
Latinx 763 29 21 9
Middle Easterners / Muslims 792 0 0 0
Asians 789 3 3 0
Whites 707 85 81 4
Table D.2: Text used for negative, implicit references to Blacks and African Americans
Language N
food stamps 2
President Obama’s radical agenda 2
Born in Kenya 2
food stamps 1
Obama let Syrian refugees 1
obama, breakfast in bed defense cuts, radical 1
Obama’s pass of ISIS 1
Obamacare 4





Table D.3: Text used for negative, implicit references to Latinx or Hispanics
Language N
borders 1
build the wall 1
deportee, sanctuary city, illegals, illegal immigrant 1
illegal immigrants 1
illegal immigrants, crime, deported, border, end sanctuary cities 1
illegal immigration 1
securing our border 1
amnesty 3
Amnesty 1
amnesty, illegal immigrants 1
border, end sanctuary cities 1
Build that Wall 1
build the wall 2





illegal immigration, defend our borders, foreigner 1
illegal, immigrants 1





immigration, amnesty, crossing our border 1
immigration, security 1
open borders, sanctuary cities 1
protect our borders 2
protect our borders, tough immigration reform 1
protect our homeland, secure our borders 1
secure broader 1
secure our border 2
secure our borders 3
secure the border 2
securing the border 1
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Table D.4: Text used for negative, implicit references to Muslims or Middle Easterners
Language N
isis 1
Radical Islam, ISIS, Israel 1
Radical Islamic terrorism 1
Radical Islamic Terrorism 1
terrorism, Iran 1
terrorism, securing our borders 1
terrorism 2
Iran 1
Iran the terrorist state, terrorists 1
Iran, terrorism, enemies 1
ISIS 4
ISIS, Iran 1
ISIS, Iran, terrorism 1
ISIS, terror at home and abroad, terrorism, Iran 1
ISIS, terrorism 1
Islamic Terrorists 1














First, the data collection process guidebook is presented (p. 28). Then, the codebook that students
worked from is presented (starting on p. 29).
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Data Collection: Political Advertisements 
Overview of the Collection Process  
Leah Christiani, last updated: 9/18/19 
 
You are collecting data from television advertisements aired during the 2016 House 
elections throughout the entire country! So exciting! Here’s how it will work: 
 
1. Make sure you know your assignment (from Leah) about which advertisements 
you are supposed to be collecting. There is an excel spreadsheet in the Dropbox 
folder that has these listed in case you forget.  
a. Note: you can also use this excel sheet to track the videos you code as you 
go along! Next to your name, there is a variable called: “complete.” When 
you finish coding a video, put a 1 in this column. Save this excel sheet to 
your computer so that you can keep track of your progress as you go along.  
 
2. Once you know which video you are going to collect data for, find it in the proper 
Dropbox folder. You can watch these videos, regardless of format, in the browser. 
 
3. Watch the video! 
a. If two observations have the same video but slightly different names  
(i.e. HOUSE_CO03_TIPTON_WHO_IS_GAIL and 
HOUSE_CO03_TIPTON_NRCC_WHO_IS_GAIL), fill out one entry for each. 
Indicate in the notes section that it is a duplicate and give the name of the 
other identical video.  
 
4. Then, fill out the Qualtrics form about the video. Make sure you copy the name of 
the file exactly into the second answer. You can omit the .wmv or .mov ending but 
otherwise, copy and paste it exactly as it appears as the file name (and in the excel 
sheet).  
a. Make sure you submit when you get to the final step 
b. There is a codebook you can use if you get confused about what a question 
is asking (in the Dropbox under “Documentation”) 
 
5. There is a space at the end of the Qualtrics form for writing any notes as they come 
up – but also feel free to email Leah with questions/comments/thoughts 
whenever (at christiani@unc.edu).  
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Data Collection: Political Advertisements 
Codebook  
Leah Christiani, last updated: 9/18/19 
 
You are collecting data from television advertisements aired during the 2016 House 
elections throughout the entire country! So exciting! Here’s a code book that describes the 
variables we are collecting, what they mean, and how to code them. There is also a 
running example used to help guide you through the process.  
 
Variable Description 
coder_name Question text: What is your first and last name? 
 
The name of the person who coded this particular 
advertisement 
name_ad Question text: What is the name of the advertisement? 
 
The name of the advertisement – as it appears in the file name, 
in the excel spreadsheet, and in the WMP dataset. A typical 
name would look something like:  
HOUSE_AK01_LINDBECK_BOB_HOOYMAN	
group_lang_presence Question text: Were any of the following groups mentioned, 
verbally, in the ad? Note that this mention can include 
either explicit mentions or implicit (coded) mentions. 
 
This is an indicator as to whether or not a group is talked 
about in the advertisement. Check the groups that are 
mentioned, either explicitly or implicitly. 
 
Running Example: Take for example, a presidential 
campaign advertisement that Hillary Clinton’s campaign 
ran in 2016 called “Role Models” (link here). It featured 
Donald Trump’s comment about Mexicans being rapists and 
murderers. The advertisement was criticizing Donald 
Trump’s language – but, it did feature explicit, negative 
language about Mexicans. So, here, you would indicate that 
Latinos were referenced verbally.  
 
Note that this commercial also includes references to women 
(the “blood coming out of her eyes”) and to people with 
disabilities (Trump mocking the reporter). You’d mark these 
groups and answering the following questions about them as 
well (but for the running example, we are going to stick with 
the comment about Mexicans).  
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lang_impexp Question text: Were [GROUP] as a group discussed explicitly 
or implicitly in the advertisement? 
 
Indicator as to whether the mention was explicit or implicit.  
 
Running Example: Continuing with the example from above, 
you would indicate explicit because there was an overt 
reference to identity (i.e. “Mexicans”).  
 
lang_exp_txt Question text: Write in the words used to explicitly reference 
[GROUP], separated with commas. 
 
The specific (explicit) words spoken to reference the group – 
this question only comes up if an explicit mention occurred  
 
Running Example: You would write “Mexicans” because it 
is the word that was used to overtly reference a group.  
 
lang_imp_txt Question text: Write in the words used to implicitly reference 
[GROUP], separated with commas. 
 
The specific (implicit) words spoken to reference the group – 
this question only comes up if an implicit mention occurred 
 
Running Example: You would not see this question because 
you did not select “explicit” when you indicated the type of 
reference that was made.  
 
lang_tone Question text: What was the overall tone used to discuss 
[GROUP]? 
 
This is a scale indicating the general tone that was used to 
discuss the group. Positive means that the language about the 
group was complimentary and negative means that the 
language about the group was derogatory.  
 
Running Example: This is about the actual language used – 
not whether the politician airing the advertisement is 
endorsing the language. So, in this running example, you’d 
indicate extremely negative because Mexicans are being 





lang_content_txt Question text: Specifically, what was said about [GROUP]? 
Use exact language if possible. 
 
Write exactly what was said about the group in this box.  
 
Running Example: Continuing with our example, you 
would write in the exact words that Trump said: “When 
Mexico sends its people, they’re bringing drugs. They’re 
bringing crime. They’re rapists.” 
 
The key here is that you transcribe what was said about the 
group exactly. Note that this differs slightly from Trump’s 
original quote (it crops out some language in between). 
Make sure you write out the language used in the 
advertisement word for word.  
 
lang_pol1 Question text: Who was talking about [GROUP] in this way? 
 
Here is where you get to indicate WHO talked about the 
group in this way.  
 
Running Example: In our running example, Donald Trump 
said these comments. He is Clinton’s opponent, and this is 
Clinton’s advertisement. So, you’d select: the politician’s 
opponent  
 
lang_pol2 Question text: Is the politician who is running this 
advertisement endorsing the language about [GROUP] or 
criticizing it? 
 
This is finally where you get to indicate whether the person 
running the advertisement is okay with this language, or 
whether they are trying to use it to show how bad their 
opponent is. 
 
Running Example: You would indicate that the politician 








appeal1 Question text: Overall, taking everything into consideration 
(both verbally and visually), would you say there was a 
group-based appeal about [GROUP] in this ad? 
 
Again, this is regardless of whether the politician running the 
advertisement was endorsing or criticizing the appeal. 
 
Running example: Here is your opportunity to record 
whether there appeared to be an appeal about Latinos in this 
ad (remember: regardless of Clinton’s position on it). Here, 
you would say that there was an explicit, negative appeal 
because there was language calling Mexicans rapists and 
murderers. You’ve already indicated that the politician 
running the ad was not in favor of this, so this is just about a 
holistic record that an appeal was made and presented on tv. 
  
  
Note that in our running example, you would have selected 
three groups represented verbally: Latinos, women, and 
people with disabilities. At this point, Qualtrics would 
redirect you to answer all of those questions about women. 
Then, you would finish and it would redirect you again to 
answer all of those questions about people with 
disabilities. 
 
After that is finished, you’d move on to the questions about 
who was represented visually.  
 
group_visual_presence Question text: Were any of the following groups depicted, 
visually, in the ad? 
 
This does NOT include depictions of the politician or their 
opponent.  
 
Running example: In the Clinton ad, there are a bunch of 
children represented who appear to be white, Latino, and 
black. So, you’d select those three racial groups. You’d also 
select women and men because there are both boys and girls 
represented. Qualtrics will ask all the following questions for 
each group you select.  
 
If it is just a giant crowd of people (like the crowd behind 




visual_amount Question text: How much did [GROUP] appear in the ad? 
 
Running example: Coding for the Clinton ad would start 
with whites (because Qualtrics follows the order listed). So, 
there were a couple of white children watching tv – but there 
were other kids from different racial groups too. For this one, 
you’d select whites are about evenly represented, in 
comparison to other groups.  
 
visual_tone Question text: What was the overall tone of the depiction of 
[GROUP]? Were they portrayed in a positive or negative 
light? 
 
Running example: The white children in the ad were 
depicted positively – they seemed like innocent kids. So 
you’d choose extremely positive.  
 
visual_descrip Question text: What were [GROUP] doing in the 
advertisement? 
 
Running example: They were watching her political 
opponent (Trump) on tv saying negative things about other 
people 
 
visual_speak Question text: do [GROUP] speak in the ad? 
 
Running example: the kids do not talk, they’re silently 
watching Trump on tv. So you’d select no.  
 
visual_pol Question text: Is the politician who is running this 
advertisement endorsing the depiction of [GROUP] or 
criticizing it? 
 
This is only referring to the one group and the visual 
reference you are coding at the moment. 
 
Running example: you’d select yes. Clinton is depicting these 







appeal2 Question text: Overall, taking everything into consideration 
(both verbally and visually), would you say there was a 
group-based appeal about [GROUP] in this ad? 
 
Running example: this one is a little tricky for our example. 
There is either no appeal or an implicit, positive appeal. 
However, because the point of the commercial appears to be 
Trump’s negative influence on children, I’d select no appeal. 
Clinton is not trying to appeal to white children demographic 
even though they’re represented positively.  
 
threat1 Question text: Were there any references to threats in the 
advertisement? If so, what type? 
 
Running example: Clinton is Trump’s potential election to 
office as a threat in this case… so I would select: political 
threat.  
 
threat2 Question text: If there was a threat, who appeared to pose 
the threat? 
 
If the safety threat stems from potential crime, select "threat 
of crime." 
 
If the threat stems from immigration, select the type of 
threat that immigrants are portrayed as posing (i.e. is that 
they'd commit crime? That they'd edge out others in 
jobs/hiring (economic threat)? If it is just that immigration is 
happening, without a clear message about the implications 
of this, you may consider "status threat" (i.e. they are 
entering and changing demographics of the US)).  
 
Running example: In this running example, you’d select 
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